Chapter 1: The functional source of innovation general patterns economic explanation shifting and predicting the sources of innovation innovation as a distributed process. Chapter 2: Users as innovators. Chapter 3: Variations in the functional source of innovation. Chapter 4: Why does the functional source of innovation vary? How do innovators benefit from innovations? Do benefit expectations differ? Chapter 5: The hypothesis in testable form methods five empirical studies discussion. Chapter 6: Shifting the functional source of innovation. Chapter 7: Root of the problem: market research constrained by user experience Lead users as a solution testing the method discussion. Chapter 8: Innovation cooperation between competing firms applications for innovation management.

The sources of innovation

This survey reviews the growing use of patent data in economic analysis. After describing some of the main characteristics of patents and patent data, it focuses on the use of patents as an indicator of technological change. Cross-sectional and time-series studies of the relationship of patents to R&D expenditures are reviewed, as well as scattered estimates of the distribution of patent values and the value of patent rights, the latter being based on recent analyses of European patent renewal data. Time-series trends of patents granted in the U.S. are examined and their decline in the 1970s is found to be an artifact of the budget stringencies at the Patent Office. The longer run downward trend in patents per R&D dollar is interpreted not as an indication of diminishing returns but rather as a reflection of the changing meaning of such data over time. The conclusion is reached that, in spite of many difficulties and reservations, patent data remain a unique resource for the study of technical change.

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Patent Statistics as Economic Indicators: A Survey

To HAVE the incentive to undertake research and development, a firm must be able to appropriate returns sufficient to make the investment worthwhile. The benefits consumers derive from an innovation, however, are increased if competitors can imitate and improve on the innovation to ensure its availability on favorable terms. Patent law seeks to resolve this tension between incentives for innovation and widespread diffusion of benefits. A patent confers, in theory, perfect appropriability (monopoly of the invention) for a limited time in return for a public

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Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development

We examine the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation. Recent survey evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents to appropriate returns to R&D. Yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically since the mid1980s. We explore this apparent paradox by conducting interviews with industry representatives and analyzing the patenting behavior of 95 U.S. semiconductor firms during 1979‐1995. The results suggest that the 1980s strengthening of U.S. patent rights spawned ‘‘patent portfolio races’’ among capital-intensive firms, but it also facilitated entry by specialized design firms.

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The patent paradox revisited: an empirical study of patenting in the U.S. semiconductor industry, 1979-1995

Currently two models of innovation are prevalent in organization science. The "private investment" model assumes returns to the innovator results from private goods and efficient regimes of intellectual property protection. The "collective action" model assumes that under conditions of market failure, innovators collaborate in order to produce a public good. The phenomenon of open source software development shows that users program to solve their own as well as shared technical problems, and freely reveal their innovations without appropriating private returns from selling the software. In this paper we propose that open source software development is an exemplar of a compound model of innovation that contains elements of both the private investment and the collective action models. We describe a new set of research questions this model raises for scholars in organization science. We offer some details regarding the types of data available for open source projects in order to ease access for researchers who are unfamiliar with these, and also offer some advice on conducting empirical studies on open source software development processes.

Aubrey Silberston

Papers

The economic impact of the patent system : a study of the British experience