DOCUMENT RESUME JC 700 176 Giles, Louise A Research Project to Determine the Student Acceptability and Learning Effectiveness of Microform Collections in Community Colleges: Phase Final Report. American Association of Junior Colleges, Washington, D. C,. Office of Education (DHEW) , Washington, D.C. Bureau of Research. BR-9-0260 Jun 70 OEC-0-9-180260-3703-(095) 248p. EDRS Price MF-$1.00 HC-$12.50 *Educational Research, Educational Resources, *Educational Technology, Information Retrieval, Information Storage, *Instructional Materials, *Junior Colleges, Microfiche, Microfilm, *Microforms Microform collections offer one of the more promising methods of increasing student learning while, at the same time, responding economically to the pressure of increasing enrollments. This study reports on the first phase of a 3-phase project to determine student acceptance of microform, and on the effectiveness of microform for learning. Included in this report are a description of the problem to be investigated, the methods and activities involved in establishing the project office and selecting staff, and the progress of the project to date. At this time, microform materials will be used in conjunction with the following courses: art appreciation, Black studies, college algebra, economics, freshman composition, life science, nursing, political science, basic psychology, and beginning college Spanish. Bibliographies for these courses have been prepared (included as appendices to the report) and will be microformed to provide most of the necessary course material. In concluding the Phase I report, the principal investigator observes that completion of the full study could have a meaningful effect on patterns of information storage and retrieval, and on the field of educational resources in general. -(Phase II will involve the conduct of a pilot study using developed materials, and Phase III will involve the conduct of a full field study and evaluation of the results.) (JO) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEWN, EDUCATION & WELFARE OFFICE OF EDUCATION THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE N. PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY. C:) L4.1 Final Report Contract No. OEC-0-9-i80260-3703-(095) A Research Project to Determine the Student Acceptability and Learning Effectiveness of Microform Collections in Community Colleges: Phase I

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A Research Project to Determine the Student Acceptability and Learning Effectiveness of Microform Collections in Community Colleges: Phase I, Final Report.

We present a rational-choice theory of how decision makers choose sides, or neutrality, in ongoing wars. The theory focuses on each nation's expected utility from the war's possible outcomes, and on each nation's utility for its available strategies. Once the decision-making calculus is specified, the theory is tested against more than two thousand national decisions to remain neutral or to join an ongoing war on one side or the other. The theory proves to have considerable explanatory power, with the results of the data analysis indicating that the basic decision-making calculus used to choose sides in wars has not changed substantially during the past century and a half, although there have been some adjustments upwards and downwards in the relative importance of particular elements in the calculus.

Choosing Sides in Wars

Introduction 1 The methodological debate and the quest for custom 2 Conditions of self-defence 3 The Armed Attack Requirement Ratione Materiae 4 The Armed Attack Requirement Ratione Temporis 5 The Armed Attack Requirement Ratione Personae 6 What future for the armed attack criterion?

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'Armed Attack' and Article 51 of the Un Charter : Evolutions In Customary Law And Practice

SUMMARY This article, in two parts, starts by examining the process at play in the definition of a coherent planning unit for protected areas. The argument centers around the differences between the natural and social science approaches to defining the boundaries to such areas, indicating how the two have influenced planning. The difficult challenge of combining both visions is stressed, and illustrated by a discussion of the concepts of region and bioregion. The second part of the paper examines the biosphere reserve model and its application to areas spanning international boundaries. The five existing transboundary biosphere reserves, all situated in Europe, illustrate some of the issues facing transboundary planning.

Planning Protected Areas Across Boundaries

medium of paint alone.(12) Their affinity with, one would hesitate to call it a historical derivation from, the deserted, magniloquent, and awesome landscapes of Romantic painting obviously furthered nationalist overtones for these artists as well. By 1950, in none of the recently occupied and worn-out countries could there be painting of such naked, prepossessing self-confidence, such a metaphoric equation of the grandeur of one's homeland with religious veneration. Still, it would misrepresent this art to call it internally assured. As the '50s wore on, it became evident that however original in pictorial style, American painters had emotional ties with the anxieties and dreads of French existentialism. It is true that they disengaged themselves from the typical Sartrean problem of the translation of personal to political liberty, but they showed great concern for his notion that one is condemned to freedom, that the very necessity to create oneself, to give oneself a distinguishable existence, was a desperate, fateful plight. The tension of the private myth is the content of every painting of this vanguard. The act on the canvas springs from an attempt to resurrect the saving moment in his "story" when the painter first felt himself released from Value—myth of past self-recognition. Or it attempts to initiate a new moment in which the painter will realize his total personality—myth of future selfrecognition.(13) From quite a famous essay, "The American Action Painters," Harold Rosenberg's sonorous remarks were designed to reveal the heights to which the gestural side of our art aspired by indicating the precipices off which the psychology of gesture might easily fall. One false step, one divergence from the "real act," and you produced merely "apocalyptic wallpaper." In terms of American tradition, the new painters stand somewhere between Christian Science and Whitman's "gangs of cosmos." That is, between a discipline of vagueness by which one protects

American Painting During the Cold War

THE recent Six Day War in the Middle East grew out of the sterile confrontation to which the peoples of the region had committed themselves over the past twenty years. Both parties had frequently proclaimed their intention to go to war under certain circumstances. It seems unlikely, however, that any of them plotted and planned war for 1967. It seems more likely that they blundered into it. Both sides might on many occasions have moved to end their confrontation by compromise, but this neither side showed the slightest willingness to do. The Israelis, feeling themselves be leaguered by fifty million hostile neighbors, acutely conscious of the recent fate of six million Jews in Europe, believed any signifi cant concession would merely whet insatiable Arab appetites and start Israel down the slippery slope to extinction. The Arabs, looking upon the establishment of Israel as the latest in a series of imperialist occupations of their homeland, of which the presence of a million Palestine refugees was a constant reminder, found it emotionally and politically impossible to accept Israel as a perma nent fact of life or to forego harassing it and conspiring against it. This common intolerance and mutual harassment had brought on war in 1956. It is pertinent to note that, in his "Diary of the Sinai Campaign" published in 1966, General Dayan wrote that the three major objects of that campaign from the Israeli point of view were "freedom of shipping for Israeli vessels in the Gulf of Aqaba; an end to the Feydayen terrorism; and a neutraliza tion of the threat of attack on Israel by the joint Egypt-Syria Jordan military command." With slight variations, these were the issues that brought on war again eleven years later.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/20039302.pdf

The Arab-Israeli War

How It Began

THERE are many different ways of conducting a govern ment. In the United States the executive authority is both more formally centralized in the President and more sharply separated from the legislature than in most democracies. This is particularly true of the conduct of foreign affairs, where the authority of the President has been seriously challenged only in those rare instances, such as the Versailles Treaty or the Vietnam war, when he seems to be grossly ignoring or overrid ing the opinions both of the Congress and of the public. In general, he has been free to conduct foreign affairs more or less as he chooses, to use traditional instruments, to set up new ones or to carry on diplomacy from his own hip pocket. There is little use arguing whether or not he has the constitutional right to do so. As our government is organized, he has both the re sponsibility and the power. Critics in or out of the Congress can make things difficult for him, but they can neither conduct for eign affairs themselves nor prevent him from doing so. Of course, a wise President will consult the Congress closely, in fact as well as in form, on matters of major import, which recent Presidents have often foolishly failed to do. Our concern here, however, is with the instruments which Presidents use for the conduct of foreign affairs. Up until the 1930s the instrument was almost always the traditional one, the Secretary and Department of State, except in those not infre quent cases where a strong President, such as Theodore Roose velt and Woodrow Wilson, chose to carry on a particular exer cise in diplomacy himself, sometimes with the help of a personal adviser or emissary. Nevertheless, as late as 1931, President Hoover, though not himself inexperienced in foreign affairs, relied on Secretary Stimson to deal, in so far as the United States was prepared to deal, with the Manchurian crises. Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, just at the moment when the rise to power of ambitious dictators in both Europe and Asia made inevitable much deeper American involvement in foreign affairs, named as Secretary of State, almost entirely for domestic political reasons, an eminent Senator, Cordell Hull, who had

Charles W. Yost

Papers

The Arab-Israeli War

How It Began

The Instruments of American Foreign Policy

The conduct and misconduct of foreign affairs

World Order and American Responsibility