Showing papers by "Clifford Geertz published in 1968"
Book•
01 Jan 1968
TL;DR: Geertz as discussed by the authors studied the development of Islam in two quite contrasting civilizations, the Indonesian and the Moroccan, by tracing the evolution of their classical religious styles which, with disparate settings and unique histories, produced strikingly different spiritual climates.
Abstract: "In four brief chapters," writes Clifford Geertz in his preface, "I have attempted both to lay out a general framework for the comparative analysis of religion and to apply it to a study of the development of a supposedly single creed, Islam, in two quite contrasting civilizations, the Indonesian and the Moroccan." Mr. Geertz begins his argument by outlining the problem conceptually and providing an overview of the two countries. He then traces the evolution of their classical religious styles which, with disparate settings and unique histories, produced strikingly different spiritual climates. So in Morocco, the Islamic conception of life came to mean activism, moralism, and intense individuality, while in Indonesia the same concept emphasized aestheticism, inwardness, and the radical dissolution of personality. In order to assess the significance of these interesting developments, Mr. Geertz sets forth a series of theoretical observations concerning the social role of religion.
461 citations
TL;DR: For instance, the authors argues that thinking is a social act, and that one is responsible for it as for any other social act and, in the long run, it is the most consequential social act.
Abstract: * When I try to sum up what, above all else, I have learned from grappling with the sprawling prolixities of John Dewey's work, what I come up with is the succinct and chilling doctrine that thought is conduct and is to be morally judged as such. It is not the notion that thinking is a serious matter that seems to be distinctive of this last of the New England philosophers; all intellectuals regard mental productions with some esteem. It is the argument that the reason thinking is serious is that it is a social act, and that one is therefore responsible for it as for any other social act. Perhaps even more so, for, in the long run, it is the most consequential of social acts. In short, Dewey brings thinking out into the public world where ethical judgment can get at it. To some, this seems to debase it terribly, to turn it into a thing, a weapon, a possession or something equally ordinary. Revolutionary moralists-for that, finally, amid all his awkwardness of expression, is what Dewey was-are never much liked, particularly by those, in this case practitioners of
111 citations