A System-of-Systems perspective for information fusion system design and evaluation

Abstract : This report summarizes a selection of the acquisition literature from the 1960s to the present on potential sources of program schedule cycle time and growth, as well as potential opportunities for improvement. It presents the range of possible causes of schedule-related problems and various recommendations cited for improving schedules by various authors and organizations. This report does not provide critical analysis or an assessment of the strengths or weaknesses of the claims made in the literature. Rather, it provides a starting point for further research or consideration by government acquisition professionals, oversight organizations, and the analytic community. We identified the following reasons for schedule delays in the literature: (1) the difficulty of managing technical risk (e.g., program complexity, immature technology, and unanticipated technical issues), (2) initial assumptions or expectations that were difficult to fulfill (e.g., schedule estimates, risk control, requirements, and performance assumptions), and (3) funding instability. The most commonly cited recommendations for reducing cycle time and controlling schedule growth in the literature are strategies that manage or reduce technical risk. Some of those recommendations include using incremental fielding or evolutionary acquisition strategies, developing derivative products (rather than brand-new designs), using mature or proven technology (i.e., commercial, off-the-shelf components), maintaining stable funding, and using atypical contracting vehicles.

Prolonged Cycle Times and Schedule Growth in Defense Acquisition

Military transformations are usually understood as linear processes involving diverse, steady, and costly initiatives to be achieved during a specific timeframe. However, other influencing elements...

Dynamics of State Modernization in Colombia: The Virtuous Cycle of Military Transformation

This report evaluates the capabilities of current and programmed U.S. forces to meet the demands of conflicts that could arise involving any of five potential adversaries. The report finds that U.S. forces today are larger than needed to fight a single war, are failing to keep pace with the forces of great power adversaries, are poorly postured to meet key challenges in Europe and East Asia, and are insufficiently trained and ready.

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U.S. Military Capabilities and Forces for a Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning

: Modularity in military vehicle design is generally considered a positive attribute that promotes adaptability, resilience, and cost savings. The benefits and burdens of modularity are considered by studying historical programs dating back to World War II. Using a taxonomy developed at the U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center, vehicles were considered based on horizontal modularity, vertical modularity, and distributed modularity. Examples were given for each type, including the most extensive attempt at horizontal modularity in the1980s, known as the Armored Family of Vehicles.

Survey of Modular Military Vehicles: Benefits and Burdens

: The Future Combat Systems (FCS) program was the largest and most ambitious planned acquisition program in the Army s history. As a program it was intended to field not just a system, but an entire brigade: a system of systems developed from scratch and integrated by means of an advanced, wireless network. Moreover, the FCS-equipped brigade would operate with novel doctrine that was being developed and tested along with the materiel components of the unit. To paraphrase the Army at the time, FCS was Army modernization. In 2009 the FCS program was cancelled, although some of its efforts continued on as follow-on programs. The FCS program had garnered considerable attention throughout its existence, but few studies have been released documenting the lessons from the program to aid the Army in moving forward from such a large acquisition termination. In 2010, the Army s Acquisition Executive asked RAND Arroyo Center to conduct an after-action analysis of the FCS program in order to leverage its successes and learn from its problems.

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Christopher Rizzi

Papers

Lessons from the Army's Future Combat Systems Program