From the Book:
“Clean code that works” is Ron Jeffries’ pithy phrase. The goal is clean code that works, and for a whole bunch of reasons:
Clean code that works is a predictable way to develop. You know when you are finished, without having to worry about a long bug trail.Clean code that works gives you a chance to learn all the lessons that the code has to teach you. If you only ever slap together the first thing you think of, you never have time to think of a second, better, thing. Clean code that works improves the lives of users of our software.Clean code that works lets your teammates count on you, and you on them.Writing clean code that works feels good.But how do you get to clean code that works? Many forces drive you away from clean code, and even code that works. Without taking too much counsel of our fears, here’s what we do—drive development with automated tests, a style of development called “Test-Driven Development” (TDD for short). 
In Test-Driven Development, you:
Write new code only if you first have a failing automated test.Eliminate duplication.

Two simple rules, but they generate complex individual and group behavior. Some of the technical implications are:You must design organically, with running code providing feedback between decisionsYou must write your own tests, since you can’t wait twenty times a day for someone else to write a testYour development environment must provide rapid response to small changesYour designs must consist of many highly cohesive, loosely coupled components, just to make testing easy

The two rules imply an order to the tasks ofprogramming:
1. Red—write a little test that doesn’t work, perhaps doesn’t even compile at first
2. Green—make the test work quickly, committing whatever sins necessary in the process
3. Refactor—eliminate all the duplication created in just getting the test to work


Red/green/refactor. The TDD’s mantra.

Assuming for the moment that such a style is possible, it might be possible to dramatically reduce the defect density of code and make the subject of work crystal clear to all involved. If so, writing only code demanded by failing tests also has social implications:
If the defect density can be reduced enough, QA can shift from reactive to pro-active workIf the number of nasty surprises can be reduced enough, project managers can estimate accurately enough to involve real customers in daily developmentIf the topics of technical conversations can be made clear enough, programmers can work in minute-by-minute collaboration instead of daily or weekly collaborationAgain, if the defect density can be reduced enough, we can have shippable software with new functionality every day, leading to new business relationships with customers


So, the concept is simple, but what’s my motivation? Why would a programmer take on the additional work of writing automated tests? Why would a programmer work in tiny little steps when their mind is capable of great soaring swoops of design? Courage.
Courage
Test-driven development is a way of managing fear during programming. I don’t mean fear in a bad way, pow widdle prwogwammew needs a pacifiew, but fear in the legitimate, this-is-a-hard-problem-and-I-can’t-see-the-end-from-the-beginning sense. If pain is nature’s way of saying “Stop!”, fear is nature’s way of saying “Be careful.” Being careful is good, but fear has a host of other effects:
Makes you tentativeMakes you want to communicate lessMakes you shy from feedbackMakes you grumpy

None of these effects are helpful when programming, especially when programming something hard. So, how can you face a difficult situation and:
Instead of being tentative, begin learning concretely as quickly as possible.Instead of clamming up, communicate more clearly.Instead of avoiding feedback, search out helpful, concrete feedback.(You’ll have to work on grumpiness on your own.) 

Imagine programming as turning a crank to pull a bucket of water from a well. When the bucket is small, a free-spinning crank is fine. When the bucket is big and full of water, you’re going to get tired before the bucket is all the way up. You need a ratchet mechanism to enable you to rest between bouts of cranking. The heavier the bucket, the closer the teeth need to be on the ratchet.

The tests in test-driven development are the teeth of the ratchet. Once you get one test working, you know it is working, now and forever. You are one step closer to having everything working than you were when the test was broken. Now get the next one working, and the next, and the next. By analogy, the tougher the programming problem, the less ground should be covered by each test.

Readers of Extreme Programming Explained will notice a difference in tone between XP and TDD. TDD isn’t an absolute like Extreme Programming. XP says, “Here are things you must be able to do to be prepared to evolve further.” TDD is a little fuzzier. TDD is an awareness of the gap between decision and feedback during programming, and techniques to control that gap. “What if I do a paper design for a week, then test-drive the code? Is that TDD?” Sure, it’s TDD. You were aware of the gap between decision and feedback and you controlled the gap deliberately.

That said, most people who learn TDD find their programming practice changed for good. “Test Infected” is the phrase Erich Gamma coined to describe this shift. You might find yourself writing more tests earlier, and working in smaller steps than you ever dreamed would be sensible. On the other hand, some programmers learn TDD and go back to their earlier practices, reserving TDD for special occasions when ordinary programming isn’t making progress.

There are certainly programming tasks that can’t be driven solely by tests (or at least, not yet). Security software and concurrency, for example, are two topics where TDD is not sufficient to mechanically demonstrate that the goals of the software have been met. Security relies on essentially defect-free code, true, but also on human judgement about the methods used to secure the software. Subtle concurrency problems can’t be reliably duplicated by running the code.

Once you are finished reading this book, you should be ready to:
Start simplyWrite automated testsRefactor to add design decisions one at a time

This book is organized into three sections.
An example of writing typical model code using TDD. The example is one I got from Ward Cunningham years ago, and have used many times since, multi-currency arithmetic. In it you will learn to write tests before code and grow a design organically.An example of testing more complicated logic, including reflection and exceptions, by developing a framework for automated testing. This example also serves to introduce you to the xUnit architecture that is at the heart of many programmer-oriented testing tools. In the second example you will learn to work in even smaller steps than in the first example, including the kind of self-referential hooha beloved of computer scientists.Patterns for TDD. Included are patterns for the deciding what tests to write, how to write tests using xUnit, and a greatest hits selection of the design patterns and refactorings used in the examples.

I wrote the examples imagining a pair programming session. If you like looking at the map before wandering around, you may want to go straight to the patterns in Section 3 and use the examples as illustrations. If you prefer just wandering around and then looking at the map to see where you’ve been, try reading the examples through and refering to the patterns when you want more detail about a technique, then using the patterns as a reference.

Several reviewers have commented they got the most out of the examples when they started up a programming environment and entered the code and ran the tests as they read.

A note about the examples. Both examples, multi-currency calculation and a testing framework, appear simple. There are (and I have seen) complicated, ugly, messy ways of solving the same problems. I could have chosen one of those complicated, ugly, messy solutions to give the book an air of “reality.” However, my goal, and I hope your goal, is to write clean code that works. Before teeing off on the examples as being too simple, spend 15 seconds imagining a programming world in which all code was this clear and direct, where there were no complicated solutions, only apparently complicated problems begging for careful thought. TDD is a practice that can help you lead yourself to exactly that careful thought.

Test Driven Development: By Example

A large number of distributed applications requires continuous and timely processing of information as it flows from the periphery to the center of the system. Examples include intrusion detection systems which analyze network traffic in real-time to identify possible attacks; environmental monitoring applications which process raw data coming from sensor networks to identify critical situations; or applications performing online analysis of stock prices to identify trends and forecast future values.Traditional DBMSs, which need to store and index data before processing it, can hardly fulfill the requirements of timeliness coming from such domains. Accordingly, during the last decade, different research communities developed a number of tools, which we collectively call Information flow processing (IFP) systems, to support these scenarios. They differ in their system architecture, data model, rule model, and rule language. In this article, we survey these systems to help researchers, who often come from different backgrounds, in understanding how the various approaches they adopt may complement each other.In particular, we propose a general, unifying model to capture the different aspects of an IFP system and use it to provide a complete and precise classification of the systems and mechanisms proposed so far.

Processing flows of information: From data stream to complex event processing

Malicious code is an increasingly important problem that threatens the security of computer systems. The traditional line of defense against malware is composed of malware detectors such as virus and spyware scanners. Unfortunately, both researchers and malware authors have demonstrated that these scanners, which use pattern matching to identify malware, can be easily evaded by simple code transformations. To address this shortcoming, more powerful malware detectors have been proposed. These tools rely on semantic signatures and employ static analysis techniques such as model checking and theorem proving to perform detection. While it has been shown that these systems are highly effective in identifying current malware, it is less clear how successful they would be against adversaries that take into account the novel detection mechanisms. The goal of this paper is to explore the limits of static analysis for the detection of malicious code. To this end, we present a binary obfuscation scheme that relies on the idea of opaque constants, which are primitives that allow us to load a constant into a register such that an analysis tool cannot determine its value. Based on opaque constants, we build obfuscation transformations that obscure program control flow, disguise access to local and global variables, and interrupt tracking of values held in processor registers. Using our proposed obfuscation approach, we were able to show that advanced semantics-based malware detectors can be evaded. Moreover, our opaque constant primitive can be applied in a way such that is provably hard to analyze for any static code analyzer. This demonstrates that static analysis techniques alone might no longer be sufficient to identify malware.

/pdf/limits-of-static-analysis-for-malware-detection-2mrakaqmj6.pdf

Limits of Static Analysis for Malware Detection

Software engineering comprehends several disciplines devoted to prevent and remedy malfunctions and to warrant adequate behaviour. Testing, the subject of this paper, is a widespread validation approach in industry, but it is still largely ad hoc, expensive, and unpredictably effective. Indeed, software testing is a broad term encompassing a variety of activities along the development cycle and beyond, aimed at different goals. Hence, software testing research faces a collection of challenges. A consistent roadmap of the most relevant challenges to be addressed is here proposed. In it, the starting point is constituted by some important past achievements, while the destination consists of four identified goals to which research ultimately tends, but which remain as unreachable as dreams. The routes from the achievements to the dreams are paved by the outstanding research challenges, which are discussed in the paper along with interesting ongoing work.

/pdf/software-testing-research-achievements-challenges-dreams-et7gocee7m.pdf

Software Testing Research: Achievements, Challenges, Dreams

http://christian.schallhart.net/publications/2009--jlap--a-brief-account-of-runtime-verification.pdf

A Brief Account of Runtime Verification

This article studies runtime verification of properties expressed either in lineartime temporal logic (LTL) or timed lineartime temporal logic (TLTL). It classifies runtime verification in identifying its distinguishing features to model checking and testing, respectively. It introduces a three-valued semantics (with truth values true, false, inconclusive) as an adequate interpretation as to whether a partial observation of a running system meets an LTL or TLTL property.For LTL, a conceptually simple monitor generation procedure is given, which is optimal in two respects: First, the size of the generated deterministic monitor is minimal, and, second, the monitor identifies a continuously monitored trace as either satisfying or falsifying a property as early as possible. The feasibility of the developed methodology is demontrated using a collection of real-world temporal logic specifications. Moreover, the presented approach is related to the properties monitorable in general and is compared to existing concepts in the literature. It is shown that the set of monitorable properties does not only encompass the safety and cosafety properties but is strictly larger.For TLTL, the same road map is followed by first defining a three-valued semantics. The corresponding construction of a timed monitor is more involved, yet, as shown, possible.

/pdf/runtime-verification-for-ltl-and-tltl-3qkh8x1gqu.pdf

Runtime Verification for LTL and TLTL

When monitoring a system w.r.t. a property defined in a temporal logic such as LTL, a major concern is to settle with an adequate interpretation of observable system events; that is, models of temporal logic formulae are usually infinite words of events, whereas at runtime only finite but incrementally expanding prefixes are available.

In this work, we review LTL-derived logics for finite traces from a runtime-verification perspective. In doing so, we establish four maxims to be satisfied by any LTL-derived logic aimed at runtime verification. As no pre-existing logic readily satisfies all of them, we introduce a new four-valued logic Runtime Verification Linear Temporal Logic RV-LTL in accordance to these maxims. The semantics of Runtime Verification Linear Temporal Logic (RV-LTL) indicates whether a finite word describes a system behaviour which either (i) satisfies the monitored property, (ii) violates the property, (iii) will presumably violate the property, or (iv) will presumably conform to the property in the future, once the system has stabilized. Notably, (i) and (ii) correspond to the classical semantics of LTL, whereas (iii) and (iv) are chosen whenever an observed system behaviour has not yet lead to a violation or acceptance of the monitored property.

Moreover, we present a monitor construction for RV-LTL properties in terms of Moore machines signalizing the semantics of the so far obtained execution trace w.r.t. the monitored property.

/pdf/comparing-ltl-semantics-for-runtime-verification-4910s0j1ie.pdf

Comparing LTL Semantics for Runtime Verification

This paper presents a construction for runtime monitors that check real-time properties expressed in timed LTL (TLTL). Due to D'Souza's results, TLTL can be considered a natural extension of LTL towards real-time. Moreover, a typical obstacle in runtime verification is solved both for untimed and timed formulae, in that standard models of linear temporal logic are infinite traces, whereas in runtime verification only finite system behaviours are at hand. Therefore, a 3-valued semantics (true, false, inconclusive) for LTL and TLTL on finite traces is defined that resembles the infinite trace semantics in a suitable and intuitive manner. Then, the paper describes how to construct, given a (T)LTL formula, a deterministic monitor with three output symbols that reads a finite trace and yields its according 3-valued (T)LTL semantics. Notably, the monitor rejects a trace as early as possible, in that any minimal bad prefix results in false as a return value.

Monitoring of real-time properties

The ease of compiling malicious code from source code in higher programming languages has increased the volatility of malicious programs: The first appearance of a new worm in the wild is usually followed by modified versions in quick succession. As demonstrated by Christodorescu and Jha, however, classical detection software relies on static patterns, and is easily outsmarted. In this paper, we present a flexible method to detect malicious code patterns in executables by model checking. While model checking was originally developed to verify the correctness of systems against specifications, we argue that it lends itself equally well to the specification of malicious code patterns. To this end, we introduce the specification language CTPL (Computation Tree Predicate Logic) which extends the well-known logic CTL, and describe an efficient model checking algorithm. Our practical experiments demonstrate that we are able to detect a large number of worm variants with a single specification.

/pdf/detecting-malicious-code-by-model-checking-4jm4qn13zs.pdf

Christian Schallhart

Papers

A Brief Account of Runtime Verification

Runtime Verification for LTL and TLTL

Comparing LTL Semantics for Runtime Verification

Monitoring of real-time properties

Detecting malicious code by model checking