American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

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Current index to legal periodicals

International law is a social historical legal tradition that emerged and spread over time to deal with matters between and across polities. This statement may appear obvious, but its full implications point to a thorough reconstruction of theoretical accounts of international law. Part I recounts how Bentham inadvertently created an enduring set of theoretical problems for international law. Part II describes international law as a social historical legal tradition, showing its European origins and diffusion with imperialism, and exposing three slants in international law. Part III broadens the lens to sketch the history of interaction between and across polities and how this has been managed. Part IV details contemporary efforts to deal with this interaction through organizations and transnational law and regulation. With this background in place, Part V elaborates a series of theoretical clarifications. First I unravel several confusions that result from construing state law and international law as parallel categories and conflating system with category. Then I explain why international law is a form of law, although not a unified hierarchical system. Contrary to common perceptions, furthermore, I show that state law and international law are not and have never been separate systems. Finally, I clarify the relationship between international law and transnational law and regulation. Aspects of this theoretical reconstruction may initially appear surprising, but they follow from the insight that international law is a social historical tradition.

What Is International Law

Manias, Panics, and Crashes. A History of Financial Crises

International organizations are widely believed to undermine domestic democracy+ Our analysis challenges this conventional wisdom, arguing that multilat- eral institutions can enhance the quality of national democratic processes, even in well- functioning democracies, in a number of important ways: by restricting the power of special interest factions, protecting individual rights, and improving the quality of dem- ocratic deliberation, while also increasing capacities to achieve important public pur- poses+ The article discusses conflicts and complementarities between multilateralism and democracy, outlines a working conception of constitutional democracy, elabo- rates theoretically the ways in which multilateral institutions can enhance constitu- tional democracy, and discusses the empirical conditions under which multilateralism is most likely to have net democratic benefits, using contemporary examples to illus- trate the analysis+ The overall aim is to articulate a set of critical democratic standards appropriate for evaluating and helping to guide the reform of international institutions+ Many scholars and popular commentators assert that international organizations undermine democracy+ Global governance, they argue, is distant, elitist, and tech- nocratic+ Debates over multilateralism are increasingly waged between critics, who point to the ways in which international institutions undermine domestic demo- cratic processes, and defenders, who stress pragmatic benefits+ In this article we challenge this conventional framing of the issue+ We do so by arguing that participation in multilateral institutions—defined broadly to include international organizations, regimes, and networks governed

/pdf/democracy-enhancing-multilateralism-8xkrvkjk2b.pdf

Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism

1. Introduction: From interdependence and institutions to globalization and governance Part 1: Interdependence and Institutions 2. International Institutions: Can interdependence work? 3. International Liberalism Reconsidered 4. Hobbe's Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in international society 5. Risk, Threat and Security Institutions Part 2: Law 6. International Relations and International Law: Two optics 7. The Concept of Legalization 8. Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and transnational Part 3: Globalism, Liberalism and Governance 9. Governance in a Globalizing World 10. The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy 11. Governance in a Partially Globalized World 12. Afterword: The globalization of informal violence, theories of world politics and the 'liberalism of fear'

Power and governance in a partially globalized world

DAVID ZARING^ I. INTRODUCTION This article seeks to shed light on a major question of international law by examining a narrowly defined group of participants in international life. The question is, How do relevant international rules develop? Given the insolvency of the United Nations, the agonies of European unification, and the controversies surrounding the expansion of regional entities such as NAFTA, ASEAN, and NATO, one might be excused for harboring some pessimism concerning the future of the best known fora for international cooperation. That pessimism is augmented by the intuition that international laws are easy to break, even if they are not broken all of the time.1 This article, however, is optimistic about the future of international cooperation because that cooperation is blossoming among the world's regulators. One multibilliondollar global regulatory scheme promulgated by banking regulators and examined in this article may serve as some evidence of that blossoming. But regulatory cooperation not only matters because of its effect on international life, but because it is a new and increasingly important way that international rules develop. The regulatory cooperation studied here-involving banking, securities, and insurance regulators-is not the product of state arrangement, but of international agreement among domestic regulatory agencies that claim to be working for themselves, rather than for their governments.2 I have selected international financial regulatory cooperation as an example of the broader phenomenon of regulatory cooperation in international society because the financial sphere is composed of organizations with diverse ages and memberships,3 has enjoyed tangible successes,4 and has recently attracted the attention of a number of observers of the international scene.5 Three international financial organizations and their activities exemplify this new phenomenon of international regulatory cooperation across borders. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (Basle Committee), founded in 1974, consists of representatives of twelve central banks that regulate the world's largest banking markets.6 The Basle Committee seeks to create common standards of banking oversight. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), a decade-old organization of securities commissions, consists of representatives of over 100 of the world's securities regulators and pursues a similar sort of harmonization for the world's security rules. The newest of the organizations, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), first met in 1994. It consists of representatives from almost 100 of the world's insurance regulators interested in the international coordination of their activities.7 The Basle Committee, IOSCO, and IAIS are leading an administrative response to the dramatic globalization of the economy. This globalization is exemplified by the growth of the banking industry. For example, the banking assets of foreign branches of U.S. banks grew from $3.5 billion in 1960 to $378.8 billion in 1990.8 Likewise, foreign banking activity accounted for 22.9% of total U.S. banking assets in 1990,9 up from 15.2% in 1982.10 International banking has thus developed from a relatively unimportant sideline activity of a few major institutions to an important financial activity that accounts for a significant portion of the assets of a number of large banks. Similar changes have occurred in the international securities and insurance markets. The value of transactions in stocks and bonds of all types involving parties residing in different countries increased fourfold during the mid-1980s,11 while American reinsurers doubled the premiums they earned from foreign clients during that decade.12 However, as financial transactions become easier to make transnationally, the specter of financial institutions migrating to countries with lax regulatory regimes and thereby damaging the safety and soundness of financial markets elsewhere becomes, at least to regulators, more real. …

International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations

▪ Abstract This literature review asks three questions of the scholarship on the regulatory networks that have so transformed global governance. First, what are these networks good for? We summarize the state of the literature on regulatory races, the fit between networks and the process of globalization, and the crucial role of the revolution in communications in the development of networks, introducing the topics with a brief intellectual history of regulatory network analysis in international relations and international law scholarship. Second, we examine how we can make sure that regulatory networks are good by asking this question: How might necessary and appropriate accountability mechanisms for the networks be constructed? The answers to these questions are at the foundation of a global administrative law, which is itself the subject of a burgeoning scholarly literature. Our third question concerns the way regulatory networks fit into a world where traditional intergovernmental relations and formal...

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID961575_code734316.pdf?abstractid=960484&mirid=1&type=2

Networking Goes International: An Update

How should we understand the federal government's response to the financial crisis? The government's team, largely staffed by investment bankers, pushed the limits of its statutory authority to authorize an ad hoc series of deals designed to mitigate that crisis. It then decided to seek comprehensive legislation that, as it turned out, paved the way for more deals. The result has not been particularly coherent, but it has married transactional practice to administrative law. In fact, we think that regulation by deal provides an organizing principle, albeit a loose one, to the government's response to the financial crisis. Dealmakers use contract to avoid some legal constraints, and often prefer to focus on arms-length negotiation, rather than regulatory authorization, as the source of legitimacy for their actions, though the law does provide a structure to their deals. They also do not always take the long view or place value on consistency, instead preferring to complete the latest deal at hand and move to the next transaction. In this paper, we offer a first look at the history of the financial crisis from the fall of Bear Stearns up to, and including, the initial implementation of the Economic Emergency Stability Act of 2008. We analyze in depth each deal the government concluded, and how it justified those deals within the constraints of the law, using its authority to sometimes stretch but never truly break that law. We consider what the government's response so far means for transactional and administrative law scholarship, as well as some of the broader implications of crisis governance by deal.

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Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to the Financial Crisis

Informal international regulatory cooperation is changing into recognizable forms of international administration. This paper surveys some of those forms. The forms range from hard procedural law to soft harmonization-through-example. They include: 1) hard international rules that constrain institutions in developed countries; 2) softer principles of supervision which bureaucrats in developing countries may emulate; and 3) models for regulators in adjacent issue areas. It is in attempting to adopt hard rules that we see an escalating procedural formality to regulatory cooperation. We also see a softer proselytization of unobjectionable, easy (for already sophisticated regulators, at least) standards throughout the developing world. Finally, the horde of organizations that have copied the form and agendas of established regulatory cooperation mechanisms also play a part in emerging international administration. The principal case studies for the paper come from international financial regulation.

Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration

This article adds an empirical perspective to the debate over the use of foreign authority by federal courts. It surveys sixty years of federal court practice in citing opinions from foreign high courts, through a citation count analysis. The data reveals that federal courts rarely cite to foreign decisions, they do so no more now than they did in the past, and on those few occasions where they do cite to foreign decisions, it's usually not to help them interpret domestic law. Instead the citation of foreign decisions is best understood as a relatively rare phenomenon of judicial dialogue in cases where international issues are squarely presented by the facts. The article examines those few cases where federal courts have cited foreign decisions in some detail, and briefly considers some implications of the limited use of foreign decisions by federal courts.

David Zaring

Papers

International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations

Networking Goes International: An Update

Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to the Financial Crisis

Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration

The Use of Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis