Dhananjay Nanda

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine systematic differences in earnings management across 31 countries and propose an explanation for these differences based on the notion that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders.

TL;DR: The authors examined the pervasiveness of earnings management across 31 countries between 1990 and 1999 and found that insiders, in an attempt to protect their private control benefits, use earnings management to conceal firm performance from outsiders.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the relation among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital, and find that firms with good earnings quality have more expansive voluntary disclosures (as proxied by a self-constructed index of coded items found in 677 firms' annual reports and 10-K filings in fiscal 2001).

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the relation between managers' disclosure activities and their stock price-based incentives and find that firms' disclosures, measured both by management earnings forecast frequency and analysts' subjective ratings of disclosure practice, are positively related to the proportion of CEO compensation affected by stock price and the value of shares held by the CEO.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the relation between outside investor protection and earnings management and found that strong protection limits insiders' ability to acquire private control benefits and hence reduces their incentives to mask firm performance.