This monograph synthesizes current information from the various fields of cognitive science in support of a new theory of mind Most psychologists study horizontal processes like memory Fodor postulates a vertical and modular psychological organization underlying biologically coherent behaviours This view of mental architecture is consistent with the historical tradition of faculty psychology while integrating a computational approach to mental processes One of the most notable aspects of Fodor’s work is that it articulates features not only of speculative cognitive architecture but also of current research in artificial intelligence – Part I Four accounts of mental structure; – Part II A functional taxonomy of cognitive mechanisms; – Part III Input systems as modules; – Part IV Central systems; – Part V Caveats and conclusions M-M V

The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology

Preface 1. Introduction What Is Philosophy of Mind? Metaphysical Preliminaries Mind-Body Supervenience Materialism and Physicalism Varieties of Mental Phenomena Is There a "Mark of the Mental"? For Further Reading Notes 2. Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes's Dualism Descartes's Interactionist Substance Dualism Why Minds and Bodies Are Distinct: Some Arguments Princess Elisabeth Against Descartes The "Pairing Problem": Another Causal Argument Immaterial Minds in Space? Substance Dualism and Property Dualism For Further Reading Notes 3. Mind and Behavior: Behaviorism The Cartesian Theater and the "Beetle in the Box" What Is Behavior? Logical Behaviorism: A Positivist Argument A Behavioral Translation of "Paul Has a Toothache" Difficulties with Behavioral Definitions Do Pains Entail Pain Behavior? Ontological Behaviorism The Real Relationship Between Pain and Pain Behavior Behaviorism in Psychology Why Behavior Matters to Mind For Further Reading Notes 4. Mind as the Brain: The Psychoneural Identity Theory Mind-Brain Correlations Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations The Argument from Simplicity Explanatory Arguments for Psychoneural Identity An Argument from Mental Causation Against Psychoneural Identity Theory Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism For Further Reading Notes 5. Mind as a Computing Machine: Machine Functionalism Multiple Realizability and the Functional Conception of Mind Functional Properties and Their Realizers: Definitions Functionalism and Behaviorism Turing Machines Physical Realizers of Turing Machines Machine Functionalism: Motivations and Claims Machine Functionalism: Further Issues Can Machines Think? The Turing Test Computationalism and the "Chinese Room" For Further Reading Notes 6. Mind as a Causal System: Causal-Theoretical Functionalism The Ramsey-Lewis Method Choosing an Underlying Psychology Functionalism as Physicalism: Psychological Reality Objections and Difficulties Roles Versus Realizers: The Status of Cognitive Science For Further Reading Notes 7. Mental Causation Agency and Mental Causation Mental Causation, Mental Realism, and Epiphenomenalism Psychophysical Laws and "Anomalous Monism" Is Anomalous Monism a Form of Epiphenomenalism? Counterfactuals to the Rescue? Physical Causal Closure and the "Exclusion Argument" The "Supervenience Argument" and Epiphenomenalism Further Issues: The Extrinsicness of Mental States For Further Reading Notes 8. Mental Content Interpretation Theory The Causal-Correlational Approach: Informational Semantics Misrepresentation and the Teleological Approach Narrow Content and Wide Content: Content Externalism The Metaphysics of Wide Content States Is Narrow Content Possible? Two Problems for Content Externalism For Further Reading Notes 9. What Is Consciousness? Some Views on Consciousness Nagel and His Inscrutable Bats Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness Consciousness and Subjectivity Does Consciousness Involve Higher-Order Perception or Thought? Transparency of Experience and Qualia Representationalism For Further Reading Notes 10. Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem The "Explanatory Gap" and the "Hard Problem" Does Consciousness Supervene on Physical Properties? Closing the Explanatory Gap: Reduction and Reductive Explanation Functional Analysis and Reductive Explanation Consciousness and Brain Science What Mary, the Super Vision Scientist, Didn't Know The Limits of Physicalism For Further Reading Notes References Index

Philosophy of Mind

The view that I am advertising is a variant on the functionalism familiar in the philosophy of mind. However, I will not be attempting to counter 
the objections that have been raised to that view (except briefly, and in 
passing). My bet is that looking at functionalism from the point o f view of 
meaning (rather than mentality) and with an eye to its fertility and power 
rather than its weaknesses will provide a rationale for working on its problems.

Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology

The target article is an attempt to make some progress on the problem of color realism. Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the color properties? We defend the view that physical objects (for instance, tomatoes, radishes, and rubies) are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically, types of reflectance. This is probably a minority opinion, at least among color scientists. Textbooks frequently claim that physical objects are not colored, and that the colors are "subjective" or "in the mind." The article has two other purposes: First, to introduce an interdisciplinary audience to some distinctively philosophical tools that are useful in tackling the problem of color realism and, second, to clarify the various positions and central arguments in the debate. The first part explains the problem of color realism and makes some useful distinctions. These distinctions are then used to expose various confusions that often prevent people from seeing that the issues are genuine and difficult, and that the problem of color realism ought to be of interest to anyone working in the field of color science. The second part explains the various leading answers to the prob- lem of color realism, and (briefly) argues that all views other than our own have serious difficulties or are unmotivated. The third part explains and motivates our own view, that colors are types of reflectances and defends it against objections made in the recent literature that are often taken as fatal.

/pdf/color-realism-and-color-science-4kca5epgzi.pdf

Dennis W. Stampe

Papers

Toward a Causal Theory of Linguistic Representation