A
Ariel J. Feldman
Researcher at University of Chicago
Publications - 15
Citations - 2638
Ariel J. Feldman is an academic researcher from University of Chicago. The author has contributed to research in topics: Encryption & Cloud computing. The author has an hindex of 9, co-authored 15 publications receiving 2470 citations. Previous affiliations of Ariel J. Feldman include Princeton University & University of Pennsylvania.
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Journal ArticleDOI
Lest we remember: cold-boot attacks on encryption keys
J. Alex Halderman,Seth D. Schoen,Nadia Heninger,William Clarkson,William Paul,Joseph A. Calandrino,Ariel J. Feldman,Jacob Appelbaum,Edward W. Felten +8 more
TL;DR: It is shown that dynamic RAM, the main memory in most modern computers, retains its contents for several seconds after power is lost, even at room temperature and even if removed from a motherboard, and this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access to a machine.
Proceedings Article
Lest we remember: cold boot attacks on encryption keys
J. Alex Halderman,Seth D. Schoen,Nadia Heninger,William Clarkson,William Paul,Joseph A. Calandrino,Ariel J. Feldman,Jacob Appelbaum,Edward W. Felten +8 more
TL;DR: In this article, cold reboots are used to find cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay, which limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
SPORC: group collaboration using untrusted cloud resources
TL;DR: SPORC is a generic framework for building a wide variety of collaborative applications with untrusted servers that illustrates the complementary benefits of operational transformation (OT) and fork* consistency and can automatically recover from malicious forks.
Proceedings Article
Security analysis of the diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine
TL;DR: This paper presents a fully independent security study of a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine, including its hardware and software, obtained from a private party, which shows that it is vulnerable to extremely serious attacks.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Verifying computations with state
Benjamin Braun,Ariel J. Feldman,Zuocheng Ren,Srinath Setty,Andrew J. Blumberg,Michael Walfish +5 more
TL;DR: Prestry as mentioned in this paper is a built system for proof-based verifiable computation with untrusted storage, where the client expresses its computation in terms of digests that attest to state, and verifiably outsources that computation.