D
Dennis Andriesse
Researcher at VU University Amsterdam
Publications - 20
Citations - 1080
Dennis Andriesse is an academic researcher from VU University Amsterdam. The author has contributed to research in topics: Source code & Benchmarking. The author has an hindex of 13, co-authored 20 publications receiving 897 citations. Previous affiliations of Dennis Andriesse include Intel.
Papers
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Practical Context-Sensitive CFI
Victor van der Veen,Dennis Andriesse,Enes Goktas,Ben Gras,Lionel Sambuc,Asia Slowinska,Herbert Bos,Cristiano Giuffrida +7 more
TL;DR: This work shows that Context-sensitive CFI (CCFI) for both the backward and forward edge can be implemented efficiently on commodity hardware, and presents PathArmor, a binary-level CCFI implementation which tracks paths to sensitive program states, and defines the set of valid control edges within the state context to yield higher precision.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
SoK: P2PWNED - Modeling and Evaluating the Resilience of Peer-to-Peer Botnets
Christian Rossow,Dennis Andriesse,T. Werner,Brett Stone-Gross,Daniel Plohmann,Christian J. Dietrich,Herbert Bos +6 more
TL;DR: A formal graph model is introduced to capture the intrinsic properties and fundamental vulnerabilities of P2P botnets and can be used to assist security researchers in evaluating mitigation strategies against current and future P2p botnets.
Proceedings Article
An In-Depth Analysis of Disassembly on Full-Scale x86/x64 Binaries
TL;DR: This work studies the accuracy of nine state-of-the-art disassemblers on 981 real-world compiler-generated binaries with a wide variety of properties, and reveals a mismatch between expectations in the literature, and the actual capabilities of modern disassembler.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Highly resilient peer-to-peer botnets are here: An analysis of Gameover Zeus
TL;DR: Through a detailed analysis of this new Zeus variant, this work demonstrates the high resilience of state of the art peer-to-peer botnets in general, and of peer- to-peer Zeus in particular.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
StackArmor: Comprehensive Protection From Stack-based Memory Error Vulnerabilities for Binaries
TL;DR: An implementation of StackArmor for x86 64 Linux is presented and a detailed experimental analysis of the prototype is provided to demonstrate that StackArmor offers better security than prior binary and source-level approaches, at the cost of only modest performance and memory overhead even with full protection.