This article conceptualizes community cultural wealth as a critical race theory (CRT) challenge to traditional interpretations of cultural capital. CRT shifts the research lens away from a deficit view of Communities of Color as places full of cultural poverty disadvantages, and instead focuses on and learns from the array of cultural knowledge, skills, abilities and contacts possessed by socially marginalized groups that often go unrecognized and unacknowledged. Various forms of capital nurtured through cultural wealth include aspirational, navigational, social, linguistic, familial and resistant capital. These forms of capital draw on the knowledges Students of Color bring with them from their homes and communities into the classroom. This CRT approach to education involves a commitment to develop schools that acknowledge the multiple strengths of Communities of Color in order to serve a larger purpose of struggle toward social and racial justice.

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Whose culture has capital? A critical race theory discussion of community cultural wealth

This survey characterizes an emerging research area, sometimes called coordination theory, that focuses on the interdisciplinary study of coordination. Research in this area uses and extends ideas about coordination from disciplines such as computer science, organization theory, operations research, economics, linguistics, and psychology.A key insight of the framework presented here is that coordination can be seen as the process of managing dependencies among activities. Further progress, therefore, should be possible by characterizing different kinds of dependencies and identifying the coordination processes that can be used to manage them. A variety of processes are analyzed from this perspective, and commonalities across disciplines are identified. Processes analyzed include those for managing shared resources, producer/consumer relationships, simultaneity constraints, and task/subtask dependencies.Section 3 summarizes ways of applying a coordination perspective in three different domains:(1) understanding the effects of information technology on human organizations and markets, (2) designing cooperative work tools, and (3) designing distributed and parallel computer systems. In the final section, elements of a research agenda in this new area are briefly outlined.

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The interdisciplinary study of coordination

Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know

Chinese ways of dealing with seeming contradictions result in a dialectical or compromise approach—retaining basic elements of opposing perspectives by seeking a "middle way." On the other hand, European-American ways, deriving from a lay version of Aristotelian logic, result in a differentiation model that polarizes contradictory perspectives in an effort to determine which fact or position is correct. Five empirical studies showed that dialectical thinking is a form of folk wisdom in Chinese culture: Chinese participants preferred dialectical proverbs containing seeming contradictions more than did American participants. Chinese participants also preferred dialectical resolutions to social conflicts and preferred dialectical arguments over classical Western logical arguments. Furthermore, when 2 apparently contradictory propositions were presented, American participants polarized their views, and Chinese participants were moderately accepting of both propositions. Origins of these cultural differences and their implications for human reasoning in general are discussed.

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Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction.

Networked publics must be understood in terms of “publics,” a contested and 
messy term with multiple meanings that is used across different disciplines to 
signal different concepts. One approach is to construct “public” as a collection 
of people who share “a common understanding of the world, a shared identity, 
a claim to inclusiveness, a consensus regarding the collective interest” (Livingstone, 2005, p. 9). In this sense, a public may refer to a local collection of 
people (e.g., one’s peers) or a much broader collection of people (e.g., 
members of a nation-state). Those invested in the civic functioning of publics 
often concern themselves with the potential accessibility of spaces and 
information to wide audiences-“the public”—and the creation of a shared 
“public sphere” (Habermas, 1991). Yet, as Benedict Anderson (2006) argues, 
the notion of a public is in many ways an “imagined community.” Some scholars contend that there is no single public, but many publics to which some 
people are included and others excluded (Warner, 2002).
 Cultural and media studies offer a different perspective on the notion of 
what constitutes a public. In locating the term “public” as synonymous with 
“audience,” Sonia Livingstone (2005) uses the term to refer to a group 
bounded by a shared text, whether a worldview or a performance. The audience produced by media is often by its very nature a public, but not necessarily a passive one. For example, Michel de Certeau (2002) argues that 
consumption and production of cultural objects are intimately connected, and 
Henry Jenkins (2006) applies these ideas to the creation and dissemination of 
media. Mizuko Ito extends this line of thinking to argue that “publics can bereactors, (re)makers and (re)distributors, engaging in shared culture and 
knowledge through discourse and social exchange as well as through acts of 
media reception” (Ito, 2008, p. 3).
 It is precisely this use of public that upsets political theorists like Jurgen Habermas, who challenge the legitimacy of any depoliticized public preoccupied “with 
consumption of culture” (Habermas, 1991, p. 177). Of course, not all political 
scholars agree with Habermas’ objection to the cultural significance of publics. 
Feminist scholar Nancy Fraser argues that publics are not only a site of discourse 
and opinion but “arenas for the formation and enactment of social identities” 
(Fraser, 1992), while Craig Calhoun argues that one of Habermas’ weaknesses is 
his naive view that “identities and interests [are] settled within the private world 
and then brought fully formed into the public sphere” (Calhoun, 1992, p. 35).
 Networked publics exist against this backdrop. Mizuko Ito introduces the 
notion of networked publics to “reference a linked set of social, cultural, and 
technological developments that have accompanied the growing engagement 
with digitally networked media” (Ito, 2008, p. 2). Ito emphasizes the networked media, but I believe we must also focus on the ways in which this 
shapes publics-both in terms of space and collectives. In short, I contend that 
networked publics are publics that are restructured by networked technologies; they are simultaneously a space and a collection of people.
 In bringing forth the notion of networked publics, I am not seeking to 
resolve the different discursive threads around the notion of publics. My 
approach accepts the messiness and, instead, focuses on the ways in which networked technologies extend and complicate publics in all of their forms. What 
distinguishes networked publics from other types of publics is their underlying 
structure. Networked technologies reorganize how information flows and how 
people interact with information and each other. In essence, the architecture of 
networked publics differentiates them from more traditional notions of publics.

Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: Affordances, Dynamics, and Implications

By demonstrating the uniformity and universality of the principles of valid interpretation of verbal texts of any sort, this closely reasoned examination provides a theoretical foundation for a discipline that is fundamental to virtually all humanistic studies. It defines the grounds on which textual interpretation can claim to establish objective knowledge, defends that claim against such skeptical attitudes as historicism and psychologism, and shows that many confusions can be avoided if the distinctions between meaning and significance, interpretation and criticism are correctly understood. It provides perhaps the first genuinely comprehensive account of hermeneutic theory to appear in English and the first systematic presentation of the principles of valid interpretation in any language.Mr. Hirsch, associate professor of English at the University of Virginia, is the author of Wordsworth and Schelling and Innocence and Experience: An Introduction to Blake. "Here is a book that brings logic to the most unruly of disciplines, literary interpretation. Viewing this subject within the tradition of hermeneutics, Mr. Hirsch is able to trace its origins and development with brilliant insight. The result is a lucidly systemic and authoritative account of the premises and procedures applicable to the interpretation of a literary text. Mr. Hirsch has performed a monumental service thereby that of reinstating the credentials of objectivism and defining the limits of the aesthetics of truth. This study is a necessary took for anyone who wants to talk sense about literature."-Virginia Quarterly Review "Professor Hirsch demonstrates convincingly that objectivity is attainable in humane studies, and that it is not identified with the subject but with the evidence. A valid interpretation is not necessarily a correct one, but one which is more probably than any other on the basis of existing evidence. He makes a subtle and important distinction between a text's 'meaning' (which does not change) and its 'significance' (which does), and brilliantly relates meaning to understanding (the necessary preliminary to interpretation) and interpretation to explanation..." In short, this is a work which future students of literary theory cannot afford to neglect."-Notes and Queries E.D. Hirsch, Jr., is professor of English at the University of Virginia.

Validity in Interpretation

s I sit here writing about anti-intellectualism in American education, a debate is raging in my state, Virginia, over a proposal to "raise standards of learning" by mandating knowledge standards for each grade. The factual knowledge that is specified in the Virginia draft is far more explicit than in any currently existing state guidelines. But prospects for approval in any but watered-down form are dim. According to the Washington Post (March 29, 1995), the draft guidelines "have provoked scathing criticism from teachers' groups, superintendents, parent organizations, education professors, and legislators, both Republican and Democrat. Some say the goals are unrealistically ambitious for the lower grades, [and] promote rote memorization over critical thinking." (Now, at a later date, as I revise this text, I can report that a watered-down compromise was reached.) That American professors of education are more hostile to the teaching of factual knowledge than education professors elsewhere in the world offers another point of entry into the American educational Thoughtworld. But, as the report from the Washington Post indicates, it is not just education profes sors who express hostility to "rote memorization." That attitude also rallies Republicans and Democrats, parents and legislators, and, as I infer from the tenor of the Post article, newspaper reporters as well. There is widespread antiknowledge sentiment in American thought that Richard Hofstadter has labeled "anti-intellectualism." 1 It is a convenient term, but I wonder whether Hofstadter's definition of it[107] does adequate justice to its attractions for a wide spectrum of Americans. Hofstadter defines anti-intellectualism as contempt for "knowledge for its own sake." This definition perhaps misses something essential, namely, that the knowledge most often scorned by Americans tends to be academic knowledge connected with scientific lore and past traditions—the kind taught in lecture halls and recorded mostly in books. Disinterested curiosity is not in itself scorned by Americans— only disinterested curiosity about the contents of lec tures and books. Of course, Hofstadter is right that interested, as distinct from disinterested, practicality is a persistent American trait. We are fondest of knowledge that has utility for economic and moral improvement, a preference I happen to share. Befitting our early image of ourselves as giving mankind a new, Edenic start in history, Americans have valued knowledge that comes directly from experience more than knowledge that comes from books. "Critical thinking" about one's own direct experience is to be preferred to "rote memorization" of the writings of others. Huck Finn is an archetypal American antibook fig ure. He is going to get his education by critically thinking about what he discovers on the river and in the Territory. Nature and experience will be his teachers. Huck's attitudes are not very different from those of Walt Whitman:

E. D. Hirsch

Papers

Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know

Validity in Interpretation

The Schools We Need: And Why We Don't Have Them

The aims of interpretation

The new dictionary of cultural literacy