We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Random graphs

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Besides attracting a billion dollar economy, Bitcoin revolutionized the field of digital currencies and influenced many adjacent areas. This also induced significant scientific interest. In this survey, we unroll and structure the manyfold results and research directions. We start by introducing the Bitcoin protocol and its building blocks. From there we continue to explore the design space by discussing existing contributions and results. In the process, we deduce the fundamental structures and insights at the core of the Bitcoin protocol and its applications. As we show and discuss, many key ideas are likewise applicable in various other fields, so that their impact reaches far beyond Bitcoin itself.

Bitcoin and Beyond: A Technical Survey on Decentralized Digital Currencies

Online content exhibits rich temporal dynamics, and diverse realtime user generated content further intensifies this process. However, temporal patterns by which online content grows and fades over time, and by which different pieces of content compete for attention remain largely unexplored.We study temporal patterns associated with online content and how the content's popularity grows and fades over time. The attention that content receives on the Web varies depending on many factors and occurs on very different time scales and at different resolutions. In order to uncover the temporal dynamics of online content we formulate a time series clustering problem using a similarity metric that is invariant to scaling and shifting. We develop the K-Spectral Centroid (K-SC) clustering algorithm that effectively finds cluster centroids with our similarity measure. By applying an adaptive wavelet-based incremental approach to clustering, we scale K-SC to large data sets.We demonstrate our approach on two massive datasets: a set of 580 million Tweets, and a set of 170 million blog posts and news media articles. We find that K-SC outperforms the K-means clustering algorithm in finding distinct shapes of time series. Our analysis shows that there are six main temporal shapes of attention of online content. We also present a simple model that reliably predicts the shape of attention by using information about only a small number of participants. Our analyses offer insight into common temporal patterns of the content on theWeb and broaden the understanding of the dynamics of human attention.

/pdf/patterns-of-temporal-variation-in-online-media-105ws0roat.pdf

Patterns of temporal variation in online media

The Long Tail: How Technology is turning mass markets into millions of niches. (p. 15). This passage from The Long Tail, pretty much sums it all up. The Long Tail by Chris Anderson is a good and worthwhile read for information scientists, computer scientists, ecommerce researchers, and others interested in all areas of Web research. The central premise of the book is that the combination of (1) the Pareto or Zipf distribution (i.e., power law probability distribution) that is characteristic of Web traffic and (2) the direct access to consumers via Web technology has opened up new business opportunities in the ''long tail''. Producers and advertisers no longer have to target ''the big hits'' at the head of the distribution. Instead, they can target the small, niche communities or even individuals in the tail of the distribution. The long tail is has been studied by Web researchers and has been noted in term usage on search engines, access times to servers, and popularity of Web sites. Andersen points out that the long tail also applies to products sold on the Web. He recounts that a sizeable percentage of Amazon sales come from books that only sell a few copies, a large number of songs from Rhapsody get downloaded only once in a month, and a significant number of movies from Netflix only get ordered occasionally. However, since the storage is in digital form for the songs and music (and Amazon out sources the storage of books) there is little additional inventory cost of these items. This phenomenon across all Web companies has led to a broadening of participation by both producers and consumers that would not have happened without the Web. The idea of the long tail is well known, of course. What Anderson has done is present it in an interesting manner and in a Web ecommerce setting. He applies it to Web businesses and then relates the multitude of other factors ongoing that permit the actual implementation of the long tail effect. Anderson also expands on prior work on the long tail by introducing an element of time, given the distribution a three dimensional effect. All in all, it is a nifty idea. The book is comprised of 14 chapters, plus an Introduction. Chapter 1 presents an overview of what the long tail is. Chapter 2 discusses the ''head'', which is the top of the tail where the …

The Long Tail: Why the Future of Business is Selling Less of More

Peer-assisted content distribution matches user demand for content with available supply at other peers in the network. Inspired by this supply-and-demand interpretation of the nature of content sharing, we employ price theory to study peer-assisted content distribution. The market-clearing prices are those which align supply and demand, and the system is studied through the characterization of price equilibria. We discuss the efficiency and robustness gains of price-based multilateral exchange, and show that simply maintaining a single price per peer (even across multiple files) suffices to achieve these benefits.Our main contribution is a system design---PACE (Price-Assisted Content Exchange)---that effectively and practically realizes multilateral exchange. Its centerpiece is a market-based mechanism for exchanging currency for desired content, with a single, decentralized price per peer. Honest users are completely shielded from any notion of prices, budgeting, allocation, or other market issues, yet strategic or malicious clients cannot unduly damage the system's efficient operation. Our design encourages sharing of desirable content and network-friendly resource utilization.Bilateral barter-based systems such as BitTorrent have been attractive in large part because of their simplicity. Our research takes a significant step in understanding the efficiency and robustness gains possible with multilateral exchange.

/pdf/peer-assisted-content-distribution-with-prices-4cm48t3ub2.pdf

Peer-assisted content distribution with prices

Since there is, in principle, no reason why third parties should not pay individuals for the use of their data, we introduce a realistic market that would allow these payments to be made while taking into account the privacy attitude of the participants. And since it is usually important to use unbiased samples to obtain credible statistical results, we examine the properties that such a market should have and suggest a mechanism that compensates those individuals that participate according to their risk attitudes. Equally important, we show that this mechanism also benefits buyers, as they pay less for the data than they would if they compensated all individuals with the same maximum fee that the most concerned ones expect.

A Market for Unbiased Private Data: Paying Individuals According to their Privacy Attitudes

We formulate a peer-to-peer system for filesharing as an exchange economy: a price is associated with each file, and users exchange files only when they can afford it. This formulation solves the free-riding problem, since uploading files is a necessary condition for being able to download. However, we do not explicitly introduce a currency; users must upload files in order to earn a budget for downloading. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and dynamic stability of the competitive equilibrium, which is always guaranteed to be Pareto efficient. In addition, a novel aspect of our approach is an allocation mechanism for clearing the market out of equilibrium. We analyze this mechanism when users can anticipate how their actions affect the allocation mechanism (price anticipating behavior). For this regime we characterize the Nash equilibria that will occur, and show that as the number of users increases, the Nash equilibrium rates become approximately Pareto efficient.

/pdf/a-peer-to-peer-system-as-an-exchange-economy-4oqpl9y4a6.pdf

A peer-to-peer system as an exchange economy

Aseller in an online marketplace with an effective reputation mechanism should expect that dishonest behavior results in higher payments now whereas honest behavior results in a better reputation---and thus higher payments---in the future. We study the Window Aggregation Mechanism, a widely used class of mechanisms that shows the average value of the seller's ratings within some fixed window of past transactions. We suggest approaches for choosing the window size that maximizes the range of parameters for which it is optimal for the seller to be truthful. We show that mechanisms that use information from a larger number of past transactions tend to provide incentives for patient sellers to be more truthful but for higher-quality sellers to be less truthful.

/pdf/optimal-windows-for-aggregating-ratings-in-electronic-33m91bt86m.pdf

Optimal Windows for Aggregating Ratings in Electronic Marketplaces

We present a study of the group purchasing behavior of daily deals in Groupon and LivingSocial and introduce a predictive dynamic model of collective attention for group buying behavior. In our model, the aggregate number of purchases at a given time comprises two types of processes: random discovery and social propagation. We find that these processes are very clearly separated by an inflection point. Using large data sets from both Groupon and LivingSocial we show how the model is able to predict the success of group deals as a function of time. We find that Groupon deals are easier to predict accurately earlier in the deal lifecycle than LivingSocial deals due to the final number of deal purchases saturating quicker. One possible explanation for this is that the incentive to socially propagate a deal is based on an individual threshold in LivingSocial, whereas in Groupon it is based on a collective threshold, which is reached very early. Furthermore, the personal benefit of propagating a deal is also greater in LivingSocial.

Christina Aperjis

Papers

Peer-assisted content distribution with prices

A Market for Unbiased Private Data: Paying Individuals According to their Privacy Attitudes

A peer-to-peer system as an exchange economy

Optimal Windows for Aggregating Ratings in Electronic Marketplaces

Collective Attention and the Dynamics of Group Deals