Foreword by Norbert Hornstein Preface Part I 1 Mind and Body 2 Structures, Capacities, and Conventions 3 Knowledge of Grammar 4 Some Elements of Grammar Part II 5 On the Biological Basis of Language Capacities 6 Language and Unconscious Knowledge Notes Index

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/BB96E4E09C461EFC230F72A9D7BDF603/S0140525X00001515a.pdf/div-class-title-rules-and-representations-div.pdf

Rules and Representations

Environmental enrichment: increasing the biological relevance of captive environments

To date humans, chimpanzees, and orangutans are the only species which have been shown capable of recognizing themselves in mirrors. Several species of macaques have now been provided with years of continuous exposure to mirrors, but they still persist in reacting to their reflection as if they were seeing other monkeys. Even gibbons (apes) and gorillas (great apes) seem incapable of learning that their behavior is the source of the behavior depicted in the image. Most primates, therefore, appear to lack a cognitive category for processing mirrored information about themselves. The implications of these data for traditional views of consciousness are considered briefly, and a recent attempt to develop an operant analog to self-recognition is critically evaluated. Finally, an attempt is made to show that self-awareness, consciousness, and mind are not mutually exclusive cognitive categories and that the emergence of self-awareness may be equivalent to the emergence of mind. Several indices of "mind" which can be applied to nonhuman species are discussed in the context of an attempt to develop a comparative psychology of mind.

Self‐awareness and the emergence of mind in primates

Rules and Representations.

This paper presents a model for the nature and adaptive significance of intelligence and language in early hominids based on comparative developmental, ecological, and neurological data. We propose that the common ancestor of the great apes and man displayed rudimentary forms of late sensorimotor and early preoperational intelligence similar to that of one- to four-year-old children. These abilities arose as adaptations for extractive foraging with tools, which requires a long postweaning apprenticeship. They were elaborated in the first hominids with the shift to primary dependence on this feeding strategy. These first hominids evolved a protolanguage, similar to that of two-year-old human children, with which they could describe the nature and location of food and request help in obtaining it. The descendents of the first hominids displayed intuitive intelligence, similar to that of four- to seven-year-old children, which arose as an adaptation for complex hunting involving aimed-missile throwing, stone-tool manufacture, animal butchery, food division, and shelter construction. The comparative developmental and paleontological data are consistent with the hypothesis that the stages of development of intelligence and language and their neural substrates in our species recapitulate the stages of their evolution.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X0006307X

A developmental model for the evolution of language and intelligence in early hominids

Through use of learned symbols, two chimpanzees accurately specified 11 foods by name to one another when the food item's identity was known by only one. They could not do this when denied use of the symbols. The chimpanzees then spontaneously requested specific foods of one another by name. Requests resulted in cooperative and reciprocal symbolically mediated food exchange.

https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/201/4356/641.full.pdf

Symbolic communication between two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Three chimpanzees learned to label three edibles as "foods" and three inedibles as "tools" Two chimpanzees could then similarly categorize numerous objects during blind trial 1 tests when shown only objects' names The language-like skills of the chimpanzee who failed (Lana) illustrates that apes can use symbols in ways that emulate human usage without comprehending their representational function

https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/210/4472/922.full.pdf

Reference: the linguistic essential

Rumbaugh, Savage-Rumbaugh, and Hegel (1987) reported that two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) could select, with better than 90% accuracy, the greater of two paired quantities of chocolate chips. In that study, no one quantity of chocolates (from 0 through 5) was used in both pairs on a given trial. We investigated the effect of having one quantity in common (CQ) in both pairs. Whether the other quantities (OQs) of chocolates were both less than or greater than the CQ, summation still occurred. Accuracy was primarily a function of the ratios of sums to be differentiated. This finding substantiated the earlier conclusion that summation was based on both quantities of each pair and not on some simpler process such as the avoidance of the tray with the smallest single amount or selection of the tray with the single largest amount.

Addendum to "Summation in the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes)."

On the care of captive chimpanzees: methods of enrichment

https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/206/4423/1201.full.pdf

E. S. Savage-Rumbaugh

Papers

Symbolic communication between two chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)

Reference: the linguistic essential

Addendum to "Summation in the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes)."

On the care of captive chimpanzees: methods of enrichment

Chimpanzee problem comprehension: insufficient evidence