政治自由主义 = Political liberalism

As previously discussed, Reyhner and Eder (1989) have divided the history of American Indian educational policy, and indeed Indian policy generally, into six distinct periods or eras, culminating in our current state of Self-Determination. While this seems to be an accurate assessment of the present day, the authors would like to suggest that recent global developments have created considerable impetus for change in Indian Country. The authors believe that Indigenous populations may well be on the cusp of a new day in Indian policy in America, if proper consideration is given to this global imperative.

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

Susan Goethel Campbell’s exhibition Field Guide explores the nature of art and the conceptual process through a multimedia installation that also reflects upon temporality, art history, ecology and science. Introduced with a time-lapse video of weather patterns captured by web cam over the course of an entire year, atmospheric effects assume the quality of translucent washes that blur distinctions between opacity and transparency, painting and technology. Aerial views of built environments set against expansive cityscapes present essential imagery for large-format digital woodblock prints realized in monochromatic tonals and saturated grids of yellow and blazing orange. Some combine undulating wood grain patterns with pinhole perforations to admit light; others consist of diaphanous walnut stains applied to hand-crafted paper, a self-referential allusion to art’s planarity and permeable membrane. The evanescence of these views is echoed in pristine impressions of filtered dust and shimmering milkweed assemblages contained in Plexiglas light boxes. Known as Asclepias, milkweed is an herbaceous flower named by Carl Linnaeus after Asclepius, the Greek god of healing, due to its efficacious medicinal powers. Like the weather, the milkweed’s reflective silver filaments respond to shifting currents of air paired with gently wafted treetops projected in the viewing room. Here pearls of light corresponding to the spheres and pinpricks of the prints on the walls float randomly over the fictitious frame of a cubical vitrine. Orbs appear and disappear amid nocturnal shadows as figments of the imagination, their languid dispersion eliciting not-ofthis-world sensations of suspension, ascent and transcendence. This joined to the mesmerizing stillness of a gallery pierced occasionally by the sound of supersonic aircraft, a reminder of the machine in the garden. Beyond, the history of landscape photography and the Romantic sublime are encoded in works titled “Old Stand” that render minuscule figures of stationary box photographers against the grandeur of ice-capped Rockies. In some of the works the human figure is effaced as a historical memory through exquisitely modulated rubbings whose unbounded spatiality contrasts with the reflexive interiority of the viewing room. Campbell’s incandescent vision of nature asserts the phenomenal power of art to elevate the human spirit in the presence of heart-stirring beauty. It dares to reaffirm the timeless union between the material and immaterial substance of the universe, between human life and the ephemera of the natural world. f i l m

This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate

Appendix A: Excerpts from Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

The duty to consult Aboriginal peoples requires the Crown to speak with First Nations, Inuit peoples, and Métis communities before undertaking action which may adversely impact those groups’ constitutional rights. The Crown must take account of Aboriginal concerns and, where it anticipates an adverse impact, accommodate Aboriginal interests to the extent reasonably possible. So far so good. This is, however, about as much as the Supreme Court has said on the application of the duty, leaving many unanswered questions, and many anxious Aboriginal people, resource developers, lawyers, and government decision-makers. Dwight Newman’s The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples is an accessible, comprehensive, and thoughtful effort to calm the waters.1

The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples

Autor u tekstu nudi argument u prilog postojanja nesvodivo kolektivnih moralnih prava. Autor odbacuje dve koncepcije koje kolektivne interese tretiraju kao "zajednicke" i kao "agregativne", i zalaže se za koncepciju koja kolektivne interese zasniva na zajednickom dobru, za koje veruje da se sastoji od faktora koji doprinose kontinuiranoj saradnji clanova održive i razumne zajednice. Autor dalje dokazuje da određeni individualni interesi pretpostavljaju zadovoljenje određenih kolektivnih interesa. Iz toga sledi zakljucuje autor, da ukoliko neko individualno moralno pravo postoji, tada postoje i kolektivna moralna prava.

Collective Interests and Collective Rights

PART I: THE EXISTENCE OF COLLECTIVE MORAL RIGHTS 1. Introduction 2. Collectivities as Moral Rights-Holders 3. Collective Interests and Collective Rights PART II: MORAL CONDITIONS FOR COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 4. Conflicting Rights 5. The Service Principle 6. The Mutuality Principle 7. Rights to Exit and Membership Control PART III: REALISING COLLECTIVE RIGHTS 8. Imperfect Collectivities 9. Toward a Community of Communities

Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical Framework for Rights Held by Groups

Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples

† I am grateful to Timothy Endicott and Joseph Raz for discussions on and written comments on substantial parts of versions of this article, which derives from a portion of Dwight G. Newman, Community and Collective Rights (D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford University Faculty of Law, 2005) [unpublished]. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for further comments and challenges. I thank Carolyn Frantz, Hans Oberdiek, and Leslie Sebba for comments on some of my claims. I have delivered earlier versions of this article at the Oxford University Jurisprudence Discussion Group and at a special seminar at the Law University of Lithuania. I thank all who commented on these occasions and, in particular, Simonne Horwitz, Maris Köpcke Tinturé, Dimitrios Kyritsis, John O’Dowd, Charalampos Papadopoulos, Vesselin Paskalev, Danny Priel, Prince Saprai, Ron Stevenson, and Delaine Swenson. I thank the Rhodes Trust and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for financial support during the preparation of this article. 1 Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are There Any Cultural Rights?’ (1992) 20 Pol.Theory 105 at 133. 2 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) at 187 [Raz, Ethics] (though acknowledging that rights of exit are an ‘imperfect’ safeguard). 3 See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) at 221; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974) at 299, 312, 320, 330–1; Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002) at 19–20; William Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 123 [Galston, Libereal Pluralism].

Dwight G. Newman

Papers

The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples

Collective Interests and Collective Rights

Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical Framework for Rights Held by Groups

Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples

Exit, Voice, and 'Exile': Rights to Exit and Rights to Eject