Distinguishing four sources of power in human societies – ideological, economic, military and political – The Sources of Social Power traces their interrelations throughout human history In this first volume, Michael Mann examines interrelations between these elements from neolithic times, through ancient Near Eastern civilizations, the classical Mediterranean age and medieval Europe, up to just before the Industrial Revolution in England It offers explanations of the emergence of the state and social stratification; of city-states, militaristic empires and the persistent interaction between them; of the world salvation religions; and of the particular dynamism of medieval and early modern Europe It ends by generalizing about the nature of overall social development, the varying forms of social cohesion and the role of classes and class struggle in history First published in 1986, this new edition of Volume 1 includes a new preface by the author examining the impact and legacy of the work

The sources of social power

International anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (i.e., policies which increase one state's security tend to decrease that of others) make it difficult for states to realize their common interests. Two approaches are used to show when and why this dilemma operates less strongly and cooperation is more likely. First, the model of the Prisoner's Dilemma is used to demonstrate that cooperation is more likely when the costs of being exploited and the gains of exploiting others are low, when the gains from mutual cooperation and the costs of mutual noncooperation are high, and when each side expects the other to cooperate. Second, the security dilemma is ameliorated when the defense has the advantage over the offense and when defensive postures differ from offensive ones. These two variables, which can generate four possible security worlds, are influenced by geography and technology.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100016191

Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma

Although various single-concentration measurements of pharmaceuticals are available in the literature, detailed information on the variation over time of the concentration and the load in wastewater effluents and rivers and on the fate of these compounds in the aquatic environment are lacking. We measured the concentrations of six pharmaceuticals, carbamazepine, clofibric acid, diclofenac, ibuprofen, ketoprofen, and naproxen, in the effluents of three wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), in two rivers and in the water column of Lake Greifensee (Switzerland) over a time period of three months. In WWTP effluents, the concentrations reached 0.95 μg/L for carbamazepine, 0.06 μg/L for clofibric acid, 0.99 μg/L for diclofenac, 1.3 μg/L for ibuprofen, 0.18 μg/L for ketoprofen, and 2.6 μg/L for naproxen. The relative importance in terms of loads was carbamazepine, followed by diclofenac, naproxen, ibuprofen, clofibric acid, and ketoprofen. An overall removal rate of all these pharmaceuticals was estimated in surf...

Occurrence and Fate of Carbamazepine, Clofibric Acid, Diclofenac, Ibuprofen, Ketoprofen, and Naproxen in Surface Waters

Contemporary balance-of-power theory has become too parsimonious to yield determinate predictions about state alliance strategies in multipolarity. Kenneth Waltz's theory predicts only that multipolarity predisposes states to either of two opposite errors, which this article characterizes as chain-ganging and buck-passing. To predict which of these two policies will prevail, it is necessary to complicate Waltz's theory by adding a variable from Robert Jervis's theory of the security dilemma: the variable of whether offense or defense is perceived to have the advantage. At least under the checkerboard geographical conditions in Europe before World Wars I and II, perceived offensive advantage bred unconditional alliances, whereas perceived defensive advantage bred free riding on the balancing efforts of others.

/pdf/chain-gangs-and-passed-bucks-predicting-alliance-patterns-in-uf2uof9di6.pdf

Chain gangs and passed bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity

This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the relationship between trade and war. We show that the intuition that trade promotes peace is only partially true even in a model where trade is beneficial to all, war reduces trade and leaders take into account the costs of war. When war can occur because of the presence of asymmetric information, the probability of escalation is indeed lower for countries that trade more bilaterally because of the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains. However, countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of war because multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country. Using a theoretically-based econometric model, we test our predictions on a large dataset of military conflicts in the period 1948-2001. We find strong evidence for the contrasting effects of bilateral and multilateral trade. Our empirical results also confirm our theoretical prediction that multilateral trade openness increases more the probability of war between proximate countries. This may explain why military conflicts have become more localized and less global over time.

Make Trade not War

Guerra y sociedad en Europa, 1870-1970

Britain's Two World Wars against Germany: The transformation of war on the Western Front, 1914–1918

(1990). The calm before the storm: Britain and the ‘Phoney War’ 1939–40. The RUSI Journal: Vol. 135, No. 1, pp. 61-67.

Brian Bond

Papers

Guerra y sociedad en Europa, 1870-1970

Britain's Two World Wars against Germany: The transformation of war on the Western Front, 1914–1918

The calm before the storm: Britain and the ‘Phoney War’ 1939–40

Britain's Two World Wars against Germany: Attrition in the First World War: the naval blockade

Judgment in military history