The effect of ethnic division on civil war and the role of political systems in preventing these conflicts are analyzed, using the importance of religious polarization and animist diversity to explain the incidence of ethnic civil war. Findings show that religious differences are a social cleavage more important than linguistic differences in the development of civil war, and being a consociational democracy significantly reduces the incidence of ethnic civil war.

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Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars

Research on welfare states and inequality has tended to be bifurcated, focusing either on class or on gender This paper combines gender and class in an analysis of patterns of inequalities in different types of welfare states in 18 countries Whereas a major dimension of class inequality can be described in terms of material standards of living, in the advanced Western countries it is fruitful to conceptualize gender inequality in terms of agency In analyses of gender as well as of class inequalities, welfare states have been seen as significant intervening variables However, major problems have emerged in attempts to devise typologies of welfare states that are of heuristic value in analyses of gender inequality as well as of class inequality This paper describes the development of gendered agency inequality during the period after the Second World War in 18 OECD countries in the arenas of democratic politics, tertiary education, and labor force participation Class inequality is measured in terms of disposable house income based on LIS data The paper develops a new typology of welfare states based on institutional structures of relevance for gender inequality as well as class inequality The combination of gender and class throws new light on the driving forces behind inequalities and on the role of welfare states in this context Gender inequality is conceptualized in terms of agency The paper presents a new typology of welfare states based on institutional structures of relevance for gender inequality as well as class inequality The combination of gender and class throws new light on the driving forces behind inequalities and on the role of welfare states in this context

/pdf/faces-of-inequality-gender-class-and-patterns-of-v9ypac5eyt.pdf

Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class, and Patterns of Inequalities in Different Types of Welfare States

The extent to which member states transpose EU directives in a timely fashion is often argued to be strongly associated with the general effectiveness of national bureaucracies. But what kind of institutional solutions ensure better performance? This paper examines the patterns and effects of departmental oversight across 28 ministries in Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. In mapping the strength of oversight, it relies on around 90 structured interviews regarding the rules-in-use on transposition planning, legal review and monitoring of deadlines. The analysis of the impact of departmental oversight is based on an original dataset of over 300 directives with transposition deadlines between January 2005 and December 2008.

On the european union

This article investigates hypotheses generated by the veto players' theory. The fundamental insight of this theory is that an increase in the number of veto players (for all practical purposes, in parliamentary systems the number of parties in government) and their ideological distance from one another will reduce the ability of both government and parliament to produce significant laws. In addition, the number of significant laws increases with the duration of a government and with an increase in the ideological difference between current and previous government. These propositions are tested with legislative data (both laws and government decrees) on working time and working conditions identified in two legislative sources: the NATLEX computerized database in Geneva (produced by the International Labour organization) and Blanpain's International Encyclopedia for Labour Law and Industrial Relations. The data cover fifteen West European countries for the period 1981–91. The evidence corroborates the proposed hypotheses.

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Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis

This work develops and tests a theory of voter choice in parliamentary elections. I demonstrate that voters are concerned with policy outcomes and hence incorporate the way institutions convert votes to policy into their choices. Since policy is often the result of institutionalized multiparty bargaining and thus votes are watered down by power-sharing, voters often compensate for this watering-down by supporting parties whose positions differ from (and are often more extreme than) their own. I use this insight to reinterpret an ongoing debate between proximity and directional theories of voting, showing that voters prefer parties whose positions differ from their own views insofar as these parties pull policy in a desired direction. Utilizing data from four parliamentary democracies that vary in their institutional design, I test my theory and show how institutional context affects voter behavior.

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When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections

Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. By Arend Lijphart. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. xv + 229. 6.95, paper.)

David R. Herron

Papers

Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. By Arend Lijphart. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. xv + 229. 6.95, paper.)