Introduction 1. Natural law in historical context 2. A novel doctrine of the sources of law: nature and the classics 3. Proving natural law: the influence of classical rhetoric on Grotius' method 4. Social instinct or self-preservation? 5. Justice for the state of nature: from Aristotle to the Corpus Iuris 6. Grotius' concept of the state of nature 7. Natural rights: Roman remedies in the state of nature 8. Natural rights and just wars 9. Enforcing natural law: the right to punish Epilogue Bibliography Index.

Roman Law in the State of Nature : The Classical Foundations of Hugo Grotius' Natural Law

For many years, philosophers and other scholars have commented on the remarkable similarity between Spinoza and the Stoics, with some even going so far as to speak of 'Spinoza the Stoic'. Until now, however, no one has systematically examined the relationship between the two systems. In Spinoza and the Stoics Jon Miller takes on this task, showing how key elements of Spinoza's metaphysics, epistemology, philosophical psychology, and ethics relate to their Stoic counterparts. Drawing on a wide range of secondary literature including the most up-to-date scholarship and a close examination of the textual evidence, Jon Miller not only reveals the sense in which Spinoza was, and was not, a Stoic, but also offers new insights into how each system should be understood in itself. His book will be of great interest to scholars and students of ancient philosophy, early modern philosophy, Spinoza, and the philosophy of the Stoics.

Spinoza and the Stoics

This paper argues that Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a major protagonist in the history of individual natural rights, developed his highly influential rights doctrine by reference to ancient Roman legal remedies and Cicero's moral philosophy. The paper thus puts forward a fresh account of the historical background of modern thinking on rights, one that runs counter to the traditional liberal historical account, epitomized by Benjamin Constant, according to which modern liberty is distinct from ancient liberty precisely on account of the alleged lack of a concept of individual rights in classical antiquity. It is argued that Grotius, a humanist steeped in Roman law, had substantive reasons for using his Roman sources. Roman law had already developed a doctrine of the freedom of the high seas, based on the idea of the sea as having remained in a natural state. Furthermore, Roman law and Cicero's ethics provided a fair amount of commerce driven remedies in contract law, which were part of the so-called law of peoples (ius gentium), a body of law initially created to accommodate foreigners, especially merchants, and give them standing in Roman courts. Although this paper's focus is not on the Roman texts themselves, but on the use Grotius made of them in some of his early works, the paper does entail the claim that those texts contain a concept of subjective rights. Moreover, it is suggested that the paper's historical account can contribute not only to a better doctrinal understanding of Grotius' rights doctrine, but also to a better understanding of modern liberal doctrines of rights.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID946160_code712102.pdf?abstractid=946160&mirid=5

Is Modern Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius' Early Works on Natural Law

The Dutch humanist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) is widely acknowledged to have made important contributions to an influential doctrine of individual natural rights. In this article I argue that Grotius developed his rights doctrine primarily out of normative Roman sources, that is to say Roman law and ethics. If this Roman tradition has been as central to Grotius's influential writing on natural rights as I claim, why has it not received more scholarly attention? The reasons lie in the view that while rights are constitutive of modern liberty, they were unknown in classical antiquity.

Is Modern Liberty Ancient? Roman Remedies and Natural Rights in Hugo Grotius's Early Works on Natural Law

The standard account has it that Hugo Grotius secularised international law by grounding it on human nature. This chapter argues we should not stop at the standard account, but rather should dig deeper and examine the theological anthropology grounding Grotius’ ideas on the law of nature and nations. With some attention for the influence of both (neo-)scepticism and (neo)stoicism in analyses of Grotius’ understanding of human nature and natural law, this chapter examines Grotius’ ideas through the lens of the Christian theological notion of imago Dei – the idea that human beings are different from other animals in that they are created in ‘the image and likeness of God’. The chapter relates the concept of the imago Dei briefly to the early seventeenth-century theological and political debates in the Dutch Republic and discusses the Arminian interpretation of the imago Dei along the lines of three dimensions generally set apart: ontological, teleological (the telos being to reach God, also through others in society), and functional (linked to the function of dominium). This chapter argues that the Arminian imago Dei anthropology is foundational to Grotius’ theory of the law of nature and nations in (at least) three ways along the lines of these three dimensions. The chapter concludes with a few remarks on how a post-skeptical reading of Grotius, through the lens of his imago Dei anthropology, is relevant for the future of international law thinking.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2665553_code1636539.pdf?abstractid=2665553&mirid=1

Benajamin Straumann

Papers

Oikeiosis and appetitus societatis