We enter the debate over the role of sex in judging by addressing the two predominant empirical questions it raises: whether male and female judges decide cases distinctly (individual effects) and whether the presence of a female judge on a panel causes her male colleagues to behave differently (panel effects). We do not, however, rely exclusively on the predominant statistical models - variants of standard regression analysis - to address them. Because these tools alone are ill-suited to the task at hand, we deploy a more appropriate methodology - non-parametric matching - which follows from a formal framework for causal inference. Applying matching methods to sex discrimination suits resolved in the federal circuits between 1995 and 2002 yields two clear results. First, we observe substantial individual effects: The likelihood of a judge deciding in favor of the party alleging discrimination decreases by about 10 percentage points when the judge is a male. Likewise, we find that men are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the rights litigant when a woman serves on the panel. Both effects are so persistent and consistent that they may come as a surprise even to those scholars who have long posited the existence of gendered judging.

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Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging

This article integrates the literatures on judicial compliance, panel decision making, and case selection in the federal judiciary hierarchy. Many studies have speculated that ‘‘panel effects’’—the phenomena under which an individual judge’s vote may depend on her colleagues on a three-judge panel—can be tied to a ‘‘whistleblower effect,’’ through which a lower court judge can constrain a panel majority from disobeying with Supreme Court precedent by threatening to dissent. However, no study has systematically found such a relationship. I present a game-theoretic model of circuit court-Supreme Court interaction that demonstrates how panel composition might affect the likelihood of lower court compliance to Supreme Court doctrine. The model illustrates how three-judge panels, while not inducing perfect doctrinal control of lower courts by the Supreme Court, significantly increases the latter’s ability to see its preferred doctrine carried out by its subordinates in the judicial hierarchy.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/40058185

Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US Courts of Appeals

Do judges make decisions that are truly impartial? A wide range of experimental and field studies reveal that several extralegal factors influence judicial decision making. Demographic characteristics of judges and litigants affect judges' decisions. Judges also rely heavily on intuitive reasoning in deciding cases, making them vulnerable to the use of mental shortcuts that can lead to mistakes. Furthermore, judges sometimes rely on facts outside the record and rule more favorably toward litigants who are more sympathetic or with whom they share demographic characteristics. On the whole, judges are excellent decision makers and sometimes resist common errors of judgment that influence ordinary adults. The weight of the evidence, however, suggests that judges are vulnerable to systematic deviations from the ideal of judicial impartiality.

/pdf/judging-the-judiciary-by-the-numbers-empirical-research-on-51m0qk83m0.pdf

Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers: Empirical Research on Judges

This paper evaluates the substantive consequences of judicial diversity on the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Because of the small percentage of racial minorities on the federal bench, the key question in evaluating these consequences is not whether minority judges simply vote differently from non-minority judges, but whether their presence on appellate courts influences their colleagues and also affects case outcomes. Using matching methods, I show that black judges are significantly more likely than white judges to support affirmative action programs. In fact, the random assignment of a black counter-judge - a black judge sitting with two white judges - to a three-judge panel of the Courts of Appeals nearly ensures that the panel will vote in favor of an affirmative action program. Thus, the substantive consequences of racial diversity on the Courts of Appeals are quite large.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1946507_code726071.pdf?abstractid=1674052&mirid=1&type=2

Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts

Do hierarchical politics in the federal judiciary shape collegial politics on the U.S. Courts of Appeals and thus influence judicial voting and case outcomes? I develop a model in which the political control of the dual layer of hierarchy above three-judge panels - full circuits and the Supreme Court - affects the ability of a single Democratic or Republican judge on a three-judge panel to influence two colleagues from the opposing party. The theory predicts that panel majorities should be more strongly influenced by a single judge of the opposing party - a "counter-judge" - when that judge is aligned with the Supreme Court. Examining thousands of judicial votes in multiple issue areas, I show that the effect of adding a counter-judge to a panel is indeed asymmetric, and varies based on hierarchical alignment. The interaction of hierarchical and collegial politics increases the Supreme Court's control of the judicial hierarchy andhelps promotes the rule of law.

Charles M. Cameron

Papers

Diversity and Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from Affirmative Action Cases in the Federal Courts of