In recent years, the study of discourse has grown dramatically in anthropology and linguistics, generating a plethora of terms, concepts, and issues. A wide array of disciplinary orientations lies behind labels such as "text," "textuality," "discourse," "rhetoric," "narrative," and "poetic" (198). Here I focus on a limited range of issues in the organization and interpretation of text, working primarily with selected linguistic (34, 36, 54, 92, 118, 202), anthropological (17-20, 63a, 182, 188, 211), sociological (39, 76, 89, 90, 134), and critical (48, 73, 111, 123, 155, 161, 162, 205, 206) approaches. General overviews of these approaches, or collections of articles representative of them, can be found in the works just cited. Although research on text unavoidably touches on literacy and writing (38), language acquisition, education, and socialization (47, 89, 90, 153, 165), and political discourse and dispute (23, 29, 30), I do not address these topics directly in the following discussion. Rather, I concentrate on the status of text as sociocultural product and process, voicing in text, elements of textual organization, the relation of text to power in social contexts, some recent ethnographic studies of text, and certain further implications of this literature for social science. It is helpful by way of introduction to consider the relation between the two terms conjoined in the title. When used as a mass noun, as in "text is composed of interconnected sentences," text can be taken (heuristically) to designate any configuration of signs that is coherently interpretable by some community of users. As vague as such a definition is, already it commits us to a certain line of inquiry. The term "sign" raises issues of textual typology [iconic, indexical, and symbolic (59, 157, 170); dense, replete (77, 155)],

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Text and textuality

Proteus in Quotation-Land: Mimesis and the Forms of Reported Discourse

The article presents a model-oriented approach to how third-person narratives are read. Building on Minsky's (1979 [1975]) theory of frames, Jackendoff's (1983; 1987) concept of preference rules, Perry's (1979) theory of literary dynamics, and Sternberg's (1982b) Proteus Principle, its main aim is to conceptualize third-person narrative situations (Stanzel 1984) in terms of cognitive models, and to explore the mechanics of top-down/bottom-up hermeneutic processes. Avoiding classical "low-structuralist" narratology with its "normal case" approach, the essay also proposes new ways of analyzing protean phenomena like description, free indirect discourse, and parenthetical discourse. It presents an integrative account of primacy/recency conflicts and sketches the possible direction of a genuinely readingoriented narratology. A Frame-Based Conceptualization of Third-Person Narrative Situations The termframe, either in its usual meaning of context, pattern or scheme, or in a variety of stipulative meanings is currently popular in a number of different disciplines-in literary theory alone, recent reference works list more than ten different uses.' In the present context, a frame will be The author wants to thank Helmut Bonheim, Monika Fludernik, Robert F. Kemp, Delphine Lettau, and Ansgar Niinning for commenting on various preliminary versions of this article. 1. See Prince 1987, Wales 1991, and Hawthorne 1992 under "frame" for a cumulative general survey. The possible impact of cognitive, empirical, and artificial intelligence issues on literary theory is also discussed in van Dijk and Kintsch 1983; Hrushovski 1982 and 1984; Poetics Today 18: 4 (Winter 1997). Copyright ? 1997 by The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.70 on Tue, 06 Sep 2016 05:10:32 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 442 Poetics Today 18:4 understood, as in Perry 1979, to denote the cognitive model that is selected and used (and sometimes discarded) in the process of reading a narrative text. According to Perry, a frame stores and structures the answers to questions like "What is happening? What is the state of affairs? What is the situation? Where is this happening? What are the motives? What is the purpose? What is the speaker's position?" (Perry 1979: 43). But while in Perry the term remains largely an undefined primitive, a more explicit theory of frames has been available from artificial intelligence research since about 1975. The following introductory passage from Marvin Minsky's influential exposition presents a useful working definition: (1) Here is the essence of frame theory: When one encounters a new situation (or makes a substantial change in one's view of a problem), one selects from memory a structure called a frame. This is a remembered framework to be adapted to fit reality by changing details as necessary. We can think of a frame as a network of nodes and relations. The "top levels" of a frame are fixed, and represent things that are always true about the supposed situation. The lower levels have many terminals-"slots" that must be filled by specific instances or data. Each terminal can specify conditions its assignments must meet. (The assignments themselves are usually smaller "sub-frames.") . . . Much of the phenomenological power of the theory hinges on the inclusion of expectations and other kinds of presumptions. A frame's terminals are normally already filled with "default" assignments. (1979 [1975]: 1-2) To illustrate the uses of frame theory as a general theory of cognition and knowledge, Minsky discusses cases of visual perception such as seeing a room, the semantic processing of ungrammatical sentences, and the understanding of stories and various social scenarios. Given the wide scope of frame theory, a frame conceptualization of Franz K. Stanzel's (1984) concept of narrative situations clearly falls within its range of possible applications. Although primarily conceived as tools of narratological taxonomy, the narrative situations emphasize pragmatic and cognitive detail. Part of their integrative power derives from Stanzel's decision to describe "ideal types," a notion that corresponds closely to the frame-theoretical "defaults." Despite such promising points of contact, however, a frame-oriented conceptualization of narrative situations Halasz 1987; Harker 1989; Ibsch 1990; Ryan 1991; Weber 1992; Gerrig 1993; Andringa and Davis 1994; Cook 1994; Duchan et al. 1995; as well as in several articles in New Literary History 20:2 (1989) and Poetics 19:1 (1990). Readers may also want to refer to the forthcoming papers of the 1995 Utrecht conference, Narrative Perspective: Cognition and Emotion, edited by Will van Peer and Seymour Chatman. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.70 on Tue, 06 Sep 2016 05:10:32 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Jahn ? Toward a Cognitive Narratology 443 is not immediately obvious. Certainly, Stanzel's own design of a "typological circle," despite achieving an impressive featural synthesis (Cohn 1981: 159), cannot satisfactorily represent the complex dependencies, intricate hierarchies, correlations, and restrictions pertaining to person, mediacy, perspective, and narrative mode that are usually apparent in any discursive account of the narrative situations. It would seem possible, however, to enlarge on Mieke Bal's (1981) proposal that the formula X relates that r sees that Z does constitutes a miniature general model of narrative situation. In Bal's formula, X is a narrator, Y a focalizer, and Z one or several actors. According to Bal, if the narrator is a focalizer and also one of the actors, the narrative situation corresponds to homodiegetic (first-person) fictional "autobiography." But if the narrator does not take part in the action, the narrative situation is a heterodiegetic, "realist" (ibid.: 45) one, which is more or less the extent of Bal's utilization of the formula. In later elaborations of the various narrator-focalizer relations (Bal 1985: 120), she resorts to a different type of formalization that is less germane to my present purpose. Marrying Stanzel's narrative situations to Bal's formula requires some adjustments in the latter. First, I will extend the formula to include a "receiver" (R) to represent the narratee, that is, the narrator's fictional immediate addressee. Thus X tells R that sees that Z does conveniently installs the text-internal pragmatic dimension and provides a possible projection of text-external pragmatics. Second, Bal's focalizer will be understood to be a reflector in Stanzel's sense, in other words, a characterial center of consciousness (I will make no use here of "external" or narrator-focalizers). Third, two cases will be separated out, one without a reflector-X tells R that Z does-and one with a covert or withdrawn narrator(X tells R that) sees Z does. These two cases correspond to Stanzel's authorial and figural narrative situations, respectively. The structural trees shown below (representing the basic syntactic relations of the respective formulas) can now serve as intuitive frame visualizations of the three major third-person narrative situations.2 In (2), the rounded squares denote the extent of narratorial control, the ellipses or "spotlights of consciousness" (Stanzel 1984: 155) indicate reflectorial seeing, the "clipboard" icons represent sets of conditions, and the small black boxes under the clipboards represent the terminal slots that hold the various agents-narrators, narratees, reflectors, and actors. Despite the drastic simplifications, (2) enables one to visualize frames as hier2. Strictly speaking, only A and C correspond to Stanzel's two "ideal" third-person types; B is an "intermediate" or "mixed" type. This content downloaded from 157.55.39.70 on Tue, 06 Sep 2016 05:10:32 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 444 Poetics Today 18:4 (2) Third-person narrative situations as frames:

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Frames, Preferences, and the Reading of Third-Person Narratives: Towards a Cognitive Narratology

This paper focuses on the potential contribution of storytelling to education. It examines theoretical frameworks used to contextualise storytelling in formal education. The aim of the review was to identify a range of answers relating to the question: What does storytelling offer to the formal education of primary age children? Five major kinds of contributions, identified in the review of relevant literature, are discussed. They reflect the present state of knowledge about storytelling in education and the aspects which major theorists consider to be important. I have tried to explicate the links between the themes, and to discuss interrelated aspects of the use of storytelling in schools by educationists and storytellers. The first section begins by analysing the relationship of storytelling to other language and expressive arts: writing, talking, reading and drawing.The second section considers thinking and feeling, and the contribution of storytelling to the inner world of affect. The focus moves in ...

The Use of Traditional Storytelling in Education to the Learning of Literacy Skills

This article examines a series of issues involved in identifying metaphors in texts. Metaphor identification is, in turn, a fundamental part of the more complex issue of how to relate linguistic metaphors in texts to the conceptual metaphors of cognitive metaphor theory. In section 1 we list a number of general issues involved in metaphor identification. In sections 2 and 3 we examine two short fictional extracts from novels written in the 1990s (one from popular fiction and one from serious fiction), relating our detailed analyses to the general questions raised at the beginning of the article. We thus raise and exemplify a series of issues which do not have easy resolutions but which must be grasped (a) if a corpus-based approach to metaphor is to become a reality and (b) if the relations between conceptual and linguistic metaphors are to be fully understood. Interestingly, this attempt to be extremely detailed and systematic in turn leads us to comment on differences in aesthetic effects between the use of metaphors in the two extracts examined.

Linguistic metaphor identification in two extracts from novels

Metaphor is a curious case. Perhaps it reflects the current state of poetics in relation to other fields of the humanities. On the one hand, there is an endless cross-disciplinary procession of theoretical books and papers on the subject. One wave peaked in the nineteen fifties and sixties, another has developed in recent years. Important contributions have been made to the clarification of the basic

Poetic Metaphor and Frames of Reference: With Examples from Eliot, Rilke, Mayakovsky, Mandelshtam, Pound, Creeley, Amichai, and the New York Times

1. It is common practice in the interpretation and teaching of poetry that the interpreter "mobilizes" the sound effects of the poetic text to reinforce his argument on the poem's meaning. The insight formulated by I. A. Richards that poems are written with the "full body" of words finds its obvious expression in this domain. Such observations are made not merely by critics interested in the "form" of the poem, but even more so by practical critics preoccupied with the poem's "meaning" or the poet's "message," who feel, perhaps, uneasy about the dense and complex network of sound patterning in verse and try to incorporate it, sometimes sporadically and casually, often ingeniously, in their total interpretation. In the other camp one finds prominent critics and theoreticians who deny altogether any inherence of specific meanings in specific sounds.' The problem of the relations (arbitrary or natural) between sounds and the meanings or the reality which language may represent is as old as Plato's "Cratylos," and the literature in the field is enormous. Besides literary critics and theoreticians, the arguments were shared by philosophers, psychologists, linguists, and poets of various persuasions. Indeed, do sounds have meaning in poetry? And if so, how? As many basic issues of aesthetics, this question cannot be answered in an either-or manner. It

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The Meaning of Sound Patterns in Poetry: An Interaction Theory

The purpose of this paper* is to present the argument that literary texts can be apprehended fully only through a three-dimensional model. For purposes of understanding or analysis we may have to observe one dimension (or certain aspects of it) at a time; we cannot, however, disregard its relations with aspects of the other dimensions. Theories based on properties of one dimension only will remain weak and limited in solving the problems of literary texts in their aesthetic or communicative functions, because bridging between the abstract model and concrete descriptive analysis requires relegating too much to "context," whereas this "context" is merely part of a different kind of organization. Furthermore, though literary texts - in their wealth of structuration and meaning-relations - most readily display typical properties of sign-complexes, such properties are by no means confined to literature. The three-dimensional model applies actually to all kinds of texts, indeed: to all objects which may be considered "semiotic." This is a paper on a very general, abstract model, which, I hope, will become clear through a number of concrete examples (however sketchily illustrated). At the same time, it is a simple model, reflecting the simplicity of our basic cognitive operations. Three different kinds of operations - it is argued - combine to grasp any specific complex configuration in language texts or in other objects which convey meanings to us - and this is precisely because meanings are conveyed through objects which possess these three dimensions. * An earlier version, entitled "A Three-Dimensional Model of Semiotic Objects," was presented at the International Conference on Semiotics of Art, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 1978, and will be published in the proceedings. The theory will be presented in full in my book Integrational Semantics (in preparation). The present paper, having the nature of a lecture, is obviously oriented toward sketching and illustrating the general framework rather than mapping and defining with precision and detail each dimension.

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The structure of semiotic objects: a three-dimensional model

Sign and System of Language: A Reassessment of Saussure's Doctrine

K.P. In one of your recent synoptic surveys discussing the tasks of the science of language among other contemporary sciences, in Scientific American 1972, you made a brief outline of the history of linguistics and touched upon the doctrine of the Young Grammarians. Their methodology actually amounted to nothing more than a history of language. Overcoming the Young Grammarian doctrine, which had been prevalent for some time, was one of de Saussure's achievements. However, in his Cours de linguistique gdnerale he again reduced the task of studying the language and system to one aspect only, that of static synchrony. Both approaches the historicism of the Young Grammarians and the static program of de Saussure were evidently onesided. How could one overcome this limitation?

Benjamin Hrushovski

Papers

Poetic Metaphor and Frames of Reference: With Examples from Eliot, Rilke, Mayakovsky, Mandelshtam, Pound, Creeley, Amichai, and the New York Times

The Meaning of Sound Patterns in Poetry: An Interaction Theory

The structure of semiotic objects: a three-dimensional model

Sign and System of Language: A Reassessment of Saussure's Doctrine

Dialogue on Time in Language and Literature