Showing papers by "Douglas Walton published in 2019"

How Computational Tools Can Help Rhetoric and Informal Logic with Argument Invention

Abstract: This paper compares the features and methods of the two leading implemented systems that offer a tool for helping a user to find or invent arguments to support or attack a designated conclusion, the Carneades Argumentation System and the IBM Watson Debater tool. The central aim is to contribute to the understanding of scholars in informal logic, rhetoric and argumentation on how these two software systems can be useful for them. One contribution of the paper is to explain to these potential users how the two tools are applicable to the task of inventing arguments by using some simple illustrative examples. Another is to redefine the structure of argument invention as a procedure.

Emotive Meaning in Political Argumentation

Abstract: Donald Trump’s speeches and messages are characterized by terms that are commonly referred to as “thick” or “emotive,” meaning that they are characterized by a tendency to be used to generate emotive reactions. This paper investigates how emotive meaning is related to emotions, and how it is generated or manipulated. Emotive meaning is analyzed as an evaluative conclusion that results from inferences triggered by the use of a term, which can be represented and assessed using argumentation schemes. The evaluative inferences are regarded as part of the connotation of emotive words, which can be modified and stabilized by means of recontextualizations. The manipulative risks underlying the misuse and the redefinition of emotive words are accounted for in terms of presuppositions and implicit modifications of the interlocutors’ commitments.

Epistemic and deontic authority in the argumentum ad verecundiam

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to elaborate tools that would allow us to analyse arguments from authority and guard against fallacious uses of them. To accomplish this aim, we extend the list of existing argumentation schemes representing arguments from authority. For this purpose, we formulate a new argumentation scheme for argument from deontic authority along with a matching set of critical questions used to evaluate it. We argue that clarifying the ambiguity between arguments from epistemic and deontic authority helps building a better explanation of the informal fallacy of appeal to authority (argumentum ad verecundiam).

Taking the dialectical stance in reasoning with evidence and proof

Abstract: We present a computational argumentation approach that models legal reasoning with evidence and proof as dialectical rather than probabilistic. This hybrid approach of stories and arguments models ...

When Expert Opinion Evidence Goes Wrong

Abstract: This paper combines three computational argumentation systems to model the sequence of argumentation in a famous murder trial and the appeal procedure that followed. The paper shows how the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion can be built into a testing procedure whereby an argument graph is used to interpret, analyze and evaluate evidence-based natural language argumentation of the kind found in a trial. It is shown how a computational argumentation system can do this by combining argument schemes with argumentation graphs. Frighteningly, it is also shown by this example that when there are potentially confusing conflicting arguments from expert opinion, a jury can only too easily accept a conclusion prematurely before considering critical questions that need to be asked.

Argumentos de raciocínio prático: uma abordagem modular

Abstract: Este artigo tem por objetivo comparar as formas atuais de modelar a estrutura inferencial de argumentos de raciocinio pratico (baseados em objetivos) e propor uma nova abordagem na qual esta estrutura e considerada de maneira modular. O raciocinio pratico nao e visto simplesmente como um raciocinio que parte de um objetivo e de um meio para uma acao usando o esquema basico de argumentacao; em vez disso, e concebido como uma estrutura complexa de inferencias classificatorias, avaliativas e praticas, formalizada como um agrupamento de tres tipos de esquemas de argumentacao distintos e interligados. Usando dois exemplos reais, mostramos como a aplicacao dos tres tipos de esquemas a um conjunto de raciocinio pratico permite que a/o analista reconstrua as premissas tacitas pressupostas e avalie as etapas de raciocinio argumentativo envolvidas. Esta abordagem sera apresentada de modo a superar as limitacoes dos modelos de argumentos de raciocinio pratico existentes nos quadros teoricos de BDI (Belief – Desire – Intention) e de Comprometimento, ao fornecer uma ferramenta util para a Analise do Discurso e outras disciplinas. Especificamente, a aplicacao deste metodo revela o papel crucial da classificacao no raciocinio pratico, mostrando como a ordenacao de valores e de preferencias consiste em apenas uma das possiveis areas de desacordo profundo.

Plausible Argumentation in Eikotic Arguments: The Ancient Weak Versus Strong Man Example

Abstract: In this paper it is shown how plausible reasoning of the kind illustrated in the ancient Greek example of the weak and strong man can be analyzed and evaluated using a procedure in which the pro evidence is weighed against the con evidence using formal, computational argumentation tools. It is shown by means of this famous example how plausible reasoning is based on an audience’s recognition of situations of a type they are familiar with as normal and comprehensible in their shared common knowledge. The paper extends previous work on this example by using three new multiagent argumentation schemes closely related to the scheme for argument from negative consequences.

When expert opinion evidence goes wrong

Abstract: This paper combines three computational argumentation systems to model the sequence of argumentation in a famous murder trial and the appeal procedure that followed. The paper shows how the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion can be built into a testing procedure whereby an argument graph is used to interpret, analyze and evaluate evidence-based natural language argumentation of the kind found in a trial. It is shown how a computational argumentation system can do this by combining argument schemes with argumentation graphs. Frighteningly, it is also shown by this example that when there are potentially confusing conflicting arguments from expert opinion, a jury can only too easily accept a conclusion prematurely before considering critical questions that need to be asked.

Diagnosing Misattribution of Commitments: A Normative and Pragmatic Model of for Assessing Straw Man

Abstract: This paper builds a nine-step method for determining whether a straw man fallacy has been committed in a given case or not, by starting with some relatively easy textbook cases and moving to more realistic and harder cases. The paper shows how the type of argument associated with the fallacy can be proved to be a fallacy in a normative argumentation model, and then moves on to the practical task of building a hands-on method for applying the model to real examples of argumentation. Insights from linguistic pragmatics are used to distinguish the different pragmatic processes involved in reconstructing what is said and what is meant by an utterance, and to differentiate strong and weak commitments. In particular, the process of interpretation is analyzed in terms of an abductive pattern of reasoning, based on co-textual and contextual information, and assessable through the instruments of argumentation theory.

Practical Reasoning in the Deliberations of an Intelligent Autonomous Agent

Abstract: This chapter outlines possible future developments and prospects of computational argumentation systems on practical (means-end, goal-directed) reasoning in artificial intelligence by leading the reader through a series of simple examples, gradually leading to more complex examples. The Carneades Argumentation System is used to model the structure of the argumentation in these examples, and through this, it is shown how formal systems of deliberation dialogue need to be applied to problems posed by the more complex examples.