Historians and social scientists analyzing the contemporary world unfortunately have too little contact and hence miss some of the ways that their interests overlap and the research of one field might benefit another. I am, therefore, extremely grateful that the Journal of Consumer Research has invited me to share with its readers an overview of my recent research on the political and social impact of the flourishing of mass consumption on twentieth-century America. What follows is a summary of my major arguments, enough to entice you, I hope, to read A Consumers' Republic (Cohen 2003), in which I elaborate on these themes. Although this essay is by necessity schematic, the book itself is filled with extensive historical evidence and is heavily illustrated with period images. In tracing the growing importance of mass consumption to the American economy, polity, culture, and social landscape from the 1920s to the present, I in many ways establish the historical context for your research into contemporary consumer behavior and markets. I hope you will …

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A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America

Aldon Morris. — The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, Black Communities Organizing for Change

Sokiera: This is an interview for the Oral History and Cultural Heritage Center at The University of Southern Mississippi. It is eleven o’clock on November 8, 2012. My name is Jason Sokiera, and I am at the home of Mr. Richard Burger. Mr. Burger, thank you for agreeing to this interview. And first I just wanted to begin by asking you about your childhood, where you were born, where you grew up, things like that.

Oral history

Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi

ABOUT THE AUTHORS: Russell J. Skiba, Professor, Indiana University School of Education; Director, Equity Project at Indiana University; B.A., Catholic University, 1975; Ph.D., University of Minnesota, 1987. Suzanne E. Eckes, Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Education; B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1990; Ed.M., Harvard University, 1998; J.D. and Ph.D. University of WisconsinMadison, 2003. Kevin Brown, Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington & Emeritus Director of the Hudson & Holland Scholars Program-Indiana University-Bloomington; B.S., Indiana University, 1978; J.D., Yale University, 1982. The authors would like to thank Timberly Baker, Emily Richardson, and Maggie Paino for their assistance with this article.

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African American Disproportionality in School Discipline: The Divide Between Best Evidence and Legal Remedy

By taking their seats at "whites only" lunch counters across the South in the spring of 1960, African American students not only launched a dramatic new stage in the civil rights movement, they also sparked a national reconsideration of the scope of the constitutional equal protection requirement. The critical constitutional question raised by the sit-in movement was whether the Fourteenth Amendment, which after Brown v. Board of Education prohibited racial segregation in schools and other state-operated facilities, applied to privately owned accommodations open to the general public. From the perspective of the student protesters, the lunch counter operators, and most of the American public, the question of whether the nondiscriminatory logic of Brown should apply to public accommodations involved a consideration of the role of public accommodations in social life, the dignitary costs of exclusion, and the values served by the protection of private choice and associational rights within the commercial sphere. From the perspective of lawyers, judges, and lawmakers, the relevant question centered on a doctrinal issue that had been under considerable pressure in the two decades preceding the sit-ins: the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. At the time of the sit-ins, many assumed that resolution of the issue demanded a reconsideration of the state action doctrine. Yet, when given the opportunity, neither the Supreme Court, in a series of cases arising from the sit-in protests, nor Congress, in framing the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, took this path. As a matter of official constitutional interpretation, the state action doctrine survived the civil rights movement, modified somewhat but retaining the same basic form it had when the Court first defined it in the late nineteenth century. In this Article, I explain why the sit-in movement, which proved remarkably successful at changing attitudes, practices, and statutes, ultimately failed to change constitutional law. My analysis of the resilience of the state action doctrine draws on recent scholarship on extrajudicial constitutionalism, even as it challenges some of the premises that underlie this scholarship. INTRODUCTION 768 I. THE SIT-INS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE 776 A. Civil Disobethence as a Constitutional Claim 777 B. State Action as a Normative Concept 779 C. The State of the State Action Doctrine, I960 781 D. Public Accommodations and the "Logic" of Brown 786 II. THE SIT-IN CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT 791 A. From Burton to Bell 792 B. Bell v. Maryland 795 C. Civil Disobethence and the Supreme Court 798 III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1 964 AND CONGRESSIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 802 A. The Supreme Court and Section 5 803 B. The Kennedy Administration and the Fourteenth Amendment ...... 809 C. The Fourteenth Amendment in Congress 814 D. Title II in the Supreme Court 818 E. Legislative Constitutionalism in the Shadow of the Supreme Court . . 820 CONCLUSION 823 INTRODUCTION When African American students sat down at segregated lunch counters across the South in the spring of 1 960, they presented a profound challenge to the custom and law of white supremacy. It would be hard to imagine a form of protest that more powerfully demonstrated the flagrant and perverse injustice of the Jim Crow South. …

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The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine

This Article examines how and why Supreme Court Justices venture beyond their written opinions to speak more directly to the American people. Drawing on the history of the post-New Deal Court, I first provide a general framework for categorizing the kinds of contributions sitting Justices have sought to make to the public discourse when employing various modes of extrajudicial speech — lectures, interviews, books, articles, and the like. My goal here is twofold: to provide a historically grounded taxonomy of the primary motivations behind extrajudicial speech; and to refute commonplace claims of a lost historical tradition of Justices refraining from off-the-bench commentary about their work. I then turn to an analysis of the risks and opportunities for Justices who go beyond their written opinion. I argue that our understanding of the extrajudicial contributions of the Justices has too often been clouded by idealized, historically inaccurate assumptions about the Court and by exaggerated assessments of the potential costs of substantive, controversial extrajudicial speech for the Court’s legitimacy. Compared to the typical Supreme Court written opinion, extrajudicial speech allows for, even encourages, more personalized, more accessible, and potentially more effective pathways of communication with a general audience. By identifying the unique value of extrajudicial speech, I intend this Article to serve as an invitation for a more realistic and constructive discussion about the role of Supreme Court Justices in our constitutional democracy.

Beyond the Opinion: Supreme Court Justices and Extrajudicial Speech

In this Article we offer the first comprehensive evaluation of oral dissenting on the Supreme Court. We examine the practice in both historical and contemporary perspective, take stock of the emerging academic literature on the subject, and suggest a new framework for analysis of oral dissenting. Specifically, we put forth several claims. Contrary to the common assumption of scholarship and media coverage, oral dissents are nothing new. Oral dissenting has a long tradition, and its history provides valuable lessons for understanding the potential and limits of oral dissents today. Furthermore, not all oral dissents are alike. Dissenting Justices may have different reasons for deciding to announce their opinions, and the reception and potential influence of an oral dissent varies according to the situation. Recent scholarly efforts to identify a set of factors for predicting the likelihood of an oral dissent thus may miss the forest for the trees. The more interesting question, we suggest, is not necessarily why a Justice might decide to announce a dissent, but why certain oral dissents seem to reverberate while others (perhaps most) are ignored and forgotten. We therefore seek to recenter the discussion of oral dissents, moving to an empirical and analytical discussion of the role that oral dissents actually play in the dynamic relationship between the Court and the American people.

Oral Dissenting on the Supreme Court

Symposium: How Law Works—Editor's Introduction

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Christopher W. Schmidt

Papers

The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine

Beyond the Opinion: Supreme Court Justices and Extrajudicial Speech

Oral Dissenting on the Supreme Court

Symposium: How Law Works—Editor's Introduction

Why the 1960 Lunch Counter Sit-Ins Worked: A Case Study of Law and Social Movement Mobilization