Primarily due to environmental concerns and legislative mandates, the disposition of end-of-life (EOL) electronics products has attracted much attention. Advanced recycling fees (ARFs) and government subsidies may play important roles in encouraging or curtailing the flows of recycled items. We present a Stackelberg-type model to determine ARFs and socially optimal subsidy fees in decentralized reverse supply chains where each entity independently acts according to its own interests. The model consists of one leader (the government) and two followers (a group of manufacturers, importers, and sellers (MISs) and a group of recyclers). To maximize social welfare, the government determines the ARFs paid by MIS and the subsidy fees for recyclers when MIS sells new products and recyclers process EOL products. We find that MIS and recyclers behave at the equilibrium status by choosing optimal selling quantity in the market and optimal reward money for customers bringing EOL products to recyclers. Under this approach the two fees achieve the maximum of social welfare at the equilibrium status, while both MIS and recyclers gain the maximum of profits. For comparative purposes, we also develop a conceptual model describing the current practice by which ARFs and the subsidy fees are determined on the basis of fund balance between revenues and costs along with recycling operations. We conclude that our results outperform current practice.

Determining advanced recycling fees and subsidies in “e-scrap” revere supply chains

Abstract Electronic waste is the fastest-growing domestic waste stream globally, continuously outstripping projections. With increasing ubiquity of complex computing, many non-renewables are contained in end-of-life electronics, creating a vast urban mine, potentially hazardous, depending on treatment. The aim of this study is to compare how Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) policy is applied in two case countries, Japan and Canada, the practical implications of EPR policy design on producer operations, and how EPR affects electronic waste management improvements in each case. These cases share international obligations for electronic waste management but employ contrasting EPR policies. These policies are widespread in both cases, yet are not presided over by larger, regional obligations. Therefore, country-level interviews with electronic waste management stakeholders focusing on how EPR regulation affects producer practice were conducted. The physical application of EPR, as seen in Japan, drives design changes by producers intending to simplify downstream treatment, while financial responsibility in Canada, creates greater concern with cost-savings for producers, complicating end-of-life processing. EPR implementation, along with specific geographical factors, also create contrasting resource recovery results between countries. Regulation primarily drives EPR implementation in both countries, which is consistent with the literature. This study presents new drivers and barriers, namely pre-emptive legislation, and no incentive to improve, classifying the Japanese and Canadian systems as suffering from externalities on an insular system, and lack of harmonization, respectively. This research addresses a gap in comparative studies across regions of physical and financial EPR effects on producer practice. 

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Extended producer responsibility’s effect on producers’ electronic waste management practices in Japan and Canada: drivers, barriers, and potential of the urban mine

Salah satu tingkat kerumitan pelayanan dalam pengangkutan sampah adalah dalam pemilahan sampah, khususnya sampah B3 Rumah tangga, termasuk di dalamnya sampah elektronik (e-waste). Perusahaan Daerah (PD) Kebersihan, selaku operator pengelolaan layanan sampah akan melakukan upaya maksimal dalam pengelolaan sampah elektronik. Salah satunya adalah dalam melakukan penyediaan titik-titik drop off sampah elektronik serta penjemputan sampah elektronik untuk masyarakat. Namun gagasan tersebut harus dibantu oleh teknologi dalam bentuk aplikasi yang dapat digunakan oleh masyarakat luas. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk meningkatkan praktik dan kebijakan pengelolaan sampah elektronik di Indonesia, khususnya di Kota Bandung; didukung dengan sistem dan aplikasi mobile Pengelolaan Sampah Elektronik yang dikembangkan dan diterapkan. Pada penelitian telah dilakukan kajian yang komprehensif terkait pengenalan persoalan dan solusi pengangkutan sampah serta memahami dan menentukan konteks pengguna, dituangkan dalam bentuk model. Kebutuhan pengguna, solusi perancangan telah dikonstruksi menjadi prototype awal aplikasi pengangkutan sampah. Diperlukan uji coba dan sosialisasi aplikasi layanan pengangkutan sampah disertai dengan evaluasi perancangan terhadap kebutuhan pengguna.  Untuk selanjutnya, dilakukan penerapan aplikasi layanan pengangkutan sampah elektronik untuk pilot area di Kota Bandung. Diperlukan penguatan solusi dari perspektif bisnis, agar rencana aksi memulai bisnis hijau di Bandung. Indonesia, dapat segera terwujud.

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Studi Banding dan Pengembangan Aplikasi Mobile Manajemen E-Waste untuk Rencana Aksi Bisnis Hijau Kota Bandung

Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is a legislative mandate that requires a producer to be accountable for the whole life cycle of its product—from product design to final disposal. The EPR system is imposed to solve the problem of the growing e-waste in different areas of the world. Different countries have different system designs and approaches in EPR, depending on the country’s legislation, customer demand, incentives, and resources; it can either be a physical responsibility or a financial responsibility. Physical responsibility is when the producers are responsible for the physical movements of the e-wastes necessary, while financial responsibility is when the producers are financially supporting all the costs needed to successfully fulfil the EPR goals. In this study, we will determine which type of EPR system is better by doing a comparison on its social welfare value using a social welfare model. This study uses a notebook computer as an example, and based on our analysis, we conclude that the physical responsibility is better if and only if the rate of return of e-waste is equal to or greater than a certain percentage. Otherwise, the financial responsibility model outperforms the physical responsibility model. A sensitivity analysis is also carried for each parameter used in the two models for determining the significance.

Athena Rhae Bisnar

Papers

Physical Responsibility Versus Financial Responsibility of Producers for E-Wastes