THE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS. By Oscar Kempthorne. New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1952. 631 pp. $8.50. This book by a teacher of statistics (as well as a consultant for \"experimenters\") is a comprehensive study of the philosophical background for the statistical design of experiment. It is necessary to have some facility with algebraic notation and manipulation to be able to use the volume intelligently. The problems are presented from the theoretical point of view, without such practical examples as would be helpful for those not acquainted with mathematics. The mathematical justification for the techniques is given. As a somewhat advanced treatment of the design and analysis of experiments, this volume will be interesting and helpful for many who approach statistics theoretically as well as practically. With emphasis on the \"why,\" and with description given broadly, the author relates the subject matter to the general theory of statistics and to the general problem of experimental inference. MARGARET J. ROBERTSON

The Design and Analysis of Experiments

International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors 2003の要求清浄度について － シリコンウエハ表面と雰囲気環境に要求される清浄度, 分析方法の現状について －

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Learning To Teach In Higher Education

by J. Biggs and C. Tang, Maidenhead, England,
Open University Press, 2007, 360 pp., £29.99, ISBN-13: 978-0-335-22126-4

Teaching for quality learning at university

The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly spreading, reaching a multitude of different domains, including personal health care, environmental monitoring, home automation, smart mobility, and Industry 4.0. As a consequence, more and more IoT devices are being deployed in a variety of public and private environments, progressively becoming common objects of everyday life. It is hence apparent that, in such a scenario, cybersecurity becomes critical to avoid threats like leakage of sensible information, denial of service (DoS) attacks, unauthorized network access, and so on. Unfortunately, many low-end IoT commercial products do not usually support strong security mechanisms, and can hence be target of—or even means for—a number of security attacks. The aim of this article is to provide a broad overview of the security risks in the IoT sector and to discuss some possible counteractions. To this end, after a general introduction to security in the IoT domain, we discuss the specific security mechanisms adopted by the most popular IoT communication protocols. Then, we report and analyze some of the attacks against real IoT devices reported in the literature, in order to point out the current security weaknesses of commercial IoT solutions and remark the importance of considering security as an integral part in the design of IoT systems. We conclude this article with a reasoned comparison of the considered IoT technologies with respect to a set of qualifying security attributes, namely integrity, anonymity, confidentiality, privacy, access control, authentication, authorization, resilience, self organization.

IoT: Internet of Threats? A Survey of Practical Security Vulnerabilities in Real IoT Devices

The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of numerous inter-connected resource-constrained devices such as sensors nodes and actuators, which are linked to the Internet. By 2020 it is anticipated that the IoT paradigm will include approximately 20 billion connected devices. The interconnection of such devices provides the ability to collect a huge amount of data for processing and analysis. A significant portion of the transacted data between IoT devices is private information, which must not in any way be eavesdropped on or tampered with. Security in IoT devices is therefore of paramount importance for further development of the technology. Such devices typically have limited area and energy resources, which makes the use of classic cryptography prohibitively expensive. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a class of novel hardware security primitives that promise a paradigm shift in many security applications; their relatively simple architecture can answer many of the security challenges of energy-constrained IoT devices. In this paper, we discuss the design challenges of secure IoT systems; then we explain the principles of PUFs; finally we discuss the outstanding reliability and security problems of PUF technology and outline the open research questions in this field.

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Overview of PUF-based hardware security solutions for the internet of things

Conventional cryptographic solutions to the security are expensive in terms of computing resources (memory and processing capacity) and power consumption. They are not suitable for the Internet of Things devices that have constrained resources. In this regard, physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have become an increasingly popular technology for building secure authentication in these systems. In this paper, we propose lightweight PUF-based authentication protocol. This was implemented on a wireless sensor network constructed using the resource-limited IoT devices: Zolertia Zoul re-mote. The functionality of the proposed scheme was verified using a server-client configuration. Then power consumption and memory utilisation of the proposed protocol were estimated and compared with the existing solutions, namely: DTLS (datagram transport layer security) handshake protocol and UDP (user datagram protocol). Our results indicate that the proposed PUF based authentication saves up to 45% power and uses 12% less memory compared to DTLS handshake authentication.

Lightweight PUF-Based Authentication Protocol for IoT Devices

A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a promising technology towards comprehensive security protection for integrated circuit applications It provides a secure method of hardware identification and authentication by exploiting inherent manufacturing process variations to generate a unique response for each device Subthreshold Current Array PUFs, which are based on the non-linearity of currents and voltages in MOSFETs in the subthreshold region, provide higher security against machine learning-based attacks compared with delay-based PUFs However, their implementation is not practical due to the low output voltages generated from transistor arrays In this paper, a novel architecture for a PUF, called the “Two Chooses One” PUF or TCO-PUF, is proposed to improve the output voltage ranges The proposed PUF shows excellent quality metrics The average inter-chip Hamming distance is 5023% The reliability over the temperature and ±10% supply voltage fluctuations is 9158% In terms of security, on average TCO-PUF shows higher security compared to delay-based PUFs and existing designs of Subthreshold Current Array PUFs against machine learning attacks

TCO-PUF: A subthreshold physical unclonable function

The continuous rise of static power consumption in modern CMOS technologies has led to the creation of a novel class of security attacks on cryptographic systems. The latter exploits the correlation between leakage current and the input patterns to infer the secret key; it is called leakage power analysis (LPA). The use power-balanced (m-of-n) logic is a promising solution that provides an answer to this problem, such circuits are designed to consume constant amount of power regardless of data being processed. This work evaluates the security of cryptographic circuits designed with this technology against the newly developed LPA. Two forms of LPA are investigated, one is based on differential power analysis (LDPA) and the other based on Hamming weight analysis (LHPA). Simulations performed at 90nm CMOS technology reveal that (m-of-n) circuits are totally resilient to LHPA and have a higher security level against LDPA than standard logic circuits.

Power balanced circuits for leakage-power-attacks resilient design

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) exploit the intrinsic manufacturing process variations to generate a unique signature for each silicon chip; this technology allows building lightweight cryptographic primitive suitable for resource-constrained devices. However, the vast majority of existing PUF design is susceptible to modeling attacks using machine learning technique, this means it is possible for an adversary to build a mathematical clone of the PUF that have the same challenge/response behavior of the device. Existing approaches to solve this problem include the use of hash functions, which can be prohibitively expensive and render PUF technology as the suitable candidate for lightweight security. This work presents a challenge permutation and substitution techniques which are both area and energy efficient. We implemented two examples of the proposed solution in 65-nm CMOS technology, the first using a delay-based structure design (an Arbiter-PUF), and the second using sub-threshold current design (two-choose-one PUF or TCO-PUF). The resiliency of both architectures against modeling attacks is tested using an artificial neural network machine learning algorithm. The experiment results show that it is possible to reduce the predictability of PUFs to less than 70% and a fractional area and power costs compared to existing hash function approaches.

Basel Halak

Papers

Overview of PUF-based hardware security solutions for the internet of things

Lightweight PUF-Based Authentication Protocol for IoT Devices

TCO-PUF: A subthreshold physical unclonable function

Power balanced circuits for leakage-power-attacks resilient design

Cost-efficient design for modeling attacks resistant PUFs