Over the past few decades serious reservations have been expressed about the explanatory power of sociological theory and research In this important book, leading social theorist Peter Hedstrom outlines the foundations of an analytically oriented sociology that seeks to address this criticism Building on his earlier influential contributions to contemporary debates, Professor Hedstrom argues for a systematic development of sociological theory so that it has the explanatory power and precision to inform sociological research and understanding He discusses various mechanisms of action and interaction and shows how strong links can be forged between the micro and the macro, and between theory and empirical research Combining approaches to theory and methodology and using extensive examples to illustrate how they might be applied, this clear, concise and original book will appeal to a broad range of social scientists

Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology

Preface 1. Introduction What Is Philosophy of Mind? Metaphysical Preliminaries Mind-Body Supervenience Materialism and Physicalism Varieties of Mental Phenomena Is There a "Mark of the Mental"? For Further Reading Notes 2. Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes's Dualism Descartes's Interactionist Substance Dualism Why Minds and Bodies Are Distinct: Some Arguments Princess Elisabeth Against Descartes The "Pairing Problem": Another Causal Argument Immaterial Minds in Space? Substance Dualism and Property Dualism For Further Reading Notes 3. Mind and Behavior: Behaviorism The Cartesian Theater and the "Beetle in the Box" What Is Behavior? Logical Behaviorism: A Positivist Argument A Behavioral Translation of "Paul Has a Toothache" Difficulties with Behavioral Definitions Do Pains Entail Pain Behavior? Ontological Behaviorism The Real Relationship Between Pain and Pain Behavior Behaviorism in Psychology Why Behavior Matters to Mind For Further Reading Notes 4. Mind as the Brain: The Psychoneural Identity Theory Mind-Brain Correlations Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations The Argument from Simplicity Explanatory Arguments for Psychoneural Identity An Argument from Mental Causation Against Psychoneural Identity Theory Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism For Further Reading Notes 5. Mind as a Computing Machine: Machine Functionalism Multiple Realizability and the Functional Conception of Mind Functional Properties and Their Realizers: Definitions Functionalism and Behaviorism Turing Machines Physical Realizers of Turing Machines Machine Functionalism: Motivations and Claims Machine Functionalism: Further Issues Can Machines Think? The Turing Test Computationalism and the "Chinese Room" For Further Reading Notes 6. Mind as a Causal System: Causal-Theoretical Functionalism The Ramsey-Lewis Method Choosing an Underlying Psychology Functionalism as Physicalism: Psychological Reality Objections and Difficulties Roles Versus Realizers: The Status of Cognitive Science For Further Reading Notes 7. Mental Causation Agency and Mental Causation Mental Causation, Mental Realism, and Epiphenomenalism Psychophysical Laws and "Anomalous Monism" Is Anomalous Monism a Form of Epiphenomenalism? Counterfactuals to the Rescue? Physical Causal Closure and the "Exclusion Argument" The "Supervenience Argument" and Epiphenomenalism Further Issues: The Extrinsicness of Mental States For Further Reading Notes 8. Mental Content Interpretation Theory The Causal-Correlational Approach: Informational Semantics Misrepresentation and the Teleological Approach Narrow Content and Wide Content: Content Externalism The Metaphysics of Wide Content States Is Narrow Content Possible? Two Problems for Content Externalism For Further Reading Notes 9. What Is Consciousness? Some Views on Consciousness Nagel and His Inscrutable Bats Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness Consciousness and Subjectivity Does Consciousness Involve Higher-Order Perception or Thought? Transparency of Experience and Qualia Representationalism For Further Reading Notes 10. Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem The "Explanatory Gap" and the "Hard Problem" Does Consciousness Supervene on Physical Properties? Closing the Explanatory Gap: Reduction and Reductive Explanation Functional Analysis and Reductive Explanation Consciousness and Brain Science What Mary, the Super Vision Scientist, Didn't Know The Limits of Physicalism For Further Reading Notes References Index

Philosophy of Mind

Long dismissed as unscientific, teleological explanation has been undergoing something of a revival as a result of the emergence of self-organization theory, which combines micro-level dynamics with macro-level boundary conditions to explain the tendency of systems to develop toward stable end-states. On that methodological basis this article argues that a global monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence — a world state — is inevitable. At the micro-level world state formation is driven by the struggle of individuals and groups for recognition of their subjectivity. At the macro-level this struggle is channeled toward a world state by the logic of anarchy, which generates a tendency for military technology and war to become increasingly destructive. The process moves through five stages, each responding to the instabilities of the one before — a system of states, a society of states, world society, collective security, and the world state. Human agency matters all along the way, but is increasi...

/pdf/why-a-world-state-is-inevitable-ola816dla7.pdf

Why a World State is Inevitable

1. Introduction 2. Fear, interest and honor 3. The spirit and its expression 4. The ancient world 5. Medieval Europe 6. From Sun King to Revolution 7. Imperialism and World War I 8. World War II 9. Hitler to Bush and beyond 10. General findings and conclusions.

/pdf/a-cultural-theory-of-international-relations-4bpcaeiy8z.pdf

A Cultural Theory of International Relations

Different explanations of color vision favor different philosophical positions: Computational vision is more compatible with objectivism (the color is in the object), psychophysics and neurophysiology with subjectivism (the color is in the head). Comparative research suggests that an explanation of color must be both experientialist (unlike objectivism) and ecological (unlike subjectivism). Computational vision's emphasis on optimally “recovering” prespecified features of the environment (i.e., distal properties, independent of the sensory-motor capacities of the animal) is unsatisfactory. Conceiving of visual perception instead as the visual guidance of activity in an environment that is determined largely by that very activity suggests new directions for research.

Ways of coloring: Comparative color vision as a case study for cognitive science

What is reduction? Must all discussions of the mind, value, colour, biological organisms, and persons aim to reduce these to objects and properties that can be studied by more basic, physical science? Conversely, does failure to achieve a reduction undermine the legitimacy of higher levels of description or explanation? In recent years philosophers have attempted to avoid these traditional alternatives by developing an account of higher-level phenomena which shows them to be grounded in, but not reducible to, basic physical objects and properties. The contributors to this volume examine the motivations for such anti-reductionist views, and assess their coherence and success, in a number of different fields. Their essays constitute a unified discussion, into which the reader is led by an introductory chapter where the editors set out some of the central claims and questions.

David Charles

Papers

Reduction, Explanation, and Realism