In an institutional sense, planning theory is basically one dealing with the goals and form of and the procedure and justification for the regulation of the land market. Traditionally, welfare economics, a branch of mainstream economics fostered by Arthur C. Pigou, was the most persuasive ideological foundation for such regulation. The concepts of this branch of economics are often expressed in planning terms in the applied field of regional and urban economics, commonly taught in planning schools. However, what we may call ‘neo-institutional economics’ has begun to exert its impact on planning theory. This is evidenced by the appearance in the planning literature of a wave of works informed by a cluster of concepts in this branch of economics at the turn of the millennium by Alexander (1992, 2001a, 2001b, 2002), Benchetrit and Czamanski (2004), Booth (2002), Buitelaar (2003, 2004), Dawkins (2000), Gleeson and Low (2000), Lai (1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, 2004), Lai and Chan (2004), Lai and Ho (2003), Lai and Lorne (2003), Lai and Yu (2001), Micelli (2002), Pennington (1997, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2004), Poulton (1997), Sager (2001, 2002), Staley (2001), Webster (1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 2001a, 2001b, 2003), Webster and Wu (1999a, 1999b, 2001), and Webster and

Neo-Institutional Economics and Planning Theory:

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Liberty Against Itself: British Freedoms in North America

This thesis explores the possibility of promoting social justice through the direct confrontation and rectification of manifest injustices in our existing social institutions and practices, as opposed to the more conventional theoretical approach of attempting to offer comprehensive accounts of ideal justice based on the identification of ultimate principles of justice or perfectly just institutional arrangements. Through an analysis and moral evaluation of the intergenerational transfer of wealth through the practice of inheritance, the study attempts to illustrate how a narrower theoretical focus on specific existing social institutions and practices will enhance conceptual clarity regarding their morally relevant features and, by taking the actual social and political context into account from the outset, increase the political and real-world relevance of the resulting proposal. This study also offers a thorough examination of property rights, because an understanding of the nature of ownership and the justificatory theories of entitlement claims necessarily provides the background context against which the issue of inheritance has to be addressed. As property rights give specific people claims to resources to the exclusion of others, any considerations on property rights also brings up questions of distributive and social justice. Within this broader framework of property rights and distributive justice, this study seeks to show that inheritance is not only inconsistent with the values underlying capitalism, but also an unfair and outdated practice that helps to perpetuate economic and social inequality, which undermines the ideal of democratic citizenship. To this end, a proposal is made to cap inheritance by placing an upper limit to the amount an individual will be allowed to bequeath to any other individual(s). It is argued that this limit should be high enough to allow for the transfer of a family home and objects with sentimental value, but not so high as to ensure a life of complete leisure to future generations. The merits of inheritance taxation will then be discussed in detail and arguments in favour of limiting inheritance will be subdivided into three broad categories: The first concerns the legitimacy of the practice of inheritance itself, as well as the tension between the liberal-democratic principles underlying capitalism and the practice of inheritance, the second relates to the undesirability of the social outcomes that are realised based on the practice of inheritance, and the third focuses on the potential gains that the alternative arrangement will bring. Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za

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JUSTICE, ENTITLEMENT AND INHERITANCE: Exploring Theoretical Grounds for the Rectification of Manifest Injustices through an Analysis of Inheritance

The ownership and control of private land is a core social value in the United States. Public planning can be seen as conflicting with this value. The long-standing tension between private property rights and public planning was heightened in the 1990s with the emergence of the so-called private property rights movement. This movement seeks to limit governmental authority over privately owned land through a multi-level strategy of legal, policy, political, and public relations actions. This paper explores the historical basis for this conflict, the legal framework within which it functions, and contemporary policy battles. The paper concludes that there may be no final outcome to this debate. Property rights activists are impassioned and believe their view of history and law is correct. I argue that it may be best to see debate about land use and property rights as one of the central vehicles for a continual reframing of core values in the American experience.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10511481003788760

Social conflict over property rights: the end, a new beginning, or a continuing debate?

Libertarians on the road to town planning

Property Rights: From Magna Carta to the Fourteenth Amendment breaks new ground in our understanding of the genesis of property rights in the United States. According to the standard interpretation, echoed by as lofty an authority as Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun, the courts did little in the way of protecting property rights in the early years of our nation. Not only does Siegan find this accepted teaching erroneous, but he finds post-Colonial jurisprudence to be firmly rooted in English common law and the writings of its most revered interpreters. Siegan conducts an exhaustive examination of property rights cases decided by state courts between the time of the ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1788 and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. This inventory, which in its sweep captures scores of cases overlooked by previous commentators on the history of property rights, reveals that the protection of these rights is neither a relatively new phenomenon nor a heritage with precarious pedigree. These court cases, as well as early state constitutions, consistently and repeatedly embraced key elements of a property rights jurisprudence, such as protection of the privileges and immunities of citizens, due process of law, equal protection under the law, and prohibitions on the taking of property without just compensation. Case law provides overwhelming evidence that the American legal system, from its inception, has held property rights and their protection in the highest regard. The American Revolution, Siegan reminds us, was fought largely to affirm and protect private property rights - that is, to uphold the "rights of Englishmen" - even if it meant that the colonists would cease being Englishmen. John Locke and other great theoreticians of property rights understood their importance, not only to individuals who happened to possess property, but to the preservation of a free society and to the prosperity of its inhabitants. Siegan's contribution to this venerable tradition lies in his faithful reconstruction of our legal history, which allows us to see just how central property rights have been to the American experiment in liberty - from the very beginning.

Bernard H. Siegan

Papers

Property Rights: From Magna Carta to the Fourteenth Amendment