https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w11883/w11883.pdf

The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing

In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.

/pdf/the-economic-consequences-of-legal-origins-3phhiol1rf.pdf

The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins

A common approach to evaluating robustness to omitted variable bias is to observe coefficient movements after inclusion of controls. This is informative only if selection on observables is informative about selection on unobservables. Although this link is known in theory in existing literature, very few empirical articles approach this formally. I develop an extension of the theory that connects bias explicitly to coefficient stability. I show that it is necessary to take into account coefficient and R-squared movements. I develop a formal bounding argument. I show two validation exercises and discuss application to the economics literature. Supplementary materials for this article are available online.

/pdf/unobservable-selection-and-coefficient-stability-theory-and-1r9lpwnnl2.pdf

Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence

The authors present the latest update of their aggregate governance indicators, together with new analysis of several issues related to the use of these measures. The governance indicators measure the following six dimensions of governance: (1) voice and accountability; (2) political instability and violence; (3) government effectiveness; (4) regulatory quality; (5) rule of law, and (6) control of corruption. They cover 209 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. They are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 organizations. The authors present estimates of the six dimensions of governance for each period, as well as margins of error capturing the range of likely values for each country. These margins of error are not unique to perceptions-based measures of governance, but are an important feature of all efforts to measure governance, including objective indicators. In fact, the authors give examples of how individual objective measures provide an incomplete picture of even the quite particular dimensions of governance that they are intended to measure. The authors also analyze in detail changes over time in their estimates of governance; provide a framework for assessing the statistical significance of changes in governance; and suggest a simple rule of thumb for identifying statistically significant changes in country governance over time. The ability to identify significant changes in governance over time is much higher for aggregate indicators than for any individual indicator. While the authors find that the quality of governance in a number of countries has changed significantly (in both directions), they also provide evidence suggesting that there are no trends, for better or worse, in global averages of governance. Finally, they interpret the strong observed correlation between income and governance, and argue against recent efforts to apply a discount to governance performance in low-income countries.

/pdf/governance-matters-iv-governance-indicators-for-1996-2004-1ybeh8tgzn.pdf

Governance matters IV : governance indicators for 1996-2004

Bank Regulation and Supervision: What Works Best?

https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/priv_credit_jfe.pdf

Private credit in 129 countries

We present insolvency practitioners from 88 countries with an identical case of a hotel about to default on its debt, and ask them to describe in detail how debt enforcement against this hotel will proceed in their countries. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern versus piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country. We identify several characteristics of debt enforcement procedures, such as the structure of appeals and availability of floating charge finance, that influence efficiency. Our measure of efficiency of debt enforcement is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin and predicts debt market development across countries. Interestingly, it is also highly correlated with measures of the quality of contract enforcement and public regulation obtained in other studies.

/pdf/debt-enforcement-around-the-world-48gn30t34h.pdf

Debt Enforcement Around the World

The World Development Report (WDR) 2002 is about building market institutions that promote growth and reduce poverty, addressing how institutions support markets, what makes institutions work, and how to build them. This theme is a natural a natural continuation of the WDR 2000/01, which discussed the central role of markets in the lives of poor people, leaving important issues for the WDR 2003, which will focus on the development of human, natural, and environmental capital. This report emphasizes on building institutions to support the development of markets, and its main messages address supplying effective institutions, and creating the demand for them, through: a design that complements institutions, human capabilities, and available technologies; innovations that identify institutional successes, and weaknesses, by experimenting with, and recognizing local conditions, and differences, ranging from social norms, to geography; a connection of communities of market players, by opening information flows, and trade; and, the promotion of competition among jurisdictions, firms, and individuals. The report is an introspective analysis about how do institutions support markets, growth, and poverty reduction, defining institutional work as a channel of information about market conditions, goods, and participants; as a mean to enforce property rights, and contracts; and, as a tool to increase competition in markets. The report offers lessons derived from experience in institutional evolution, and, although it does not address all possible institutional problems, it does focus on sets of institutions from many fields, to show that the framework, and messages can be applied regardless of the sector.

World development report 2002 - building institutions for markets

The authors examine patterns of media ownership in 97 countries around the world. They find that almost universally the largest media firms are controlled by the government or by private families. Government ownership is more pervasive in broadcasting than in the printed media. Government ownership is generally associated with less press freedom, fewer political and economic rights, inferior governance, and, most conspicuously, inferior social outcomes in education and health. The adverse effects of government ownership on political and economic freedom are stronger for newspapers than for television. The adverse effects of government ownership of the media do not appear to be restricted solely to instances of government monopoly. The authors present a range of evidence on the adverse consequences of state ownership of the media. State ownership of the media is often argued to be justified on behalf of the social needs of the disadvantaged. But if their findings are correct, increasing private ownership of the media--through privatization or by encouraging the entry of privately owned media--can advance a variety of political and economic goals, especially those of meeting the social needs of the poor.

Who Owns the Media

We present insolvency practitioners from 88 countries, and ask them to describe in detail how debt enforcement will proceed in their countries. We use the data on time, cost, and the likely disposition of the assets (preservation as a going concern versus piecemeal sale) to construct a measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement in each country. We identify several characteristics of debt enforcement procedures, such as the structure of appeals and availability of floating charge finance, that influence efficiency. Our measure of efficiency of debt enforcement is strongly correlated with per capita income and legal origin and predicts debt market development across countries. Interestingly, it is also highly correlated with measures of the quality of contract enforcement and public regulation obtained in other studies.

/pdf/debt-enforcement-around-the-world-34ceg1xrsb.pdf

Caralee McLiesh

Papers

Private credit in 129 countries

Debt Enforcement Around the World

World development report 2002 - building institutions for markets

Who Owns the Media

Debt Enforcement around the World