In "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism" Richard Rorty contends that: "For all his genius ... Peirce never made up his mind what he wanted a general theory of signs for, nor what it might look like. ... His contribution to pragmatism was merely to have given it a name, and to have stimulated James" (1982:161). But is it likely that a pragmatic thinker such as Peirce did not design his semeiotic for a purpose or that such an architectonic philosopher had no inkling about the shape of this theory? Part of my task is to suggest just how unlikely this is.

Toward a truly pragmatic theory of signs: Reading Peirce's semeiotic in light of Dewey's gloss

In this Paper I interpret Charles S. Peirce’s method of prescision as a transcendental method. In order to do so, I argue that Peirce’s pragmatism can be interpreted in a transcendental light only if we use a non‐justificatory understanding of transcendental philosophy. I show how Peirce’s prescision is similar to some abstracting procedure that Immanuel Kant used in his Critique of Pure Reason. Prescision abstracts from experience and thought in general those elements without which such experience and thought would be unaccountable. Similarly, in the Aesthetics, Kant isolated the a priori forms of intuition by showing how they could be abstracted from experience in general, while experience in general cannot be thought without them. However, if Peirce’s and Kant’s methods are similar in this respect, they reached very different conclusions.

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Peirce’s ‘Prescision’ as a Transcendental Method

The author of this paper explores a central strand in the complex relationship between Peirce and Kant. He argues, against Kant (especially as reconstructed by Christine Korsgaard), that the practical identity of the self-critical agent who undertakes a Critic of reason (as Peirce insisted upon translating this expression) needs to be conceived in substantive, not purely formal, terms. Thus, insofar as there is a reflexive turn in Peirce, it is quite far from the transcendental turn taken by Immanuel Kant. The identity of the being devoted to redefining the bounds of reason (for the drawing of such bounds is always a historically situated and motivated undertaking) is not that of a disembodied, rational will giving laws to itself. Nor is it that of a being whose passions and especially sentiments are heteronomous determinations of the deliberative agency in question. Rather the identity of this being is that of a somatic, social, and historical agent whose very autonomy not only traces its origin to heteronomy but also ineluctably involves an identification with what, time and again, emerges as other than this agent. A strong claim is made regarding human identity being practical identity (practical identity being understood here as the singular shape acquired by a human being in the complex course of its practical involvements, its participation in the array of practices in and through which such a being carries out its life). An equally strong claim is made regarding the upshot of Peirce's decisive movement beyond Kant's transcendental project: this movement unquestionably drives toward a compelling account of human agency.

Toward a pragmatic conception of practical identity

The essay explores how C. S. Peirce, especially in his mature thought, addressed the question of meaning. It underscores how he not only took meaning to be at bottom a function of our habits but also how he conceived these habits themselves to be functions of the histories in which they originate and operate. Hence, what I propose here is this: One of the most fruitful ways to interpret Peirce’s own contribution to this question is to see his efforts as carrying forward the impetus intensified by Hegel and Darwin’s emphasis on temporality and historicity. In Part One of this paper (“The Question of Meaning”), I suggest how Peirce approaches the question of meaning primarily in reference to what I call the drama of self-correction. Moreover, his approach is explicitly related to his pragmatism, semeiotic (or general theory of signs), and phenomenological doctrine of categories. Finally, the historical development of his own reflections on this question is taken to provide a basis for an historicist interpretation of his mature position. In Part Two (“The Routes of Significance”), I propose that the metaphor of a route provides a corrective to the excessively formal and indeed formalistic interpretations of Peirce’s theory of signs still dominating the discussion of this theory. Routes are understood here not as antecedently fixed paths, but as historically emergent and alterable trajectories defined by the movements of travelers. In conjunction with this emphasis I explore several distinct senses in which both beliefs and signs are what agents go on. Such reflections are articulated for the purpose of facilitating a deeper understand of not only what Peirce meant by meaning but also what we might mean by this elusive term.

The routes of significance: reflections on Peirce's theory of interpretants

ideas explains the following insertion in the Principles: ―And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he 313 Berkeley, Principles §10 [1710/1734] 314 See Craig, ―Berkeley‘s Attack on Abstract Ideas‖ pp. 425-430 [1968]; Monroe Beardsley‘s ―Berkeley on  ̳Abstract Ideas‘‖ roughly supports this Craig‘s analysis, although Beardsley focuses on the compatibility of Berkeley‘s account of perception and his denial of abstract ideas [1943]. 315 EP 1: 47 ―Some Consequences of Four Incapacities‖ [1868] 103 may abstract: but this will never prove, that he can frame an abstract inconsistent idea of a triangle.‖316 Thus, I can ―abstract‖ by focusing on a particular feature of an idea/image, but the image itself must be determinate. This account is both logically and phenomenologically false according to Peirce, for on his analysis the propositional structure of ideas/images necessarily contains general elements. Furthermore, abstraction is the process that generates images, not an action performed upon given images, as shown by the limitations of our physiology. That is, my image of the white page to my left, whether when I perceive it directly or recall it, is already infused with hypotheses of continuity, let alone the conceptual supposition that it is a piece of paper, which contains expectations for particular tactile sensations, etc. II.D: Reid and the Force of Memory II.D.1: Peirce and Reid Similar to Berkeley, Peirce held the ―...subtle but well-balanced intellect...,‖ Thomas Reid in high regard.317 Indeed, Peirce‘s assessment of the  ̳ideal system‘ or ̳way of ideas‘ could have come from Reid‘s own pen: ―Nothing can be more completely false than that we can experience only our own ideas. That is indeed without exaggeration the very epitome of all falsity.‖318 However, Peirce also insisted on distinguishing his own brand of common sense philosophy from that of the Scottish 316 Berkeley, Principles Intro. §16; added in the 1734 addition 317 CP 5.444 [1905] 318 CP 6.97 [1903] 104 school on 4 or 6 points, and in particular came to see his critical common-sensism as a consequence of pragmatism. Let us now turn to a review of Peirce‘s own account of his debt to Reid and his follows, before turning to Reid‘s account of memory directly. In the 1905 article ―Issues of Pragmaticism‖ Peirce asserts that he held two doctrines 9 years before he formulated the maxim of pragmatism, but in retrospect considers these two doctrines as corollaries of pragmatism.319 One of these is the doctrine of Critical Common-Sensism, which Peirce proceeds to distinguish from the Scotch Common Sense School on six points. If we take the first direct and public formulation of pragmatism as 1878‘s ―How to Make Our Ideas Clear,‖ then by Peirce‘s own assessment he espoused Critical Common-Sensism in the Cognition Series of 18671868.320 The second doctrine, which antedates and yet is a corollary to pragmatism, is Scholastic Realism.321 By way of a reminder, we will begin with a couple of quotes from ―Some Consequences of Four Incapacities‖ to establish some ―common sense‖ aspects of Peirce‘s early thought. Then, we will turn to Peirce‘s late explication of the differences between his philosophy and that of the Scotch Common Sense School. Although not stated as a distinctive doctrine, Peirce‘s critically common-sensical approach to philosophy is evident in his rejection of Cartesian skepticism: ―We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of 319 CP 5.439, ―Issues of Pragmaticism‖ [1905] 320 However, Andrè de Tienne has found a strong resonance between Critical Common-Sensism and what he calls Peirce‘s ―fideist methodology‖ of 1861-1862 – see de Tienne, ―Peirce‘s Early Method of Finding the Categories‖ p. 394 [1989]. 321 As stated in CP 5.453, ―Issues of Pragmatism‖ [1905]. As further anecdotal evidence, in a c. 1905 letter to Calderoni describing ―Issues of Pragmaticism‖ Peirce turns immediately to pragmatism‘s inherent realism, despite the infelicitous diamond example in ―How to Make Our Ideas Clear‖ – see CP 8.208. 105 philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned.‖322 Furthermore, Peirce‘s rejection of Cartesian individualism points to another connotation of common sense: ―We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself.‖323 Conversely, the critical side of Peirce‘s philosophy is expressed by his denial of a common sense belief in introspection, at least insofar as the common sense introspection means ―...a direct perception of the internal world, but not necessarily a perception of it as internal.‖324 Peirce makes this denial of introspection, ―...that man possesses no infallible introspective power into the secrets of his own heart...‖ one of the clauses of his Critical Common-Sensism.325 Reid asserts that the prime source of knowledge of the mind is accurate self-reflection, but that this reflection must be supplemented by the study of the structure of language, and furthermore attention to human actions and opinions throughout history.326 However, we must distinguish this power of reflection from consciousness proper because it requires habits of attention: ―Attention is a voluntary act; it requires an active assertion to begin and to continue it, and it may be continued as long as we will; but consciousness is involuntary and of no continuance, 322 CP 5.265, ―Some Consequences of Four Incapacities‖ [1868] – Peirce‘s italics 323 CP 5.264 ―Some Consequences of Four Incapacities‖ [1868] – Peirce‘s italics 324 CP 5.244 ―Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man‖ [1867] – Peirce‘s italics 325 CP 5.498 [c. 1905] 326 Reid, Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man pp. 23-25 [1785]. 106 changing with every thought.‖327 In addition, in a later edition of his Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man Reid adds a chapter concerning five reasons for the difficulty of reflection, and especially the errors that insufficient attention to these difficulties has led philosophers. I will quote only a portion of the fifth that could have been written by Peirce: ―...for indeed, the same precision in the use of words, the same cool attention to the minute differences of things, the same talent for abstraction and analyzing, which fit a man for the study of mathematics are no less necessary in [the study of mind].‖328 Of course, it is insufficient to show that both men agreed that introspection is hard, as Descartes and Berkeley would agree as well. However, Peirce and Reid also agree that there are indubitable first principles of thought, indubitable not because they are absolutely certain, but because they are necessary for the conduct of life, especially when we deliberate together.329 Nonetheless, as Reid puts it, ―Yet it is not impossible that what is only a vulgar prejudice may be mistaken for a first principle. Nor is it impossible that what is really a first principle may, by the enchantment of words, have such a mist thrown about it, as to hide its evidence, and to make a man of candour doubt it.‖330 In other words, these principles are practically indubitable, as they are 327 Reid, EIP p. 26 [1785]. 328 Reid, EIP in The Works of Thomas Reid Volume 1 p. 241 [1863]. Compare Peirce on the faculties necessary for phenomenology: ―The third faculty we shall need is the generalizing power of the mathematician who produces the abstract formula that comprehends the very essence of the feature under examination purified from all admixture of extraneous and irrelevant accompaniments‖ (CP 5.42 [1903]). 329 For example, ―Common sense is that degree of judgment which is common to men with whom we can converse and transact business‖ (Reid EIP p. 271 [1785]). On the following page, Reid offers an additional qualification for a person of common sense, that we can call them to account for their conduct. 330 Reid EIP p. 17 [1785] 107 actually undoubted, and often are presupposed by the very activity of doubt.331 In addition, Reid characterizes his common sense defense of the evidence of our senses explicitly in the language of semiotics; for example, ―In original perception, the signs are the various sensations which are produced by the impressions upon our organs. The things signified, are the objects perceived in consequence of those sensations, by the original consequence of our nature.‖332 Indeed, talk of our knowledge as an achievement through signs, natural or artificial, is a constant feature of Reid‘s account. But here is not the place to clarify Reid‘s semiotic tendencies.333 Instead, let us push on to the points on which Peirce claims to depart from Reid and the Common Sense school. Again, in 1905 Peirce continued to seek an audience for his conception of pragmatism, and dedicated his efforts in part to establishing pragmatism‘s relationship to what he called Critical Common-Sensism: ―This is the doctrine of Critical Commonsensism, and the present pertinency of it is that a pragmaticist, to be consistent, is obliged to embrace it.‖334 The simplest, although perhaps not the best, reason for this obligation is that the pragmaticist insistence upon the close relation between thinking and action conjoined with the largely instinctive nature of action naturally leads her to the question of irresistible instinctive beliefs. However, in addition to the somatically331 As John Greco argues, ―[w]e may conclude that Reid embraced a broad and moderate foundationalism. His foundationalism is broad because it allows for a variety of so

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Pragmatism and the past: Charles Peirce and the conduct of memory and history

Although C. S. Peirce is generally regarded as the founder of American pragmatism, the fragmentary and incomplete character of many of his texts makes it hard to glimpse any systematic or coherent philosophy of pragmatism in them. One might respond to this state of affairs by interpreting Peirce in the light of the views of other pragmatists, in particular, of William James. While this interpretive strategy certainly gives one a handle on at least aspects of Peirce's philosophy, it has one decided disadvantage: it leads one to portray Peirce as simply the first in a line of thought which extends more or less continuously through James, Mead, and Dewey to Quine and even Richard Rorty. It is thus fated to obscure such discontinuities of philosophical intention and doctrine as might exist between Peirce and the later pragmatists. We have good reason to suspect the existence of such discontinuities. Late in his life Peirce himself felt that other writers who had begun calling themselves pragmatists had so misunderstood what he meant by the term that his own philosophy was in danger of being confused with theirs; in consequence, he renamed his doctrine "pragmaticism" in order to emphasize its difference from the doctrines of other so-called pragmatists.(1) This fact is a clear indication that we need another strategy of interpretation, one which will reveal a more systematic and coherent side to Peirce's philosophy, in the light of which the difference upon which Peirce himself insisted will become more clearly visible and intelligible. In this paper, I seek to identify just such an alternative strategy and then to sketch with its help an alternative picture of Peirce. Specifically, I seek to show how one might interpret Peirce's philosophy as possessing a decidedly Kantian character or architectonic in virtue of which there must be a fundamental discontinuity between his thought and that of James and those later writers who see themselves as belonging to the one tradition of American pragmatism initiated by Peirce. I will do this by adopting and elaborating the interpretation of Peirce articulated by the contemporary German philosopher Karl-Otto Apel in his book, Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism to Pragmaticism.(2) My claim will not be that the Apel-inspired picture of Peirce which I wish to sketch here is the only possible one; the frequent difficulty and incompleteness of Peirce's texts presumably make it futile to hope for a single definitive interpretation of him. Nonetheless, I do believe, first, that such a view of Peirce finds support in at least some, if not all, of his texts; and second, that it portrays him as an interesting and original thinker who is attempting to overcome the traditional concept of theoretical knowledge as episteme(3) while not rejecting, as is currently fashionable, the very idea of theory as knowledge of how things really are. Much of what I say comes from Apel, and where that is the case, I have indicated it. At the same time, Apel's interpretation is itself rather scanty and even obscure; in order to overcome these difficulties, I have engaged in more than a little creative reconstruction of my own. In particular, the account I give in section III of what Peirce means by semiosis is not to be found in Apel, although many things he says suggest aspects of it. Nor does Apel ever explicitly describe Peirce's central problem in the way I do in section IV, namely, as the problem of showing how theoretical inquiry is possible once one has made that break with the traditional concept of theory as episteme which Apel calls Peirce's semiotic transformation of the theory of knowledge. The views expressed in sections VI and VII should not be attributed to Apel. This is particularly true of the claim I make in section VII, namely, that a consensus theory of truth, whether Peirce's or anyone else's, is best understood not as offering an alternative to the traditional correspondence theory, but rather as making this latter criterially relevant. …

C. B. Christensen

Papers

Peirce's Transformation of Kant