Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems.

The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1, Reason and the Rationalization of Society

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https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fjors.1974.92.pdf

The Nature of Managerial Work

Norms in human societies are expectations of behaviours of the individuals. In human societies, there are several types of norms such as moral norms, social norms and legal norms (laws). In multi-agent systems, software agents are modelled as possessing characteristics and behaviour borrowed from human societies. In order to design and develop robust artificial agent societies, it is important to understand different approaches proposed by researchers by which norms can spread and emerge within agent societies. This paper makes three contributions to the study of norms. Firstly, based on the simulation research on norms, we propose a life-cycle model for norms. Secondly, we discuss different mechanisms used by researchers to study norm creation, identification, spreading, enforcement and emergence. We also discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each of these mechanisms. Thirdly, in the context of identifying the desired characteristics of the simulation models of norms we discuss the research issues that need to be addressed.

/pdf/norm-creation-spreading-and-emergence-a-survey-of-simulation-1uvpfc400i.pdf

Norm creation, spreading and emergence: A survey of simulation models of norms in multi-agent systems

In this paper we propose a mechanism for norm emergence based on role models. The mechanism uses the concept of normative advice whereby the role models provide advice to the follower agents. Our mechanism is built using two layers of networks, the social link layer and the leadership layer. The social link network represents how agents are connected to each other. The leadership network represents the network that is formed based on the role played by each agent on the social link network. The two kinds of roles are leaders and followers. We present our findings on how norms emerge on the leadership network when the topology of the social link network changes. The three kinds of social link networks that we have experimented with are fully connected networks, random networks and scale-free networks.

/pdf/role-model-based-mechanism-for-norm-emergence-in-artificial-48d02klbgj.pdf

Role model based mechanism for norm emergence in artificial agent societies

The advent of virtual environments such as SecondLife call for a distributed approach for norm emergence and spreading. In open virtual environments, monitoring various interacting agents (avatars), using a centralized authority might be computationally expensive. The number of possible states and actions of an agent could be huge. An approach for sustaining order and smoother functioning of these environments can be facilitated through norms. Agents can generate norms based on interactions. In particular, those social norms that incur certain cost to an individual agent but benefit the whole society are more interesting than those benefit both the agent and the society. The problem is that the selfish agents might not be willing to share the norm adherence cost. In this work, we experiment with notion proposed by Axelrod that social norms are best at preventing small defections where the cost of enforcement is low. We also study how common knowledge can be used to faciliate the overall benefit of the society. We believe our work can be used to facilitate norm emergence in virtual online societies.

Social norm emergence in virtual agent societies

Most works on norms have investigated how norms are regulated using institutional mechanisms. Very few works have focused on how an agent may infer the norms of a society without the norm being explicitly given to the agent. This paper describes a mechanism for identifying one type of norm, an obligation norm. The Obligation Norm Inference (ONI) algorithm described in this paper makes use of an association rule mining approach to identify obligation norms. Using agent based simulation of a virtual restaurant we demonstrate how an agent can identify the tipping norm. The experiments that we have conducted demonstrate that an agent in the system is able to add, remove and modify norms dynamically. An agent can also flexibly modify the parameters of the system based on whether it is successful in identifying a norm.

Obligation Norm Identification in Agent Societies

Information extraction is the task of extracting relevant information from unstructured data. This paper aims to 'mine' (or extract) crime information from online newspaper articles and make this information available to the public. Baring few, many countries that possess this information do not make them available to their citizens. So, this paper focuses on automatic extraction of public yet 'hidden' information available in newspaper articles and make it available to the general public. In order to demonstrate the feasibility of such an approach, this paper focuses on one type of crime, the theft crime. This work demonstrates how theft-related information can be extracted from newspaper articles from three different countries. The system employs Named Entity Recognition (NER) algorithms to identify locations in sentences. However, not all the locations reported in the article are crime locations. So, it employs Conditional Random Field (CRF), a machine learning approach to classify whether a sentence in an article is a crime location sentence or not. This work compares the performance of four different NERs in the context of identifying locations and their subsequent impact in classifying a sentence as a 'crime location' sentence. It investigates whether a CRF-based classifier model that is trained to identify crime locations from a set of articles can be used to identify articles from another newspaper in the same country (New Zealand). Also, it compares the accuracy of identifying crime location sentences using the developed model in newspapers from two other countries (Australia and India).

Bastin Tony Roy Savarimuthu

Papers

Norm creation, spreading and emergence: A survey of simulation models of norms in multi-agent systems

Role model based mechanism for norm emergence in artificial agent societies

Social norm emergence in virtual agent societies

Obligation Norm Identification in Agent Societies

Extracting crime information from online newspaper articles