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David Yermack

Researcher at New York University

Publications -  111
Citations -  24144

David Yermack is an academic researcher from New York University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Executive compensation & Corporate governance. The author has an hindex of 46, co-authored 110 publications receiving 22374 citations. Previous affiliations of David Yermack include University of Western Australia & National Bureau of Economic Research.

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Deferred Compensation, Risk, and Company Value: Investor Reactions to CEO Incentives

TL;DR: The authors investigate stockholder and bondholder reactions to companies' initial reports of their CEOs' inside debt positions in early 2007 when new disclosure rules took effect, and find that bond prices rise, equity prices fall, and the volatility of both securities drops upon disclosures by firms whose CEOs have sizeable defined benefit pensions or deferred compensation.
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Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and the Future of Central Banking

TL;DR: A sovereign digital currency could have profound implications for the banking system, narrowing the relationship between citizens and central banks and removing the need for the public to keep deposits in fractional reserve commercial banks as discussed by the authors.
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Compensation and Top Management Turnover

TL;DR: An examination of CEO compensation and turnover in 452 large US companies between 1984 and 1991 provides evidence that compensation policies play a significant role in retaining the services of top managers.
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Evasive Shareholder Meetings

TL;DR: In this article, the location and timing of annual shareholders' meetings are studied and it is found that voter participation drops when meetings are held at unusual hours, even though most voting is done electronically during a period of weeks before the meeting convenes, but shareholders do not appear to decode this signal, since the disclosure of meeting locations leads to little immediate stock price reaction.
Journal ArticleDOI

Evasive shareholder meetings

TL;DR: This paper studied the strategic scheduling of annual shareholder meetings and found that shareholders tend to experience pronounced stock market underperformance in the six months after the meeting and earnings below expectations over the subsequent year when companies move their annual meetings a great distance from headquarters.