Combating militant violence - particularly within South Asia and the Middle East - stands at the top of the international security agenda. Much of the policy literature focuses on poverty as a root cause of support for violent political groups and on economic development as a key to addressing the challenges of militancy and terrorism. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to support this contention, particularly in the case of Islamist militant organizations. To address this gap we conducted a 6000-person, nationally representative survey of Pakistanis that measures affect towards four important militant organizations. We apply a novel measurement strategy to mitigate item nonresponse, which plagued previous surveys due to the sensitive nature of militancy. Our study reveals three key patterns. First, Pakistanis exhibit negative affect toward all four militant organizations, with those from areas where groups have conducted the most attacks disliking them the most. Second, contrary to conventional expectations poor Pakistanis dislike militant groups more than middle-class citizens. Third, this dislike is strongest among poor urban residents, suggesting that the negative relationship stems from exposure to the externalities of terrorist attacks. Longstanding arguments tying support for violent political organizations to individuals’ economic prospects - and the subsequent policy recommendations - may require substantial revision.

Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan

Policy debates on strategies to end extremist violence frequently cite poverty as a root cause of support for the perpetrating groups. There is little evidence to support this contention, particularly in the Pakistani case. Pakistan’s urban poor are more exposed to the negative externalities of militant violence and may in fact be less supportive of the groups. To test these hypotheses we conducted a 6,000-person, nationally representative survey of Pakistanis that measured affect toward four militant organizations. By applying a novel measurement strategy, we mitigate the item nonresponse and social desirability biases that plagued previous studies due to the sensitive nature of militancy. Contrary to expectations, poor Pakistanis dislikemilitantsmorethanmiddle-classcitizens.Thisdislikeisstrongestamongtheurbanpoor,particularlythoseinviolent districts, suggesting that exposure to terrorist attacks reduces support for militants. Long-standing arguments tying support for violent organizations to income may require substantial revision.

/pdf/poverty-and-support-for-militant-politics-evidence-from-25fe7kv7is.pdf

A central question in civil war research is how state sponsorship, overseas funding, involvement in illicit economics, and access to lootable resources affect the behavior and organization of insurgent groups. Existing research has not arrived at any consensus, as resource wealth is portrayed as a cause of both undisciplined predation and military resilience. A social-institutional theory explains why similar resource wealth can be associated with such different outcomes. The theory argues that the social networks on which insurgent groups are built create different types of organizations with differing abilities to control resource flows. There is no single effect of resource wealth: instead, social and organizational context determines how these groups use available resources. A detailed comparative study of armed groups in the insurgency in Kashmir supports this argument. A number of indigenous Kashmiri insurgent organizations received substantial funding, training, and support from Pakistan from 1988 ...

/pdf/organizing-insurgency-networks-resources-and-rebellion-in-1kpmu6q46f.pdf

Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia

Little existing work has systematically examined the factors that help terrorist groups survive or contribute to their failure. State support for terrorist groups is commonly thought to be a factor that helps groups to survive. I demonstrate with newly collected data that state sponsorship is not always helpful to terrorist groups. The resources provided by sponsors increase a group's ability to maintain itself internally. However, when a group has a sponsor that provides it with safe haven, the risk of the group being forcefully eliminated by the target increases. I argue that sponsors that provide safe haven can have incentives to provide information to the target about the groups to avoid potential costs from target military operations within their territory. The key empirical findings suggest that state sponsorship is a less serious problem for target states than many previously thought.

/pdf/a-blessing-or-a-curse-state-support-for-terrorist-groups-53nl5b55ur.pdf

A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups

In a groundbreaking study of China’s ties with Pakistan, Andrew Small (Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the USA) provides an invaluable addition to advancing our knowledge of this relationship in this timely and informative book. The Epilogue in the updated edition covers developments over the last year, which Small sees as the “ChinaPak Axis stepping out of the shadows further and faster than anyone had expected”.

Arif Jamal

Papers

Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir