https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.2307%2F3343168.pdf

Development as Freedom

Financial systems are crucial to the allocation of resources in a modern economy. They channel household savings to the corporate sector and allocate investment funds among firms; they allow intertemporal smoothing of consumption by households and expenditures by firms; and they enable households and firms to share risks. These functions are common to the financial systems of most developed economies. Yet the form of these financial systems varies widely. In the United States and the United Kingdom competitive markets dominate the financial landscape, whereas in France, Germany, and Japan banks have traditionally played the most important role. Why do different countries have such different financial systems? Is one system better than all the others? Do different systems merely represent alternative ways of satisfying similar needs? Is the current trend toward market-based systems desirable? Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale argue that the view that market-based systems are best is simplistic. A more nuanced approach is necessary. For example, financial markets may be bad for risk sharing; competition in banking may be inefficient; financial crises can be good as well as bad; and separation of ownership and control can be optimal. Financial institutions are not simply veils, disguising the allocation mechanism without affecting it, but are crucial to overcoming market imperfections. An optimal financial system relies on both financial markets and financial intermediaries.

比较金融系统 = Comparing financial systems

/pdf/silencing-the-past-power-and-the-production-of-history-1uvybflqsn.pdf

Silencing the past: power and the production of history

This book opens a fresh chapter in the debate on local enterprise clusters and their strategies for upgrading in the global economy. The authors employ a novel conceptual framework in their research on industrial clusters in Europe, Latin America and Asia and provide new perspectives and insights for researchers and policymakers alike.

Governance in global value chains

It’s been a long time since academic discussions about research and teaching were part of the board meetings of the department of Anthropology and Sociology of the University of Amsterdam. Most of our meetings today deal with administrative problems [...]

Seeing like a State.

contents List of Figures and Tables viii Chapter One: Introduction Established Approaches and their Limits The Argument: Banker Interests in EU Capital Markets Chapter Two: Competition Politics and Supranational Integration European Integration Financial Market Liberalisation and Regulation Private and Public Actors in Regulatory Policy The Competition Politics Approach The Core Features of the Approach Chapter Three: The Domestic Roots of Regulatory Reform European Capital Markets at the End of the 1980s Regulatory Reform in German Managed Capitalism Regulatory Reform in French State-led Capitalism Regulatory Reform in British Market Capitalism European State-market Condominiums in Comparison Chapter Four: Negotiating the Single Market Financial Services in the Single Market Project Negotiating a European Market in Investment Services Competitive Fault Lines and Intergovernmental Politics Chapter Five: The 1990s' Capital Market Revolution in Europe Measuring Change in EU Investment Banking Markets Market Concentration as a Source of Economic and Political Power The Rise of Capital Markets and Investment Banking in Europe Explaining Internationalisation European Bourses: From Members-only Clubs to Profi t-Seeking Firms Chapter Six: The Re-launch of Financial Market Integration Shifting Industry Preferences in the 1990s The Emergence of EU-level Lobbying EU Action and Industry-Commission Contacts Ahead of the FSAP The FSAP, the ISD and the Forum Groups Chapter Seven: The Emergence of Supranational Governance Supranational Cooperation before Lamfalussy viii widen the market, narrow the competition Launching Institutional Change Negotiating Lamfalussy Supranational Governance in Practice Industry Interests and Institutional Reform Chapter Eight: Renegotiating the ISD in the Supranational Constellation European Lobbying Transformed Lamfalussy in Action: Renegotiating the ISD Clearing and Settlement: the Persistence of National Competition Politics The supranational constellation in EU capital market governance Chapter Nine: Conclusion Banker Interests in EU Capital Market Integration EU Capital Market Governance and The Crisis Governing Finance in the Interest of All? Appendices Overview of the International Expansion of European Banks References List of Interviews Index

Widen the market, narrow the competition: banker interests and the making of a European capital market

Over the last 15 years, Europe has seen the liberalization of national financial markets as well as the integration of these markets and their governance through the introduction of the ‘Lamfalussy process’. This article argues that we can best understand these shifts as one integrated project of market-building in Europe, guided by distributional struggles over the terms of mutual markets access. To comprehend the complex linkages between private and public actors across levels of governance, we have to look beyond macro-theories of integration and financial liberalization upholding an analytical state-market dichotomy and adopt an integrative approach to theory, instead. Using the example of securities markets, this article argues that ‘competition politics’ are key to understanding European financial market integration.

Reordering the Marketplace: Competition Politics in European Finance*

Contemporary analyses commonly attribute the global credit crisis to faulty regulation. What have been the roots of these deficient rules, particularly in Europe, where rapid spill-over from US markets took policy makers and observers by surprise? This article focuses on regulatory liberalism as the paradigm guiding European Union (EU) regulation. It has dominated regulatory thinking for decades, but it has been implemented throughout Europe only since the mid-1990s. This shift can be traced to political institutions that have filtered policy ideas. EU financial reforms have pushed policy from pragmatism, under which it was adapted to political contingencies, to dogmatism, which adapts it to the intellectual exigencies of rigid policy paradigms. Inadvertently, reforms had created an epistemic community in which ‘professional’ rule setters systematically ignored external criticisms. The institutionalised ambition to craft ‘intellectually sound’ policy–rather than policy that simply ‘works’ –generated rules...

From Pragmatism to Dogmatism: European Union Governance, Policy Paradigms and Financial Meltdown

Official international economic statistics are generally considered accurate and meaningful gauges of cross-border flows of trade and capital. Most data users also assume that the quality o...

Globalization and the growing defects of international economic statistics

Macroeconomic indicators – especially inflation, gross domestic product growth, public deficits and unemployment – stand central in economic governance. Policy-makers use them to assess their economies’ health. Citizens evaluate politicians’ performance using them as yardsticks. But these indicators defy simple definition, and the formulae underlying them have varied across countries and over time. Particular choices have fundamental distributive consequences. This research agenda outlines how we might study macroeconomic indicators as powerful ideas and ask: why do we measure the economy the way we do? It illustrates the myriad ways in which macroeconomic indicators are embedded in contemporary social and political life, and it outlines how we can uncover both what power rests in these indicators and who has power over them. After path-breaking scholarship has demonstrated how consequential these indicators are, it is imperative to understand better which forces determine our choice for one indic...

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13501763.2015.1115537

Daniel Mügge

Papers

Widen the market, narrow the competition: banker interests and the making of a European capital market

Reordering the Marketplace: Competition Politics in European Finance*

From Pragmatism to Dogmatism: European Union Governance, Policy Paradigms and Financial Meltdown

Globalization and the growing defects of international economic statistics

Studying macroeconomic indicators as powerful ideas