Evolutionary psychology is one of many biologically informed approaches to the study of human behavior. Along with cognitive psychologists, evolutionary psychologists propose that much, if not all, of our behavior can be explained by appeal to internal psychological mechanisms. What distinguishes evolutionary psychologists from many cognitive psychologists is the proposal that the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations—products of natural selection—that helped our ancestors get around the world, survive and reproduce. To understand the central claims of evolutionary psychology we require an understanding of some key concepts in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology, philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. Philosophers are interested in evolutionary psychology for a number of reasons. For philosophers of science —mostly philosophers of biology—evolutionary psychology provides a critical target. There is a broad consensus among philosophers of science that evolutionary psychology is a deeply flawed enterprise. For philosophers of mind and cognitive science evolutionary psychology has been a source of empirical hypotheses about cognitive architecture and specific components of that architecture. Philosophers of mind are also critical of evolutionary psychology but their criticisms are not as all-encompassing as those presented by philosophers of biology. Evolutionary psychology is also invoked by philosophers interested in moral psychology both as a source of empirical hypotheses and as a critical target.

/pdf/stanford-encyclopedia-of-philosophy-1wqoykisq0.pdf

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

https://ai.stanford.edu/~epacuit/classes/lori-spr09/cohenlevesque-intention-aij90.pdf

Intention is choice with commitment

Nominal Reference, Temporal Constitution and Quantification in Event Semantics

Gibson developed an interactionist view of perception and action that focused on information that is available in the environment. He thereby rejected the still-prevalent framing assumption of factoring external-physical and internal-mental processes. The interactionist alternative, which focuses on processes of agent-situation interactions, is taken in ecological psychology as well as in recent research on conversational communication, research on complex, socially organized activity, and philosophical situation theory. The concepts of qffordance and ability are key ideas in an interactionist account. In situation theory, abilities in activity depend on attunements to constraints, and affordances for an agent can be understood as conditions in the environment for constraints to which the agent is attuned. This broad view of affordances includes affordances that are recognized as well as affordances that are perceived directly.

Gibson's affordances.

The handbook of pragmatics , The handbook of pragmatics , کتابخانه دیجیتال جندی شاپور اهواز

Handbook of Pragmatics

The Liar--An Essay in Truth and Circularity.

Preface.Notes on Contributors.Part I: Meaning and Theories of Meaning:1. Meaning and Truth Conditions: From Frege's Grand Design to Davidson's: David Wiggins (University of Oxford).2. Meaning, Use, Verification: John Skorupski (University of St Andrews).3. Intention and Convention: Anita Avramides (St Hilda's College, University of Oxford).4. Pragmatics: Charles Travis (University of Stirling).5. A Guide to Naturalising Semantics: Charles Travis (University of Stirling).6. Meaning and Privacy: Edward Craig (University of Cambridge).7. Tacit Knowledge: Alexander Miller (University of Michigan).8. Radical Interpretation: Jane Heal (University of Cambridge).9. Propositional Attitudes: Mark Richard (Tufts University).10. Holism: Christopher Peacocke (University of Oxford).11. Metaphor: Richard Moran (Harvard University).Part II: Language, Truth and Reality:12. Realism and its Oppositions: Bob Hale (University of Glasgow).13. Theories of Truth: Ralph C. S. Walker (Magdalen College, University of Oxford).14. Analyticity: Paul Artin Boghossian (New York University).15. Rule-following, Objectivity and Meaning: Bob Hale (University of Oxford).16. The Interdeterminacy of Translation: Crispin Wright (University of St. Andrews).17. Putnam's Model-theoretical Argument against Metaphysical Realism: Bob Hale and Crispin Wright (University of St. Andrews).18. Sorites: R. M. Sainsbury and Timothy Williamson (University of Edinburgh).Part III: Reference, Identity and Necessity:19. Modality: Bob Hale (University of Oxford).20. Essentialism: Graeme Forbes (Tulane University).21. Reference and Necessity: Robert Stalnaker (MIT).22. Names and Rigid Designation: Jason Stanley (Cornell University).23. Indexicals and Demonstratives: John Perry (Stanford University).24. Objects and Criteria of Identity: E. J. Lowe (University of Durham).25. Relative Identity: Harold Noonan (University of Birmingham).Glossary.Index.

A companion to the philosophy of language

The Reason's Proper Study

I. ONTOLOGY AND ABSTRACTION PRINCIPLES II. RESPONSES TO CRITICS III. HUME'S PRINCIPLE IV. ON THE DIFFERENTIATION OF ABSTRACTA V. BEYOND NUMBER-THEORY

Bob Hale

Papers

The Liar--An Essay in Truth and Circularity.

A companion to the philosophy of language

The Reason's Proper Study

The Reason's Proper Study: Essays towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics

Implicit definition and the a priori