The financial market turmoil in 2007 and 2008 has led to the most severe financial crisis since the Great Depression and threatens to have large repercussions on the real economy The bursting of the housing bubble forced banks to write down several hundred billion dollars in bad loans caused by mortgage delinquencies At the same time, the stock market capitalization of the major banks declined by more than twice as much While the overall mortgage losses are large on an absolute scale, they are still relatively modest compared to the $8 trillion of US stock market wealth lost between October 2007, when the stock market reached an all-time high, and October 2008 This paper attempts to explain the economic mechanisms that caused losses in the mortgage market to amplify into such large dislocations and turmoil in the financial markets, and describes common economic threads that explain the plethora of market declines, liquidity dry-ups, defaults, and bailouts that occurred after the crisis broke in summer 2007 To understand these threads, it is useful to recall some key factors leading up to the housing bubble The US economy was experiencing a low interest rate environment, both because of large capital inflows from abroad, especially from Asian countries, and because the Federal Reserve had adopted a lax interest rate policy Asian countries bought US securities both to peg the exchange rates at an export-friendly level and to hedge against a depreciation of their own currencies against the dollar, a lesson learned from the Southeast Asian crisis of the late 1990s The Federal Reserve Bank feared a deflationary period after the bursting of the Internet bubble and thus did not counteract the buildup of the housing bubble At the same time, the banking system underwent an important transformation The

/pdf/deciphering-the-liquidity-and-credit-crunch-2007-2008-3612pahtil.pdf

Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008

The newest “new institutionalism,” discursive institutionalism, lends insight into the role of ideas and discourse in politics while providing a more dynamic approach to institutional change than the older three new institutionalisms. Ideas are the substantive content of discourse. They exist at three levels—policies, programs, and philosophies—and can be categorized into two types, cognitive and normative. Discourse is the interactive process of conveying ideas. It comes in two forms: the coordinative discourse among policy actors and the communicative discourse between political actors and the public. These forms differ in two formal institutional contexts; simple polities have a stronger communicative discourse and compound polities a stronger coordinative discourse. The institutions of discursive institutionalism, moreover, are not external-rule-following structures but rather are simultaneously structures and constructs internal to agents whose “background ideational abilities” within a given “meanin...

/pdf/discursive-institutionalism-the-explanatory-power-of-ideas-2x76ola04b.pdf

Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse

The third way: the renewal of social democracy

Across the broad field of heterodox political economy, ‘neoliberalism’ appears to have become a rascal concept – promiscuously pervasive, yet inconsistently defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested. Controversies regarding its precise meaning are more than merely semantic. They generally flow from underlying disagreements regarding the sources, expressions and implications of contemporary regulatory transformations. In this article, we consider the handling of ‘neoliberalism’ within three influential strands of heterodox political economy – the varieties of capitalism approach; historical materialist international political economy; and governmentality approaches. While each of these research traditions sheds light on contemporary processes of market-oriented regulatory restructuring, we argue that each also underplays and/or misreads the systemically uneven, or ‘variegated’, character of these processes. Enabled by a critical interrogation of how each approach interprets the geographies, modalities and pathways of neoliberalization processes, we argue that the problematic of variegation must be central to any adequate account of marketized forms of regulatory restructuring and their alternatives under post-1970s capitalism. Our approach emphasizes the cumulative impacts of successive ‘waves’ of neoliberalization upon uneven institutional landscapes, in particular: (a) their establishment of interconnected, mutually recursive policy relays within an increasingly transnational field of market-oriented regulatory transfer; and (b) their infiltration and reworking of the geoinstitutional frameworks, or ‘rule regimes’, within which regulatory experimentation unfolds. This mode of analysis has significant implications for interpreting the current global economic crisis.

Variegated neoliberalization: geographies, modalities, pathways

The concept of power is central to international relations. Yet disciplin- ary discussions tend to privilege only one, albeit important, form: an actor control- ling another to do what that other would not otherwise do. By showing conceptual favoritism, the discipline not only overlooks the different forms of power in inter- national politics, but also fails to develop sophisticated understandings of how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates. We argue that scholars of international relations should employ multiple conceptions of power and develop a conceptual framework that encourages rigorous attention to power in its different forms. We first begin by producing a tax- onomy of power. Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate. This general concept entails two crucial, analytical dimensions: the kinds of social rela- tions through which power works (in relations of interaction or in social relations of constitution); and the specificity of social relations through which effects are pro- duced (specific/direct or diffuse/indirect). These distinctions generate our taxonomy and four concepts of power: compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive. We then illustrate how attention to the multiple forms of power matters for the analysis of global governance and American empire. We conclude by urging scholars to beware of the idea that the multiple concepts are competing, and instead to see connections between them in order to generate more robust understandings of how power works in international politics.

/pdf/power-in-international-politics-4o1pdthii5.pdf

Power in international politics

The fear of crime has occupied a substantial research agenda in criminology; this extends to include theories of why people fear crime. In this exemplar, we explore how political leadership influences the fear of crime (including perceptions of antisocial behaviour). The ‘age, period and cohort’ (APC) approach we adopt recognises the distinct temporal processes of all of the following: individual ageing, current context(s) and generational membership. Following Mannheim (Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, Karl Mannheim. London: Routledge, 1928), we see this as crucial to understanding the origins and shape of social change. Employing repeated cross-sectional data from the British Crime Survey, we explore how worry about crime and perceptions of antisocial behaviour are shaped by the political environment in which respondents grew up. This exemplar shows how a political legacy may instil itself in the values which individuals hold throughout their lives.

Political Generations and the Fear of Crime

Exploring the Consequences of Fast Thinking about Politics

This chapter examines criminal justice policies, specifically, the degree to which these increased levels of punitiveness, levels which still exist today. The topic of ‘law and order’ was one on which Thatcher accumulated much political capital, but did this translate into actual policies? The legacy which we chart herein in is not a straight-forward one; initially there is little evidence of a ‘toughening’ of the criminal justice system along the lines one might expect given the rhetoric on law and order. The chapter emphasises the role of ideational change and the ways in which this unfolds gradually over time.

Rising Punitiveness in the English and Welsh Criminal Justice System

En depit des postures, Royaume-Uni et Union europeenne cherchent tous deux un accord. Mais la strategie du bord du gouffre de Londres, et la maitrise de Bruxelles sur le calendrier et le deroulement des negociations pourraient ne permettre qu’un « accord faute de mieux ». De style « australien » ou « canadien », un accord commercial de dernier moment aurait de rudes consequences economiques pour le Royaume-Uni, dans le cadre d’un Brexit menacant le systeme politique et l’unite meme du Royaume1.politique etrangere

Breaking up is hard to do: Royaume-Uni et Union européenne après le Brexit

In this brief response to Bob Jessop's probing yet sympathetic critique, I clarify further the 'as if realist' political ontology of the state. I suggest that critical realism's appeal to the ontological stratification of social reality and to the logic of retroduction are the principal stumbling blocks for 'as if realists', that the appeal to state power(s) as distinct from the state as real cannot circumvent the 'as if realist' ontological objection to the state as real since both remain conceptual abstractions, but that there is a natural affinity between the strategic-relational approach developed by Jessop and others and the 'as if realist' ontology of the state that I here elucidate.

Colin Hay

Papers

Political Generations and the Fear of Crime

Exploring the Consequences of Fast Thinking about Politics

Rising Punitiveness in the English and Welsh Criminal Justice System

Breaking up is hard to do: Royaume-Uni et Union européenne après le Brexit

If it didn't exist we'd have to invent it … Further reflections on the ontological status of the state