The Theory of Monopolistic Competition.

This paper proposes an empirical framework for measuring the effects of entry in concentrated markets. Building on models of entry in atomistically competitive markets, we show how the number of producers in an oligopolistic market varies with changes in demand and market competition. These analytical results structure our empirical analysis of competition in five retail and professional industries. Using data on geographically isolated monopolies, duopolies, and oligopolies, we study the relationship between the number of firms in a market, market size, and competition. Our empirical results suggest that competitive conduct changes quickly as the number of incumbents increases. In markets with five or fewer incumbents, almost all variation in competitive conduct occurs with the entry of the second or third firm. Surprisingly, once the market has between three and five firms, the next entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2937655.pdf

Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets

The Economics of Networks

Business groups—confederations of legally independent firms—are ubiquitous in emerging economies, yet very little is known about their effects on the performance of affiliated firms. We conceive of business groups as responses to market failures and high transaction costs. In doing so, we develop hypotheses about the effects of group affiliation on firm profitability: affiliation could either boost or depress firm profitability, and members of a group are likely to earn rates of return similar to other members of the same group. Using a unique data set compiled largely from local sources, we test for these effects in 14 emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. We find evidence that business groups indeed affect the broad patterns of economic performance in 12 of the markets we examine. Group affiliation appears to have as profound an effect on profitability as does industry membership, yet strategy scholars have a much clearer grasp of industries than of groups. Moreover, membership in a group raises the profitability of the average group member in several of the markets we examine. This runs contrary to the wisdom, conventional in advanced economies, that unrelated diversification depresses profitability. Overall, our findings suggest that the roots of sustained differences in profitability may vary across institutional contexts; conclusions drawn in one context may well not apply to another. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3094254.pdf

Estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets

The first two main sections survey the roles of transnational networks in alleviating problems of contract enforcement and providing information about trading opportunities, respectively. The next section covers how domestic networks influence international trade through their impact on domestic market structure. Two overarching questions unify these sections: how do networks affect efficiency, and will networks grow or shrink in importance for international trade over time. The last main sections develop research agendas for two less studied areas: the role of intermediaries who can connect foreign agents to domestic networks and the ability of transnational production networks to facilitate technology transfer.

Business and Social Networks in International Trade

Economic theory views patents as policy instruments aimed at fostering innovation and diffusion. Three major implications are drawn regarding current policy debates. First, patents may not be the most effective means of protection for inventors to recover R&D investments when imitation is costly and first mover advantages are important. Second, patentability requirements, such as novelty or non-obviousness, should be sufficiently stringent to avoid the grant of patents for inventions with low social value that increase the social cost of the patent system. Third, the trade-off between the patent policy instruments of length and breadth could be used to provide sufficient incentives to develop inventions with high social value. Beyond these three implications, economic theory also pleads for a mechanism design approach: an optimal patent system could be based on a menu of different degrees of patent protection where stronger protection would involve higher fees, allowing self-selection by inventors.

Patent Systems for Encouraging Innovation: Lessons from Economic Analysis

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00177614/document

Patent systems for encouraging innovation: Lessons from economic analysis

Degree of Monopoly, Indices of Concentration and Threat of Entry Author(s): David Encaoua and Alexis Jacquemin Source: International Economic Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Feb., 1980), pp. 87-105 Published by: Wiley for the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and Institute of Social and Economic Research -Osaka University Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2526242 . Accessed: 09/11/2014 05:57

Degree of Monopoly, Indices of Concentration and Threat of Entry

Overview Part I: The Macroeconomic Effects of Innovation 1 On the Macroeconomic Effect of Major Technological Change P Aghion, P Howitt 2 On Knowledge Diffusion, Patents Lifetime and Innovation Based Endogenous Growth P Michel, J Nyssen 3 Endogenous Growth and the Labor Market F Cerisier, F Postel-Vinay Part II: Publicly Funded Science 4 Research Productivity in a System of Universities JD Adams, Z Griliches 5 Reputation and Competence in Publicly Funded Science: Estimating the Effects on Research Group Productivity A Arora, et al 6 The Impact and Organization of Publicly Funded Research and Development in the European Community MP Feldman, FR Lichtenberg 7 An Auction Model of Intellectual Property Protection: Patent Versus Copyright M Waterson, N Ireland 8 Information Disclosure and the Renewal of Patents C Crampes, C Langinier 9 Appropriation Strategy and the Motivations to Use the Patent Systems: An Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level E Duguet, I Kabla 10 Patents and R&D, An Econometric Investigation Using Applications for German, European and US Patents by German Companies G Licht, K Zoz Part III: Network Goods and Standardization 11 Equilibrium Coalition Structures in Markets for Network Goods N Economides, F Flyer 12 Does Standardization Really Increase Production? H Stahn Part IV: Investment and Productivity in R&D 13 Accumulation of R&D Capital and Dynamic Firm Performance: A Not-So-Fixed Effect Model TJ Klette, F Johansen 14 Are there Financing Constraints for R&D and Investment in German Manufacturing Firm? D Harhoff Part V: Profits from Innovation 15 The Commercial Success of Innovations: An Econometric Analysis at the Firm Level in French Manufacturing C Barlet, et al 16 Incentives for Cost Reducing Innovations under Quantitative Import Restraints CC Cabral, et al 17 The Size Distribution of Profits from Innovation FM Scherer Part VI: Spillovers 18 Looking for International Knowledge Spillovers: A Review of the Literature with Suggestions for New Approaches L Branstetter 19 Factor Intensities, Rates of Return, and International R&D Spillovers: The Case of Canadian and US Industries J Bernstein 20 Exploring the Spillover Impact on Productivity of World-Wide Manufacturing Firms H Capron, M Cincera 21 Innovation Spillovers and Technology Policy Y Katsoulacos Index of Names Index of Subjects

/pdf/the-economics-and-econometrics-of-innovation-3gmscqmj5v.pdf

The Economics and Econometrics of Innovation

L'article analyse les complementarites et les tensions entre la concurrence et l'innovation tant du point de vue des instruments d'analyse que du point de vue des politiques economiques.

/pdf/competition-policy-and-innovation-964rmuuv7u.pdf

David Encaoua

Papers

Patent Systems for Encouraging Innovation: Lessons from Economic Analysis

Patent systems for encouraging innovation: Lessons from economic analysis

Degree of Monopoly, Indices of Concentration and Threat of Entry

The Economics and Econometrics of Innovation

Competition Policy and Innovation