Introduction Part I. The Logic of Sovereignty: 1. The paradox of sovereignty 2. 'Nomos Basileus' 3. Potentiality and law 4. Form of law Threshold Part II. Homo Sacer: 1. Homo sacer 2. The ambivalence of the sacred 3. Sacred life 4. 'Vitae Necisque Potestas' 5. Sovereign body and sacred body 6. The ban and the wolf Threshold Part III. The Camp as Biopolitical Paradigm of the Modern: 1. The politicization of life 2. Biopolitics and the rights of man 3. Life that does not deserve to live 4. 'Politics, or giving form to the life of a people' 5. VP 6. Politicizing death 7. The camp as the 'Nomos' of the modern Threshold Bibliography Index of names.

Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life

How to Do Things With Words

Course Description In this course, we will explore the question of the actual and potential connections between democracy and education. Our focus of attention will be placed on a critical examination of democratic theory and its implications for the civic education roles and contributions of teachers, adult educators, community development practitioners, and community organizers. We will survey and deal critically with a range of competing conceptions of democracy, variously described as classical, republican, liberal, radical, marxist, neomarxist, pragmatist, feminist, populist, pluralist, postmodern, and/or participatory. Using narrative inquiry as a means for illuminating and interpreting contemporary practice, we will analyze the implications of different conceptions of democracy for the practical work of civic education.

Democracy and education.

Emotion and Adaptation

語用論(Pragmatics)を考える

Appeals to emotion-pity, fear, popular sentiment, and ad hominem attacks-are commonly used in argumentation. Instead of dismissing these appeals as fallacious wherever they occur, as many do, Walton urges that each use be judged on its merits. He distinguished three main categories of evaluation. First, is it reasonable, even if not conclusive, as an argument? Second, is it weak and therefore open to critical questioning for argument? And third, is it fallacious? The third category is a strong charge that incurs a critical burden to back it up by citing evidence from the given text and context of dialogue. Walton uses fifty-six case studies to demonstrate that the problem of emotional fallacies is much subtler than has been previously believed. Ranging over commercial advertisements, political debates, union-management negotiations, and ethical disputes, the case studies reveal that these four types of appeals, while based on presumptive reasoning that are tentative and subject to default, are not always or necessarily fallacious types of argumentation.

The place of emotion in argument

A general outline of a theory of reasoned dialogue is presented as an underlying basis of critical analysis of a text of argument discourse. This theory is applied to the analysis of informal fallacies by showing how textual evidence can be brought to bear in argument reconstruction. Several basic types of dialogue are identified and described, but the persuasive type of dialogue is emphasized as being of key importance to critical thinking theory.

Dialogue Theory for Critical Thinking

This book presents a number of themes which are already familiar from Douglas Walton's writings-the centrality of dialogue analysis in understanding and evaluating arguments, types of dialogue and dialogue shifts, the application of this to understanding fallacies. However there are two themes on which I shall concentrate in this review: Walton's emphasis on the functional, pragmatic approach to the analysis and evaluation of both argument and reasoning. Walton characterizes plausible or presumptive reasoning as "default or defeasible reasoning-a tentative kind of reasoning that is inherently subject to correction, revision, or rebuttal" (xii). Presumptive reasoning is tentative in at least two ways. First, the premises put forward are not known to be true. The respondent in a dialogue agrees to accept the premises tentatively in order to advance the dialogue. The proponent or speaker in the dialogue agrees to withdraw the premises should the respondent introduce new counterevidence into the dialogue. Secondly, presumptive reasoning is tentative in inferring conclusions from premises. Walton highlights the difference this way: Where deductive reasoning may involve a premise that all F are G and inductive reasoning a premise that most F are G, presumptive reasoning involves a premise thattypically F's areG's. Ifsomethingis an F, then we may take itto be a G, until or unless we get information that it is an exceptional case. Walton characterizes a presumption as a speech act between an assumption-a statement put forward hypothetically so as to draw out its consequences, as in conditional or reductio ad absurdum proofs-and a categorical assertion. One does not put forward an assumption for acceptance and so one incurs no burden to give evidence for it. Likewise, since the purpose of putting the assumption forward is to draw out its logical consequences, and this is not affected by whether the assumption is true or false, evidence against the assumption does not constitute grounds for withdrawing it. In putting forward an assertion, one does encounter a burden of proof, and negative evidence can mandate its retraction. For Walton, presumptions can be put forward without positive evidence, at least without sufficient positive evidence to justify acceptance. In the light of negative evidence, however, presumptions may have to be relinquished.

Plausible argument in everyday conversation

Logical dialogue-games and fallacies

This chapter explains the role of proof burdens and standards in argumentation, illustrates them using legal procedures, and surveys the history of research on computational models of these concepts It also presents an original computational model which aims to integrate the features of these prior systems The ‘mainstream’ conception of argumentation in the field of artificial intelligence is monological and deductive [6] Argumentation is viewed as taking place against the background of an inconsistent knowledge base, where the knowledge base is a set of propositions represented in some formal logic Argumentation in this conception is a method for deducing warranted propositions from an inconsistent knowledge base Which statements are warranted depends on attack relations among the arguments [10] which can be constructed from the knowledge base The notions of proof standards and burden of proof become relevant only when argumentation is viewed as a dialogical process for making justified decisions The input to the process is an initial claim or issue The goal of the process is to clarify and decide the issues, and produce a justification of the decision which can withstand a critical evaluation by a particular audience The role of the audience could be played by the respondent or a neutral-third party, depending on the type of dialogue The output of this process consists of: 1) a set of claims, 2) the decision to accept or reject each claim, 3) a theory of the generalizations of the domain and the facts of the particular case, and 4) a proof justifying the decision of each issues, showing how the decision is supported by the theory Notice that a theory or knowledge-base is part of the output of argumentation dialogues, not, as in the deductive conception, its input This is because, as has been

/pdf/proof-burdens-and-standards-3hcdfmcq1g.pdf

Douglas Walton

Papers

The place of emotion in argument

Dialogue Theory for Critical Thinking

Plausible argument in everyday conversation

Logical dialogue-games and fallacies

Proof Burdens and Standards