From the Publisher:
The old opposition of matter versus mind stubbornly persists in the way we study mind and brain. In treating cognition as problem solving, Andy Clark suggests, we may often abstract too far from the very body and world in which our brains evolved to guide us. Whereas the mental has been treated as a realm that is distinct from the body and the world, Clark forcefully attests that a key to understanding brains is to see them as controllers of embodied activity. From this paradigm shift he advances the construction of a cognitive science of the embodied mind.

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Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again

The authors describe a constructionist theory that accounts for the knowledge-based inferences that are constructed when readers comprehend narrative text. Readers potentially generate a rich variety of inferences when they construct a referential situation model of what the text is about. The proposed constructionist theory specifies that some, but not all, of this information is constructed under most conditions of comprehension. The distinctive assumptions of the constructionist theory embrace a principle of search (or effort) after meaning. According to this principle, readers attempt to construct a meaning representation that addresses the reader's goals, that is coherent at both local and global levels, and that explains why actions, events, and states are mentioned in the text. This study reviews empirical evidence that addresses this theory and contrasts it with alternative theoretical frameworks.

Constructing inferences during narrative text comprehension.

Preface. Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1. The Linguistic Turn and the Conceptual Turn. 2. Taking Philosophical Questions at Face Value. 3. Metaphysical Conceptions of Analyticity. 4. Epistemological Conceptions of Analyticity. 5. Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality. 6. Thought Experiments. 7. Evidence in Philosophy. 8. Knowledge Maximization. Afterword. Must Do Better. Appendix 1. Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic. Appendix 2. Counterfactual Donkeys. Bibliography. Index

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The Philosophy of Philosophy

Investigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing. Input analysis is thought to be initially "preconscious," "pre-attentive," fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by "conscious," "focal-attentive" analysis which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity.

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Is human information processing conscious

In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey of the space of possible analyses of the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction, together with a set of considerations which militate against all but our own proposal. Among the many accounts we consider and reject are the 'explicit' approach to quantifier domain restric- tion discussed, for example, by Stephen Neale, and the pragmatic approach to quantifier domain restriction proposed by Kent Bach. Our hope is that the exhaustive discussion of this special case of context-dependence will provide guidelines for how to decide, for an arbitrary case of context-dependent discourse, whether it should be treated syn- tactically, semantically, or pragmatically.

On Quantifier Domain Restriction

According to the received view of linguistic communication, the primary function of language is to enable speakers to reveal the propositional contents of their thoughts to hearers. Speakers are able to do this because they share with their hearers an understanding of the meanings of words. Christopher Gauker rejects this conception of language, arguing that it rests on an untenable conception of mental representation and yields a wrong account of the norms of discourse.Gauker's alternative starts with the observation that conversations have goals and that the best way to achieve the goal of a conversation depends on the circumstances under which the conversation takes place. These goals and circumstances determine a context of utterance quite apart from the attitudes of the interlocutors. The fundamental norms of discourse are formulated in terms of the conditions under which sentences are assertible in such contexts.Words without Meaning contains original solutions to a wide array of outstanding problems in the philosophy of language, including the logic of quantification, the logic of conditionals, the semantic paradoxes, the nature of presupposition and implicature, and the nature and attribution of beliefs.

Words without Meaning

The proposition expressed by a sentence is relative to a context But what determines the content of the context? Many theorists would include among these determinants aspects of the speaker’s intention in speaking My thesis is that, on the contrary, the determinants of the context never include the speaker’s intention My argument for this thesis turns on a consideration of the role that the concept of proposition expressed in context is supposed to play in a theory of linguistic communication To illustrate an alternative approach, I present an original theory of the reference of demonstratives according to which the referent of a demonstrative is the object that adequately and best satisfies certain accessibility criteria Although I call my thesis zero tolerance for pragmatics, it is not an expression of intolerance for everything that might be called “pragmatics”

Zero tolerance for pragmatics

Distinguant les elements situationnels et les elements propositionnels du contexte de l'enonciation d'une phrase, l'A. etudie la relation entre le contexte propositionnel et la finalite conversationnelle des interlocuteurs en termes de presuppositions. Se proposant de mesurer la justesse d'une enonciation plutot que d'evaluer son assertibilite, l'A. developpe une conception normative, objective et spirituelle-transcendante du contexte propositionnel qui regle le probleme des presuppositions informatives et le probleme de la coordination des presuppositions entre les deux interlocuteurs

What Is a Context of Utterance

This paper develops the hypothesis that languages may be learned by means of a kind of cause‐effect analysis. This hypothesis is developed through an examination of E. Sue Savage‐Rumbaugh's research on the abilities of chimpanzees to learn to use symbols. Savage‐Rumbaugh herself tends to conceive of her work as aiming to demonstrate that chimpanzees are able to learn the Preferential function’ of symbols. Thus the paper begins with a critique of this way of viewing the chimpanzee's achievements. The hypothesis that Savage‐Rumbaugh's chimpanzees learn to use symbols by means of cause‐effect analysis is then supported through a detailed examination of the tasks they have learned to perform. Next, it is explained how language learning in humans might be conceptualized along similar lines. The final section attempts to explain how the pertinent cause‐effect analysis ought to be conceived.

Christopher Gauker

Papers

Words without Meaning

Zero tolerance for pragmatics

What Is a Context of Utterance

How to learn a language like a chimpanzee

Words and Images