THIS paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harmful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties. The economic analysis of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the far' ory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economics of Welfare. The conclusions to which this kind of analyris seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory liable for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other

闡釋《社會成本問題》[The Problem of Social Cost]

We study learning in a setting where agents receive independent noisy signals about the true value of a variable and then communi cate in a network. They naively update beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. We show that all opinions in a large society converge to the truth if and only if the influence of the most influential agent vanishes as the society grows. We also identify obstructions to this, including prominent groups, and pro vide structural conditions on the network ensuring efficient learn ing. Whether agents converge to the truth is unrelated to how quickly consensus is approached. (JEL D83, D85, Z13)

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Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds

Introduction 1. Defining Fairness 2. Distributing Fairly 3. Introduction to Incentive Issues 4. Unequal skills 5. Income Redistribution 6. Risk, Insurance, and Option Luck 7. Fresh Starts 8. Utilitarian Reward 9. Inequalities of Opportunity and Social Mobility 10. Responsibility, Freedom, and Social Justice

Fairness, responsibility, and welfare

THERE IS NO perfect format for a CV, but it should be logical and concise to ensure maximum attention is given to your strengths. Remember, a CV is your personal marketing tool, aimed at convincing a prospective employer that you have the necessary skills, professional, educational and personal experience to undertake a particular role.

Getting a job

(2016). The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. Quality Management Journal: Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 72-72.

The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies

A refinement and extension of the no-envy concept

The authors extend the findings of Mas-Colell on valuation equilibria and the relationship of cost-share equilibria with the core. They allow for any finite number of private goods and a set of public projects without any structure. The authors show the two welfare theorems for valuation equilibrium, the inclusion of the set of cost-share equilibria in the core, and the nonequivalence of these two sets for an economy with a finite number of agents. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core

In the theory of economies with public goods one usually considers the case in which private goods are essential, i.e., each agent receives a fixed minimum level of utility if he consumes no private goods, irrespective of the public goods consumed. This paper develops the second welfare theorem for economies with public projects and possibly inessential private goods. As a corollary we also derive conditions under which valuation equilibria exist.

On the Decentralization of Pareto Optima in Economies with Public Projects, Nonessential Private Goods and Convex Costs

Existence theorems for envy-free and efficient allocations are derived for economies with public goods. For economies with an arbitrary but finite number of private and public goods, an adaptation of the existence proof of Svensson for private good economies is used. For economies with one private and one public good, a case often studied in theory and applications, two more direct proofs are given, using different conditions and taking advantage of the particularly simple structure of the set of envy-free allocations in this case. These proofs are also shown to apply to the case of excludable public goods with congestion.

Dimitrios Diamantaras

Papers

A refinement and extension of the no-envy concept

The Pure Theory of Public Goods: Efficiency, Decentralization, and the Core

On the Decentralization of Pareto Optima in Economies with Public Projects, Nonessential Private Goods and Convex Costs

On equity with public goods

A generalization of Kaneko’s ratio equilibrium for economies with private and public goods