A transaction terminal (10) having a touch screen (20) disposed in a recess (30) in the terminal housing (12) includes an adaptor (25) for facilitating use of the touch screen by persons that are vision-impaired, hearing-impaired or dexterity-challenged. The adaptor (25) is selectively positionable in operative engagement with the touch screen (20). The adaptor (25) includes an insert (50) and a keypad (60, 160, 260). The insert (50) is supported on terminal housing (12) with deck (52) disposed over and in spaced relationship to the touch screen. The deck (52) has at least one discrete opening therethrough. The keypad includes at least one key juxtaposed relative to said least one discrete opening in said deck of the insert. Upon depression of the key, contact is made with a selected portion of the touch screen (20).

Transaction terminal and adaptor therefor

A terminal includes a housing, a touch screen, and an imaging assembly. The imaging assembly in one embodiment is disposed in the housing so that an imaging axis extends externally from the housing. The imaging assembly can be utilized for capture of images disposed externally to the housing. In one embodiment a frame of image data captured utilizing an imaging assembly can be processed for attempting to decode a decodable indicia. In one embodiment a frame of image data captured utilizing an imaging assembly can be stored.

Terminal including imaging assembly

The present invention is a method and system for establishing an authenticated and secure communication session for transactions between a server and a client in a wireless data network that generally comprises an airnet, a landline network and a link server therebetween. The client having limited computing resources is remotely located with respect to the server and communicates to the server through the wireless data network. To authenticate each other, the client and the server conduct two rounds of authentication, the client authentication and the server authentication, independently and respectively, each of the authentication processes is based on a shared secret encrypt key and challenge/response mechanism. To reach for a mutually accepted cipher in the subsequent transactions, the server looks up for a commonly used cipher and forwards the cipher along with a session key to the client. The subsequent transactions between the client and the server are then proceeded in the authenticated and secure communication session and further each transaction secured by the session key is labeled by a transaction ID that is examined before a transaction thereof takes place.

Method and system for secure lightweight transactions in wireless data networks

A fraudulent intruder can eavesdrop on a call by removing information about an encryption algorithm when a multimode mobile station sends an unpro-tected initial signaling message containing this information over the radio interface to the mobile telecommunications system. The attempt can be pre-vented in a universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) comprising at least two radio access networks providing mobile stations with access to at least one core network, a multimode mobile station, and at least one core network. During connection setup with a first radio access network, the mul-timode mobile station sends an unprotected initial signaling message that includes information about those encryption algorithms that the multimode mobile station supports when it communicates in a second radio access network. The first radio access network saves some or all the information of it. Then it composes and sends an integrity-protected message that includes information about the encryption algorithms supported by the multimode mobile station in the second radio access network.

A system for ensuring encrypted communication after handover

A method performs biometric verifications to authenticate the identification of users using a central biometric authority (CBA). This allows parties to an electronic transaction to be assured of each other's identity. Specifically, at the sender side, a first message to a receiver is generated, wherein the first message includes a message text and a unique message identifier (UMI). At the sender side, a second message concerning a posting to the CBA is also generated, wherein the second message includes the sender's biometric sample, the UMI, and the sender's submission profile record. At a receiver side, it is decided that if a receiver wishes to verify the sender's identity and if so, the first message is automatically verified. At the receiver side, a third message concerning a receiver's posting to the CBA is issued, the third message including only the UMI, as received from the sender side. Finally, at the CBA, a reply to the third message is provided, the reply including the sender's verification result.

Identity verification method using a central biometric authority

The present invention relates to a process for verifying the preservation of the integrity of an unprotected request sent by an anonymous client to a server, in which only one public key, that of the server, is used. This process is remarkable in that the anonymous client sends, along with his request, a flag which specifies whether or not the server must offer an absolute guarantee of non-repetition of the requests received as well as a unique number, that is, a number which never repeats or has a low probability of repetition, consisting either of a random number with a low probability of repetition or the concatenation of a time indicator and a random number with a certainty of non-repetition, the verification of said integrity being performed during the reception of the response to the request, for which reason the global response includes the response to the request plus the result of a one-way compression function applied to the request, flag and unique number combination, the integrity of the global response moreover being protected either by means of the public key of the server used as a signature key, or by means of a private key established using the public key of the server as an encryption key.

Process for verifying the preservation of the integrity of an unprotected request sent by a client to a server by verifying the integrity of the response

The integrity verification and conservation method involves using a flag emitted by the client with its request, and also a unique number sent by the client. The flag indicates whether the server should or should not offer a guarantee of non-repetition of received requests. The unique number indicating probability or time delay before repetition of the request. The request integrity is obtained when the server's response to the request is received. The information sent with the client request is processed with an algorithm and the result returned to the client. The preferred processing is to apply the server's private encryption key, which allows verification using the server's public encryption key.

Client server verification and conservation of integrity of request

The present invention relates to a Conservation method of verifying the integrity of a request sent unprotected by an anonymous client to a server, a single public key is used, the server. This method is remarkable in that the anonymous client sends together with its application on the one hand a flag that specifies whether the server should or should not provide an absolute guarantee of non-repetition of requests received and secondly a unique number , that is to say, never repeating or having a low probability of repetition, consisting either of a random number with a low probability of repetition or by concatenating an indication of time and a random number with a non-repetition of certainty, verifying said integrity then being carried out upon receipt of the response to the request, including the overall response for this response to the request but also the result of a one-way compression function applied to all request flag and unique number, the overall response is further integrity protected either by means of the server's public key used as key if signa ture, or by means of a secret key established using the public key of the server used as the encryption key.

Denis Pinkas

Papers

Process for verifying the preservation of the integrity of an unprotected request sent by a client to a server by verifying the integrity of the response

Client server verification and conservation of integrity of request

Integrity check on requests in a client server network