In one embodiment, a server and a client are configured to trust a certificate of an intermediate proxy device. The proxy device may then intercept a client-server security session request message sent from the client to the server. In response, the proxy device initiates a proxy-server security session with the server and obtains server security information from the server. Then, the proxy device initiates a client-proxy security session with the client using the trusted proxy certificate, and obtains client security information from the client. Upon obtaining the client security information, the proxy device creates a dynamic certificate using the obtained client security information and the trusted proxy certificate, and establishes the initiated proxy-server security session with the dynamic certificate. The proxy device then establishes the initiated client-proxy session, wherein the client-proxy security session and proxy-server security session transparently appear to the client and server as the requested client-server security session.

Transparent proxy of encrypted sessions

A traffic management device (TMD), system, and processor-readable storage medium are directed to determining that an end-to-end encrypted session has been established between a client and an authentication server, intercepting and decrypting subsequent task traffic from the client, and forwarding the intercepted traffic toward a server. In some embodiments, a second connection between the TMD and server may be employed to forward the intercepted traffic, and the second connection may be unencrypted or encrypted with a different mechanism than the encrypted connection to the authentication server. The encrypted connection to the authentication server may be maintained following authentication to enable termination of the second connection if the client becomes untrusted, and/or to enable logging of client requests, connection information, and the like. In some embodiments, the TMD may act as a proxy to provide client access to a number of servers and/or resources.

Proxy SSL authentication in split SSL for client-side proxy agent resources with content insertion

A system to automatically classify types of IP addresses associated with a user. Information, such as user names, machine information, IP address, etc., may be obtained from logs. For each user or host in the logs, home IP addresses are identified from IP addresses where the user or host shows a predetermined level of activity. Travel IP addresses are identified, which are IP addresses at locations greater than a predetermined distance from the home IP addresses, as determined from geolocation data. A pattern analysis may be performed to determine which of the home IP addresses are work IP addresses associated with the user or host. The system may thus provide a classification of a user's or host's associated IP addresses as being one of travel, home, and work IP addresses. From this classification, mobility patterns may be derived, as well as applications to enhance security, advertising, search and network management.

Automatic identification of travel and non-travel network addresses

A method, system, and apparatus are directed towards enabling access to payload by a third-party sent over an SSL session The third-party may be a proxy situated between a client and a server SSL handshake messages are sent between the client and the server to establish the SSL connection As the SSL handshake messages are routed through the proxy, the proxy may extract data In addition, one of the client or the server may send another message within, or out-of-band to, the series of SSL handshake message directly to the proxy The other SSL message may include secret data that the proxy may use to generate a session key for the SSL connection With the session key, the proxy may receive SSL messages over the SSL connection, modify and/or transpose the payload within the received SSL messages, and/or terminate the SSL connection at the proxy

Accessing SSL connection data by a third-party

A traffic management device (TMD), system, and processor-readable storage medium are directed to monitoring an encrypted session between a client and a server, determining that the session identifier is unknown, and requesting a renegotiation of the session to acquire a session identifier for the renegotiated session. Determination that the session identifier is unknown may be based on interception and analysis of handshake messages sent by the client and/or the server. Following such determination, a renegotiation of the encrypted session may be triggered by sending a renegotiation request to the client, and a session identifier for the renegotiated session may be determined based on information extracted from subsequent handshake messages exchanged between the client and server during the renegotiation. Determination of the session identifier may enable decryption, encryption and modification of subsequent communications traffic, for example insertion of third party content into traffic sent to the client.

Aggressive rehandshakes on unknown session identifiers for split ssl

The existence of a proxy can be detected by examining a timing differential between handshake messages received at a server used to establish a channel according to a first protocol and the handshake messages used to establish a secondary channel on top of the first protocol (e.g., a secure communications channel). If the time between two handshakes received at the server to set up the secondary channel is greater than the time between two handshakes received at the server to establish the initial channel, the presence of a proxy can be detected.

Carsten Lankheim

Papers

System and method for passively detecting a proxy