Showing papers by "David Austen-Smith published in 2008"

Selected works of Michael Wallerstein: The political economy of inequality, unions, and social democracy

Abstract: 1 General introduction Adam Przeworski and Jeffrey Frieden Part I Class Conflict, the State, and Economic Limits to Democracy: 2 Introduction Adam Przeworski 3 The structure of class conflict in democratic capitalist societies Michael Wallerstein and Adam Przeworski 4 Structural dependence of the state on capital Michael Wallerstein and Adam Przeworski 5 Capital taxation with open borders Michael Wallerstein and Adam Przeworski Part II The Politics of Labor Organizations: 6 Introduction Miriam Golden 7 Union organization in advanced industrial democracies Michael Wallerstein 8 Centralized bargaining and wage restraint Michael Wallerstein 9 Trade union organization and industrial relations in the postwar era in 12 countries Michael Wallerstein, Miriam Golden, and Peter Lange 10 Unions in decline? What has changed and why Michael Wallerstein and Bruce Western Part III Inequality and Redistribution: 11 Introduction David Austen-Smith 12 Wage-setting institutions and pay inequality in advanced industrial societies Michael Wallerstein 13 Inequality, social insurance and redistribution Michael Wallerstein and Karl Ove Moene 14 Redistribution and affirmative action Michael Wallerstein and David Austen-Smith Part IV Labor and the Nordic Model of Social Democracy: 15 Introduction Karl Ove Moene 16 How social democracy worked Michael Wallerstein and Karl Ove Moene 17 Earnings inequality and welfare spending: a disaggregated analysis Michael Wallerstein and Karl Ove Moene 18 Social democracy as a development strategy Michael Wallerstein and Karl Ove Moene

Public Disclosure, Private Revelation or Silence: Whistleblowing Incentives and Managerial Policy

Abstract: The public revelation of organizational wrongdoing by insiders, whistleblowing, is widely reported, economically signi…cant and can be extremely costly to the whistleblowers. We develop a model of whistleblowing involving a manager and an employee. Each has a privately known type that speci…es the relative weight placed on social rather than personal payo¤s. The manager chooses a whistleblowing policy consisting of conditional penalties for various employee actions; the employee observes the policy and chooses between saying nothing, revealing a (privately observed) socially costly violation to the manager, or whistleblowing. Given common knowledge of manager types we characterize equilibrium whistleblowing policies and employee behavior. We show that there may be a nonmonotonic relationship between the severity of the violation and the likelihood of whistleblowing. When manager types are private information we provide su¢ cient conditions for a separating equilibrium. Managerial choice of whistleblowing policies thus serves a dual purpose: providing incentives for reporting violations and providing information to employees regarding the willingness of the manager to …x violations that are privately reported.

Selected Works of Michael Wallerstein

Abstract: Michael Wallerstein was a leader in developing a rigorous comparative political economy approach to understanding substantive issues of inequality, redistribution, and wage-determination. His early death from cancer left both a hole in the profession and a legacy that will surely provide the foundation for research on these topics. This volume collects his most important and influential contributions, organized by topic, with each topic preceded by an editorial introduction that provides overview and context.

In Response to Jurg Steiner's ‘Concept Stretching: The Case of Deliberation’

Abstract: Steiner's principal objection to our paper is that deliberators in a committee are permitted to speak strategically whereas deliberative theory requires ‘that actors do not lie but are truthful and authentic in their statements’. In this response we observe that such a prescription is relevant only to the extent that individuals might be expected to behave otherwise. Our paper explores conditions under which deliberators' strategic (descriptive) incentives are aligned with the (prescriptive) advice to tell the truth.