Plasmonic Nanoparticles as a Physically Unclonable Function for Responsive Anti‐Counterfeit Nanofingerprints

The counterfeiting and recycling of integrated circuits (ICs) have become major issues in recent years, potentially impacting the security and reliability of electronic systems bound for military, financial, or other critical applications. With identical functionality and packaging, it would be extremely difficult to distinguish recycled ICs from unused ICs. In this paper, two types of on-chip lightweight sensors are proposed to identify recycled ICs by measuring circuit usage time when used in the field. Recycled ICs detection based on aging in ring oscillators (ROs-based) and antifuse (AF-based) are the two techniques presented in this paper. For RO-based sensors, statistical data analysis is used to separate process and temperature variations' effects on the sensor from aging experienced by the sensor in the ICs. For AF-based sensor, counters and embedded one-time programmable memory are used to record the usage time of ICs by counting the cycle of system clock or switching activities of a certain number of nets in the design. Simulation results using 90-nm technology and silicon results from 90-nm test chips show the effectiveness of RO-based sensors for identification of recycled ICs. In addition, the analysis of usage time stored in AF-based sensors shows that recycled ICs, even used for a very short period, can be accurately identified.

Design of On-Chip Lightweight Sensors for Effective Detection of Recycled ICs

Counterfeit ICs can have a major impact on the security and reliability of critical applications. This paper presents a method called Secure Split-Test (SST) for securing the manufacturing process to prevent counterfeits, allowing intellectual property (IP) owners to protect and meter their IPs. This is done by requiring test results to be verified by the IP owner and by requiring the IP owner to provide a “key” to unlock the IPs correct functionality. The results and analysis demonstrate that SST can effectively prevent counterfeited ICs from untrusted foundries or assemblies as well as its resilience to attacks and circumvention.

Secure Split-Test for preventing IC piracy by untrusted foundry and assembly

A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a composition of independently interacting components, including computational elements, communications and control systems. Applications of CPS institute at different levels of integration, ranging from nation-wide power grids, to medium scale, such as the smart home, and small scale, e.g. ubiquitous health care systems including implantable medical devices. Cyber-physical systems primarily transmute how we interact with the physical world, with each system requiring different levels of security based on the sensitivity of the control system and the information it carries. Considering the remarkable progress in CPS technologies during recent years, advancement in security and trust measures is much needed to counter the security violations and privacy leakage of integration elements. This paper focuses on security and privacy concerns at different levels of the composition and presents system level solutions for ensuring the security and trust of modern cyber-physical systems.

Cyber-physical systems: A security perspective

The counterfeiting and recycling of integrated circuits (ICs) have become major problems in recent years, potentially impacting the security of electronic systems bound for military, financial, or other critical applications. With identical functionality and packaging, it is extremely difficult to distinguish recovered ICs from unused ICs. A technique is proposed to distinguish used ICs from the unused ones using a fingerprint generated by a light-weight on-chip sensor. Using statistical data analysis, process and temperature variations' effects on the sensors can be separated from aging experienced by the sensors in the ICs when used in the field. Simulation results, featuring the sensor using 90nm technology, and silicon results from 90nm test chips demonstrate the effectiveness of this technique for identification of recovered ICs.

Identification of recovered ICs using fingerprints from a light-weight on-chip sensor

The DoD is concerned about having trusted sources for manufacturing leading-edge new microchips. It is just as important, if not more so, to maintain high quality standards and traceability of all microchips, including legacy chips, which form the backbone of our fighting and defensive hardware in all the services. The business models for brokers are not compatible with the need for a trusted supply chain for national security applications. Not all brokers are unscrupulous or offer substandard or counterfeit parts. However, it is impossible for the DoD to make an a priori judgment of the parts bought through brokers. It is too risky to include brokers in the supply chain. Some recommendations follow to ensure that trusted supply chains are available for policy decisions of the DoD: 1) The DoD and DoD contractors must buy direct from manufacturers or authorized distributors only. 2) Rules need to be implemented that force the DKSP to only list manufacturers and distributors who exhibit proper authorizations and certifications. 3) Action must be taken to insure government agencies and contractors buy certified parts from certified suppliers for quality, traceability, and safety reasons. 4) All requirements must be removed that demand part purchases from small, disadvantaged businesses when they are not authorized by an original manufacturer. 5) All unauthorized brokers must be excluded from attending and marketing at government sponsored conferences. Following these policies will help in mitigating the risk on inclusion of counterfeit and other substandard parts in the national security systems at the system integrator level. To tackle the problem of counterfeiting at the sources, other parallel technical, legislative, law enforcement, and logistical measures need to be undertaken

D. Karraker

Papers

The Electronic Part Supply Chain and Risks of Counterfeit Parts in Defense Applications