Given the explosive growth of portable devices, mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is becoming an essential approach that fully utilizes pervasive idle resources to accomplish sensing tasks. The traditional MCS relies on the centralized server for task handle is susceptible to a single point of failure. Targeting this security issue, researchers have proposed a series of blockchain-based MCS. However, nodes in the blockchain suffer from high computation cost for data processing. Simultaneously, most blockchain-based MCS systems lack an efficient incentive mechanism for service requesters and workers. In this work, we integrate the smart contract and mobile devices to establish a secure, interactive, and fair blockchain-based MCS system called BSIF. To prevent illegitimate participants, BSIF requests all users to verify their identities using private keys from the registration phase. In the case of worker location privacy leakage, the location-based symmetric key generator is adopted to coordinate a session key for target range worker selection. Besides, we transfer the data evaluation process to the requester side (e.g., a personal computer), reducing computation cost in the blockchain nodes. Due to the homomorphic feature of the Paillier Cryptosystem and common interest, the requester cannot violate the directives from the blockchain. Subsequently, the Stackelberg game is adopted to investigate the participation level of the workers and the fair reward mechanism for the requesters to achieve a dynamic balance. Finally, the security analysis and performance evaluation demonstrate that our BSIF can defend against possible adversaries while significantly cutting overhead and giving participants the utmost incentive. 

BSIF: Blockchain-Based Secure, Interactive, and Fair Mobile Crowdsensing

Given the explosive growth of portable devices, mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is becoming an essential approach that fully utilizes pervasive idle resources to accomplish sensing tasks. The traditional MCS relies on the centralized server for task handle is susceptible to a single point of failure. Targeting this security issue, researchers have proposed a series of blockchain-based MCS. However, nodes in the blockchain suffer from high computation cost for data processing. Simultaneously, most blockchain-based MCS systems lack an efficient incentive mechanism for service requesters and workers. In this work, we integrate the smart contract and mobile devices to establish a secure, interactive, and fair blockchain-based MCS system called BSIF. To prevent illegitimate participants, BSIF requests all users to verify their identities using private keys from the registration phase. In the case of worker location privacy leakage, the location-based symmetric key generator is adopted to coordinate a session key for target range worker selection. Besides, we transfer the data evaluation process to the requester side (e.g., a personal computer), reducing computation cost in the blockchain nodes. Due to the homomorphic feature of the Paillier Cryptosystem and common interest, the requester cannot violate the directives from the blockchain. Subsequently, the Stackelberg game is adopted to investigate the participation level of the workers and the fair reward mechanism for the requesters to achieve a dynamic balance. Finally, the security analysis and performance evaluation demonstrate that our BSIF can defend against possible adversaries while significantly cutting overhead and giving participants the utmost incentive.

Enabling secure time-series data sharing via homomorphic encryption in cloud-assisted IIoT

In mobile crowdsensing (MCS), providing appropriate rewards is a common and efficient way to motivate participants to participate in sensing tasks. However, the privacy of task participants is not protected well in most quality-aware incentive schemes. Moreover, these schemes are designed for general MCS application scenarios where data are collected by internal sensors embedded in participants’ smartphones, and not suitable for scenarios where additional sensors (ASs) except internal sensors are to collect data (e.g., household medical devices). In scenarios with ASs, malicious participants can fabricate sensing data instead of collecting data from ASs, i.e., the source reliability of sensing data cannot be ensured. To address these issues, we propose P2SIM, a privacy-preserving and the source-reliable incentive mechanism scheme for MCS with ASs. We combine redactable signature with private hash function to achieve the source reliability verification of sensing data without revealing the privacy of participants. Moreover, rewards are divided into two parts: 1) fixed rewards and 2) floating rewards, to enhance the flexibility of rewards distribution. Both formal theoretical analysis and extensive experimental evaluations on a real data set show that the proposed P2SIM is secure and efficient. 

P<sup>2</sup>SIM: Privacy-Preserving and Source-Reliable Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing

In mobile crowdsensing (MCS), providing appropriate rewards is a common and efficient way to motivate participants to participate in sensing tasks. However, the privacy of task participants is not protected well in most quality-aware incentive schemes. Moreover, these schemes are designed for general MCS application scenarios where data are collected by internal sensors embedded in participants’ smartphones, and not suitable for scenarios where additional sensors (ASs) except internal sensors are to collect data (e.g., household medical devices). In scenarios with ASs, malicious participants can fabricate sensing data instead of collecting data from ASs, i.e., the source reliability of sensing data cannot be ensured. To address these issues, we propose P2SIM, a privacy-preserving and the source-reliable incentive mechanism scheme for MCS with ASs. We combine redactable signature with private hash function to achieve the source reliability verification of sensing data without revealing the privacy of participants. Moreover, rewards are divided into two parts: 1) fixed rewards and 2) floating rewards, to enhance the flexibility of rewards distribution. Both formal theoretical analysis and extensive experimental evaluations on a real data set show that the proposed P2SIM is secure and efficient.

P2SIM: Privacy-Preserving and Source-Reliable Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing

Fog-assisted mobile crowdsensing (FA-MCS) alleviates challenges with respect to computation, communication, and storage from the traditional model of mobile crowdsensing (MCS) “requester-server-users.” Data aggregation, as a specific MCS task, has attracted a lot of attentions in mining the potential value of the massive crowdsensing data. However, the process of data aggregation in FA-MCS may threaten the privacies of both users’ data and aggregation results. The untrusted server and fog nodes (FNs) may damage the correctness of aggregation results. Moreover, bad FNs, which do not upload data to server or fail to verify successfully, can endanger the reliability of FA-MCS and the accuracy of aggregation results. To tackle these problems, we propose a verifiable, reliable, and privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme for FA-MCS. Specifically, the proposed scheme preserves privacies of both users’ data and aggregation results, enables requester to verify the correctness of aggregation result, and is able to tolerate several bad FNs without affecting the data aggregation result. Through formal security analysis, the proposed scheme is shown to be secure and privacy preserving. Extensive experiments also show the proposed scheme is efficient and reliable.

Biao Zeng

Papers

Verifiable, Reliable, and Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation in Fog-Assisted Mobile Crowdsensing