The theory of precautionary saving is shown in this paper to be isomorphic to the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion, making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving, and more generally, to the theory of optimal choice under risk In particular, a measure of the strength of precautionary saving motive analogous to the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving, and to give a new interpretation of the Oreze-Modigliani substitution effect

Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large

It is argued that inflation targeting is best understood as a commitment to a targeting rule rather than an instrument rule ,e ither ageneral targeting rule (explicit objectives for monetary policy) or a specific targeting rule (a criterion for (the forecasts of) the target variables to be fulfilled), essentially the equality of the marginal rates of transformation and substitution between the target variables. Targeting rules allow the use of judgment and extramodel information, are more robust and easier to verify than optimal instrument rules, and they can nevertheless bring the economy close to the socially optimal equilibrium.

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What is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules

Purely forward-looking versions of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) generate too little inflation persistence. Some authors add ad hoc backward looking terms to address this shortcoming. We hypothesize that inflation per? sistence results mainly from variation in the long-run trend component of inflation, which we attribute to shifts in monetary policy. We derive a version of the NKPC that incorporates a time-varying inflation trend and examine whether it explains the dynamics of inflation. When drift in trend inflation is taken into account, a purely forward-looking version of the model fits the data well, and there is no need for backward-looking components. (JEL E12, E31, E52) In this paper we consider the extent to which Guillermo Calvo's (1983) model of nominal price rigidities can explain inflation dynamics without relying on arbitrary backward-looking terms. In its baseline formulation, the Calvo model leads to a purely forward-looking New Keynesian

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/29730163.pdf

Trend Inflation, Indexation, and Inflation Persistence in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve

This paper surveys the recent literature on sovereign debt and relates it to the evolu- tion of the legal principles underlying the sovereign debt market and the experience of the most recent debt crises and defaults. It finds limited support for theories that explain the feasibility of sovereign debt based on either external sanctions or exclu- sion from the international capital market and more support for explanations that emphasize domestic costs of default. The paper concludes that there remains a case for establishing institutions that reduce the cost of default but the design of such institutions is not a trivial task.

The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default

A main puzzle in the sovereign debt literature is that defaults have only minor effects on subsequent borrowing costs and access to credit. This paper comes to a different conclusion. We construct the first complete database of investor losses (“haircuts”) in all restructurings with foreign banks and bondholders from 1970 until 2010, covering 180 cases in 68 countries. We then show that restructurings involving higher haircuts are associated with significantly higher subsequent bond yield spreads and longer periods of capital market exclusion. The results cast doubt on the widespread belief that credit markets “forgive and forget.”

Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts

This paper characterizes welfare in a small open economy and derives the correspondingoptimal monetary policy rule. It shows that the utility-based loss function for a small openeconomy is a quadratic expression in domestic inflation, output gap and real exchange rate. Incontrast to previous works, this paper demonstrates that welfare in a small open economy,completely integrated with the rest of the world, is affected by exchange rate variability.Consequently, the optimal policy in a small open economy is not isomorphic to a closedeconomy and does not prescribe a pure floating exchange rate regime. Domestic inflationtargeting is optimal only under a particular parameterization, where the unique relevantdistortion in the economy is price stickiness. Under a general specification for preferencesand in the presence of inefficient steady state output, exchange rate targeting arises as part ofthe optimal monetary plan.

Monetary Policy and Welfare in a Small Open Economy

Over the past quarter of a century, emerging market economies (EMEs) have defaulted on their sovereign debts frequently. This article assesses the size and types of costs that have been associated with these defaults. It emphasises that costs, measured by the fall in output, are particularly large when default is combined with banking and/or currency crises. Output losses also seem to increase the longer that countries stay in arrears or take to restructure their debts. The paper concludes with a number of policy suggestions to improve debt crisis prevention and management and the role played by the IMF.

Costs of Sovereign Default

https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0639.pdf

This paper studies noncooperative games between a monetary authority and a macroprudential regulator whose objectives are a subset of those in the social loss function. The analysis is based on a New Keynesian model with a financial sector and a financial friction a la Gertler and Karadi (2011). When the friction affects the financing of all factors of production equally, macroprudential policy is shown to be a powerful additional tool, fully eliminating inefficiencies, regardless of the source of the shock and no matter whether the central bank and the regulator cooperate. But when trade-offs are present and policy is discretionary, the institutional arrangements become crucial. While coordination leads to higher welfare than a setting in which each authority takes the decision rule of the other as given (namely, the Nash equilibrium), our analysis shows that a noncooperative setting in which the macroprudential authority acts as a leader within the period can be superior to cooperation. Finally, our conclusions are unaffected by whether the macroprudential instrument affects funding costs or acts as a liquidity requirement.

/pdf/coordinating-monetary-and-macroprudential-policies-46v3l8bhs7.pdf

Coordinating Monetary and Macroprudential Policies

Can the structure of asset markets change the way monetary policy should be conducted? Following a linear-quadratic approach, the present paper addresses this question in a New Keynesian small open economy framework. Our results reveal that the configuration of asset markets significantly affects optimal monetary policy and the performance of standard policy rules. In particular, when comparing complete and incomplete markets, the ranking of policy rules is entirely reversed, and so are the policy prescriptions regarding the optimal level of exchange rate volatility.

Bianca De Paoli

Papers

Monetary Policy and Welfare in a Small Open Economy

Costs of Sovereign Default

Monetary Policy and Welfare in a Small Open Economy

Coordinating Monetary and Macroprudential Policies

Monetary Policy Under Alterative Asset Market Structures: the Case of a Small Open Economy