Men and Women of the Corporation

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

The Political Consciousness of Post-Industrialism@@@The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics.

In this innovative approach to the practice of social science, Charles Ragin explores the use of fuzzy sets to bridge the divide between quantitative and qualitative methods. Paradoxically, the fuzzy set is a powerful tool because it replaces an unwieldy, "fuzzy" instrument—the variable, which establishes only the positions of cases relative to each other, with a precise one—degree of membership in a well-defined set. Ragin argues that fuzzy sets allow a far richer dialogue between ideas and evidence in social research than previously possible. They let quantitative researchers abandon "homogenizing assumptions" about cases and causes, they extend diversity-oriented research strategies, and they provide a powerful connection between theory and data analysis. Most important, fuzzy sets can be carefully tailored to fit evolving theoretical concepts, sharpening quantitative tools with in-depth knowledge gained through qualitative, case-oriented inquiry. This book will revolutionize research methods not only in sociology, political science, and anthropology but in any field of inquiry dealing with complex patterns of causation.

Fuzzy-Set Social Science

This study examines whether socially responsible firms behave differently from other firms in their financial reporting. Specifically, we question whether firms that exhibit corporate social responsibility (CSR) also behave in a responsible manner to constrain earnings management, thereby delivering more transparent and reliable financial information to investors as compared to firms that do not meet the same social criteria. We find that socially responsible firms are less likely (1) to manage earnings through discretionary accruals, (2) to manipulate real operating activities, and (3) to be the subject of SEC investigations, as evidenced by Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases against top executives. Our results are robust to (1) controlling for various incentives for CSR and earnings management, (2) considering various CSR dimensions and components, and (3) using alternative proxies for CSR and accruals quality. To the extent that we control for the potential effects of reputation and financial performance, our findings suggest that ethical concerns are likely to drive managers to produce high-quality financial reports.

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Benson_Wier/publication/228133769_Is_Earnings_Quality_Associated_with_Corporate_Social_Responsibility/links/0deec530caf0ff0c3a000000.pdf

Is Earnings Quality Associated with Corporate Social Responsibility

The theoretical concept of agency costs developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (2005) are used to study the relationship between the quality of a firm's governance and its decision to issue a profit warning (PW) when it is overvalued. Based on a sample of Canadian companies between 2000 and 2004, results were only partially supportive of the hypotheses. The characteristics of the board seem to play only a secondary role in the decision to issue a profit warning when the firm is overvalued. On the other hand, as expected, governance mechanisms that factor in market values to align the interests of managers and directors with those of shareholders are negatively related to the profit warning decision. Copyright © 2008 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Governance and the Decision to Issue a Profit Warning

This chapter summarises the results for France as part of the International Corporate Sustainability Barometer (ICSB). The introduction and the first section describe the context of sustainability in France and the characteristics of the French companies surveyed. The second section presents the main findings and some comparisons between our sample of French companies and the international average regarding the three main topics of the International Corporate Sustainability Barometer. Concerning the intention to manage sustainability issues, French firms are found to be most strongly influenced by national authorities. With regard to the integration of sustainability into the organisation, the results show that in France social and environmental issues affect the majority of organisational units to a lesser degree than is the case on international average. In addition, differences exist between organisational units in France. More specifically, sustainability-related and externally-oriented units, such as CSR and communication, are most supportive of sustainability. By contrast, performance-oriented units, such as finance and accounting, are less supportive. Lastly, the actual implementation of corporate sustainability is characterised by the fact that the application of sustainability management tools is less common among French companies when compared to the international average. Nevertheless, French companies frequently measure the impact of their sustainability measures.

International Corporate Sustainability Barometer 2012: Sustainability Management in France

Purpose




The fundamental role of corporate boards is to monitor and advise top management on strategic issues It is therefore of the utmost importance that corporate directors are effective as a decision-making group to ensure corporate performance (Zattoni et al, 2015; Minichilli et al, 2012) But, what do we know about what is really going on inside the boardroom? This study aims to shed light on this important question




Design/methodology/approach




The authors undertake a targeted review of the literature to take account of all publications regarding board dynamics in relation to board effectiveness




Findings




This study shows that we know very little about what is going on inside the “black box” of board dynamics and its relation to how effective directors are at doing their job, namely, monitoring and advising top management and establishing and expanding the firm’s network, to gain access to the resources it needs The authors propose several avenues of research to better understand board dynamics




Originality/value




In this study, the authors show how and why the present body of knowledge on team effectiveness should be harnessed to better understand corporate board dynamics in relation to board effectiveness

What do we know about what is going on inside the boardroom

Blocks of shares are typically traded at a premium for the buyer. The academic literature shows that anticipated private benefits are the main determinant of this premium rather than the projected value of future synergies. The results of this study indicate that a target's litigation risk has a significant impact on the control premium. Acquirers tend to lower block premia significantly in anticipation of potential litigation related to financial disclosure or the target's market value. Legal shareholder protection also plays a significant role in countering shareholder expropriation. Block buyers pay higher premia to acquire targets that operate in protective legal environments.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/EUFM_EUFM12005.pdf?abstractid=2496681&mirid=1&type=2

Block Premia, Litigation Risk, and Shareholder Protection

Since 1 January 2005, the European Union (EU) has mandated implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for preparation of consolidated financial statements for EU-listed firms. This paper analyzes the economic impact of mandatory adoption of IFRS on firms, investors, and creditors. Relying on the positive accounting theory, we study the economic impact of the new conceptual framework of financial information from IASB (2010), especially in paragraph OB2, where investors and creditors are designated as the main users of financial information, and QC 38, which assesses whether the benefits of financial information justify the costs associated with its production and use. Our sample is composed of 2,926 European firms that adopted IFRS in 2005. Results show that firm’s cost of capital declines when comparing data before and after IFRS adoption. For creditors, our results suggest that credit rating improves after IFRS adoption. However, we do not notice any significant difference in the quality of accounting earnings for investors. We also test if these results hold in the presence of asymmetric information, financial dependence and family ownership structure. Our results confirm the above trend. We conclude that the market anticipates the content of accounting data, and that mandatory adoption of IFRS has no impact on investors.

/pdf/who-really-benefits-from-mandatory-adoption-of-ifrs-a-closer-3r3b0kxcxr.pdf

Claude Francoeur

Papers

Governance and the Decision to Issue a Profit Warning

International Corporate Sustainability Barometer 2012: Sustainability Management in France

What do we know about what is going on inside the boardroom

Block Premia, Litigation Risk, and Shareholder Protection

Who Really Benefits from Mandatory Adoption of IFRS? A Closer Look at Preparers and Users of Financial Information