We present an analytical framework for understanding what makes a product category more conducive for store brand introduction. We also investigate market characteristics that help explain differences in store brand market share across product categories. Our findings suggest that the introduction of a store brand is likely to increase retailer's profits in a product category if the cross-price sensitivity among national brands is low and the cross-price sensitivity between the national brands and the store brand is high. Our model predicts that the store brand share would also be greater under these conditions. In addition, we find that the introduction of a store brand is more likely to lead to an increase in category profits if the category consists of a large number of national brands-even though the store brand market share is expected to be lower when there are a large number of national brands. We compare the key predictions of our model with data on 426 grocery product categories. The data are consistent with the predictions of the model.

The introduction and performance of store brands

In contrast to single-equation cross-sectional studies of private label share, developing a complete understanding of the nature of the competitive interaction between national brands and private labels requires an understanding of the determinants of both demand and strategic pricing decisions by firms. Consequently, we estimate a simultaneous system of share and price for private labels and national brands. From the empirical results, two measures of market response are derived. The unilateral demand elasticity measures the pure ?own? demand response, while the residual (or ?total?) elasticity also captures the impact of competitive price reaction (Baker and Bresnahan 1985). When taken together, these provide important strategic insights into the pricing interaction between national brands and private labels. In our empirical analysis, we employ a flexible, non-linear demand specification, the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS, Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a), and specify the price reaction equations derived under the LA/AIDS demand specification. Incorporating LA/AIDS demands into a structural equation framework represents an important departure from previous demand specifications in competitive analysis. Using the proposed LA/AIDS framework, we perform a detailed intra-category analysis using data on six individual categories: bread, milk, pasta, instant coffee, butter and margarine. In addition, in an attempt to generalize the results to a broader set of categories and in order to enable us to compare our results to previous cross-section studies, we also estimate using a sample pooled across 125 categories and 59 geographic markets. Consistent with our objectives, we find that consumer response to price and promotion decisions (demand) and the factors influencing firm pricing behavior (supply) jointly determine observed market prices and market shares. Further, estimates of residual demand elasticities suggest that examination of partial demand elasticities alone may provide an incomplete picture of the ability of brands to raise price. Managerial implications, limitations and suggestion for future research are discussed.

Assessing the Competitive Interaction Between Private Labels and National Brands

In this article, we employ the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA/AIDS). and specify price reaction equations derived under the LA/AIDS specification. We perform intracategory analyses using data on six individual categories, as well as a pooled analysis on a sample of 125 categories and 59 geographic markets. We find that consumer response to price and promotion decisions (demand) and firm pricing behavior (supply) jointly determine observed market prices and market shares. Further, estimates of residual demand elasticities suggest that examination of partial demand elasticities alone may provide an incomplete picture of the ability of brands to raise price. Copyright 2000 by University of Chicago Press.

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Innovation in the Spanish food & drink industry

Like any new product, private label entry increases competition within a category leading to downward pressure on both wholesale and retail prices. But, given the higher margins for private labels and potential bargaining benefits for retailers, they have incentives to help private labels gain market share. The paper addresses two questions: First, do private labels enhance a retailer’s bargaining power with respect to manufacturers? Second, given the higher profitability and potential increase in bargaining power, does the retailer strategically set retail prices to favor and strengthen the private label? We find support for the “bargaining power” hypothesis, but qualified support for the “strategic retailer pricing” hypothesis. Retailers gain bargaining power through lower wholesale prices on imitated national brands. But the gain is greater in niche categories than in mass categories, suggesting that niche national brands with limited “pull” power lose greater bargaining power. In terms of strategic pricing, the retailer, on initially introducing the private label, strategically sets prices to help private labels gain market share in high volume mass market categories. But retail prices revert to the category profit maximizing price after a year when the private label gains a stable market share.

Do private labels increase retailer bargaining power

Own brands are now emerging in the cookware market, and retailers are thus implementing strategies which influence manufacturers, traditional shopping outlets and consumer shopping style. This new trend is examined, seeking correlation with other market sectors which have already absorbed the own‐brand factor, relating what is current practice in the cookware market, identifying retailers' own and mixed brand policies and considering consumer choice factors. Cookware brand developments are not expected to differ from those of other sectors. Retailers will try to lead the market through product advancement, while manufacturers must seek to protect their brands by developing added value and using strong marketing strategies to promulgate anti‐own brand products.

Derek McMaster

Papers

Own Brands and the Cookware Market