Several years have now elapsed since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences. But as this enterprise appeared to me to be one of great magnitude, I waited until I had attained an age so mature as to leave me no hope that at any stage of life more advanced I should be better able to execute my design. On this account, I have delayed so long that I should henceforth consider I was doing wrong were I still to consume in deliberation any of the time that now remains for action. To-day, then, since I have opportunely freed my mind from all cares [and am happily disturbed by no passions], and since I am in the secure possession of leisure in a peaceable retirement, I will at length apply myself earnestly and freely to the general overthrow of all my former opinions.

Meditations on a First Philosophy

In this book, Graham Oppy examines arguments for and against the existence of God. He shows that none of these arguments is powerful enough to change the minds of reasonable participants in debates on the question of the existence of God. His conclusion is supported by detailed analyses of the arguments as well as by the development of a theory about the purpose of arguments and the criteria that should be used in judging whether or not arguments are successful. Oppy discusses the work of a wide array of philosophers, including Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, Kant, Hume and, more recently, Plantinga, Dembski, White, Dawkins, Bergman, Gale and Pruss.

Arguing about gods

The concepts of time and identity seem at once unproblematic and frustratingly difficult. Time is an intricate part of our experience -- it would seem that the passage of time is a prerequisite for having any experience at all -- and yet recalcitrant questions about time remain. Is time real? Does time flow? Do past and future moments exist? Philosophers face similarly stubborn questions about identity, particularly about the persistence of identical entities through change. Indeed, questions about the metaphysics of persistence take on many of the complexities inherent in philosophical considerations of time. This volume of original essays brings together these two essentially related concepts in a way not reflected in the available literature, making it required reading for philosophers working in metaphysics and students interested in these topics. The contributors, distinguished authors and rising scholars, first consider the nature of time and then turn to the relation of identity, focusing on the metaphysical connections between the two, with a special emphasis on personal identity. The volume concludes with essays on the metaphysics of death, issues in which time and identity play a significant role. This groundbreaking collection offers both cutting-edge epistemological analysis and historical perspectives on contemporary topics. ContributorsHarriet Baber, Lynne Rudder Baker, Ben Bradley, John W. Carroll, Reinaldo Elugardo, Geoffrey Gorham, Mark Hinchliff, Jenann Ismael, Barbara Levenbook, Andrew Light, Lawrence B. Lombard, Ned Markosian, Harold Noonan, John Perry, Harry S. Silverstein, Matthew H. Slater, Robert J. Stainton, Neil A. Tognazzini.

Time and Identity

Abstract: The paper argues for a formal-causal account of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Its basic claim is that neither relations of ideas alone nor efficient causality – especially if interpreted “mechanistically” – articulate the basic sense of the Spinozistic ‘cause’. Instead it is formal causality, as understood by Descartes and other 17th-century mathematicians on the basis of Aristotleʼs Posterior Analytics, which fits best both with the textual evidence and with the more general conceptual constraints of Spinoza’s metaphysics. Building on the work of Carraud and Viljanen, the paper develops a more precise concept of formal causality and a systematic formal-causal account of Spinoza’s metaphysics. It gives this account footing in new arguments, shows its explanatory superiority to rival interpretations and connects it to other Spinozistic doctrines.

On the Significance of Formal Causes in Spinoza’s Metaphysics

One can distinguish statistical models used in causal modeling from the causal interpretations that align them with substantive hypotheses. Causal modeling typically assumes an efficient causal interpretation of the statistical model. Causal modeling can also make use of mereological causal interpretations in which the state of the parts determines the state of the whole. This interpretation shares several properties with efficient causal interpretations but also differs in terms of other important properties. The availability of alternative causal interpretations of the same statistical models has implications for hypothesis specification, research design, causal inference, data analysis, and the interpretation of research results.

Hypothesis Formulation, Model Interpretation, and Model Equivalence: Implications of a Mereological Causal Interpretation of Structural Equation Models.

Part I Descartes's Method 1. Analysis: The Search for Rules 2. Analysis: The Clarification of Ideas 3. Causation Part II Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy 4. Meditation I: Doubts and Suppositions 5. Meditation II: The Beginning of the Ascent 6. Meditation III: Reaching the Peak, or Variations on the Existence and Idea of God 7. Meditation IV: Truth and Falsity: Reflections from the Summit 8. Meditation V: The Beginning of the Descent 9. Meditation VI: The World Restored 10. Circles

Descartes and Method: A Search for a Method in Meditations

In the Third Meditation, Descartes suggests that God, and only God, is self-caused.(1) This claim results in objections, first from Caterus and then from Arnauld, that an efficient cause must be distinct from its effect, and therefore the notion of self-causation is unintelligible.(2) In the course of his reply to Arnauld, Descartes distinguishes between a formal cause and an efficient cause, contends that God's essence is properly the formal cause of God's existence, and attempts to find a cause midway between a formal cause and an efficient cause. In this paper, we examine Descartes' discussion of the distinction between formal and efficient causes in the reply to Arnauld. We show that Descartes' account of the formal/efficient causation distinction is consistent with prominent accounts of that distinction from Aristotle to Suarez: an explanation by formal cause is an explanation based on the essence of a thing, while an explanation by efficient cause is an explanation based on agency. We then ask whether Descartes' concern with formal causation is limited to God's self-causation. To answer that question, we examine the ontological and epistemic status of Descartes' natural laws. We argue that Cartesian natural laws are ontologically and epistermically indistinguishable from eternal truths: they constitute the form of the world. If we are correct, it follows that, apart from God's action in creating and sustaining the world and acts of the human will, all Cartesian causes are formal. Such a position makes intelligible Descartes' remarks on the union of mind and body.(3) I In the Third Meditation, Descartes considers the possibility that he, a thinking thing with an idea of God qua supremely perfect being, is caused by something distinct from himself. Either he is caused by God, or he is caused by something less perfect than God, and if the latter, he can raise the same question regarding the cause of that being. As he wrote: In respect of this cause one may again inquire whether it derives its existence from itself or from another cause. If from itself, then it is clear from what has been said that it is itself God, since if it has the power of existing through its own might, then undoubtedly it also has the power of actually possessing all the perfections of which it has an idea -- that is, all the perfections which I conceive to be in God. If, on the other hand, it derives its existence from another cause, then the same question may be repeated concerning this further cause, namely whether it derives its existence from itself or from another cause, until eventually the ultimate cause is reached, and this will be God.4 The argument is a variation on the cosmological argument, and as Descartes tells Caterus in his reply, he takes this self-causing God to effectively alleviate any possibility of an infinite causal regress.(5) Descartes' commentators found the argument puzzling. Caterus asked what Descartes meant by "from itself." Caterus distinguished between a positive and a negative sense of that expression. In the positive sense, it means "from itself as from a cause," and in this sense a cause from itself "bestows its own existence on itself; so if by an act of premeditated choice it were to give itself what it desired, it would undoubtedly give itself all things, and so would be God."(6) However, Caterus considered the negative sense of "from itself," that is, "not from another," as what is more commonly understood by that phrase. So, he naturally concludes, "it does not derive existence from itself as a cause, nor did it exist prior to itself so that it could choose in advance what it should subsequently be."(7) Caterus further relates this negative sense of "from itself " to the essence or form of a thing by focusing on the question of limitation. …

Descartes on Causation

Etude de la theorie cartesienne du temps : partant d'un scheme conceptuel presentant les differentes conceptions atomistes et continue du temps, l'A. montre que la these d'un atomisme realiste est incompatible avec la metaphysique de Descartes, d'une part, et propose une interpretation du temps cartesien en conformite avec la notion de causalite efficiente et l'idee d'immortalite de l'âme, d'autre part.

Descartes : The matter of time

Descartes's Factitious Ideas of God

THE predicates of "truth" and "falsehood" are generally ascribed solely to propositions (statements). Descartes, however, claims that all clear and distinct ideas are true1 while also claiming that truth and falsehood in the strict or formal sense pertain only to judgments, not ideas (AT 7: p. 37; CSM 2: p. 26). Descartes distinguished material falsity from formal falsity, suggesting that material falsity pertains only to ideas (AT 7: pp. 37, 43-44, 232-34, CSM 2: pp. 26, 30, 162-64), although he never explicitly indicated whether there is a corresponding sense of material truth. If there is an intelligible notion of material truth implicit in Descartess works, an understanding of that notion promises to reveal the epistemic importance of innate ideas.

Clarence A. Bonnen

Papers

Descartes and Method: A Search for a Method in Meditations

Descartes on Causation

Descartes : The matter of time

Descartes's Factitious Ideas of God

Descartes and the Epistemology of Innate Ideas