GROUNDING It takes two people working together to play a duet, shake hands, play chess, waltz, teach, or make love. To succeed, the two of them have to coordinate both the content and process of what they are doing. Alan and Barbara, on the piano, must come to play the same Mozart duet. This is coordination of content. They must also synchronize their entrances and exits, coordinate how loudly to play forte and pianissimo, and otherwise adjust to each other's tempo and dynamics. This is coordination of process. They cannot even begin to coordinate on content without assuming a vast amount of shared information or common ground-that is, mutual knowledge, mutual beliefs, and mutual assumptions And to coordinate on process, they need to update their common ground moment by moment. All collective actions are built on common ground and its accumulation. We thank many colleagues for discussion of the issues we take up here.

/pdf/grounding-in-communication-2do08wtssx.pdf

Grounding in communication

From the Publisher:
This book takes an empirical approach to language processing, based on applying statistical and other machine-learning algorithms to large corpora.Methodology boxes are included in each chapter. Each chapter is built around one or more worked examples to demonstrate the main idea of the chapter. Covers the fundamental algorithms of various fields, whether originally proposed for spoken or written language to demonstrate how the same algorithm can be used for speech recognition and word-sense disambiguation. Emphasis on web and other practical applications. Emphasis on scientific evaluation. Useful as a reference for professionals in any of the areas of speech and language processing.

/pdf/speech-and-language-processing-an-introduction-to-natural-atzaecqfem.pdf

Speech and Language Processing: An Introduction to Natural Language Processing, Computational Linguistics, and Speech Recognition

This thesis considers two alternative views of purposeful action and shared understanding. The first, adopted by researchers in Cognitive Science, views the organization and significance of action as derived from plans, which are prerequisite to and prescribe action at whatever level of detail one might imagine. Mutual intelligibility on this view is a matter of the recognizability of plans, due to common conventions for the expression of intent, and common knowledge about typical situations and appropriate actions. The second view, drawn from recent work in social science, treats plans as derivative from situated action. Situated action as such comprises necessarily ad hoc responses to the actions of others and to the contingencies of particular situations. Rather than depend upon the reliable recognition of intent, successful interaction consists in the collaborative production of intelligibility through mutual access to situation resources, and through the detection, repair or exploitation of differences in understanding. As common sense formulations designed to accomodate the unforseeable contingences of situated action, plans are inherently vague. Researchers interested in machine intelligence attempt to remedy the vagueness of plans, to make them the basis for artifacts intended to embody intelligent behavior, including the ability to interact with their human users. The idea that computational artifacts might interact with their users is supported by their reactive, linguistic, and internally opaque properties. Those properties suggest the possibility that computers might 'explain themselves: thereby providing a solution to the problem of conveying the designer's purposes to the user, and a means of establishing the intelligence of the artifact itself. I examine the problem of human-machine communication through a case study of people using a machine designed on the planning model, and intended to be intelligent and interactive~ A conversation analysis of \"interactions\" between users and the machine reveals that the machine's insensitivity to particular circumstances is a central design resource, and a fundamental limitation. I conclude that problems in Cognitive Science's theorizing about purposeful action as a basis for machine intelligence are due to the project of substituting plans for actions, and representations of the situation of action, for action's actual circumstances. XEROX PARe. ISL-6. FEBRLARY 1985

Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human Machine Communication.

Scholars have vacillated for centuries between two opposing assessments of the role of poetics in social life. A long tradition of thinking about language and society argues that verbal art provides a central dynamic force in shaping linguistic structure and linguistic study. This position emerges clearly in the writings of Vico, Herder, and von Humboldt; attention from Sapir, the Russian "Formalists," and members of the Prague School to the role of poetics contributed to the development of performance studies and ethnopoe­ tics in the last two decades. Nonetheless, poetics has often been marginalized by anthropologists and linguists who believe that aesthetic uses of language are merely parasitic upon such "core" areas of linguistics as phonology, syntax, and semantics, or upon such anthropological fields as economy and social organization. The balance between these two views shifted in favor of poetics in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a new emphasis on performance directed attention away from study of the formal patterning and symbolic content of texts to the emergence of verbal art in the social interaction between performers and

Poetics and performance as critical perspectives on language and social life

https://www.speech.kth.se/~edlund/bielefeld/references/clark-and-wilkes-gibbs-1986.pdf

E. Schegloff

Papers

Discourse as an interactional achievement: Some use of "UH-HUH" and other things that come between sentences