What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

Social identity theory and the organization

Creativity in Context: Update to "The Social Psychology of Creativity"

Earnings Management to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses

The main purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework for understanding the literature on the consequences of contemporary performance measurement (CPM) systems and the theories that explain these consequences. The framework is based on an in-depth review of 76 empirical studies published in high-quality academic journals in the areas of accounting, operations, and strategy. The framework classifies the consequences of CPM into three categories: people’s behaviour, organizational capabilities, and performance consequences. This paper discusses our current knowledge on the impact of CPM, highlighting inconsistencies and gaps as well as providing direction for future research.

Contemporary Performance Measurement Systems: A Review of Their Consequences and a Framework for Research

To ensure that audit committees provide sufficient oversight over the auditing process and quality of financial reporting, legislators have imposed stricter requirements on the independence of audit committee members. Although many audit committees appear to be “fully” independent, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs often appoint directors from their social networks. Based on a 2004 to 2008 sample of U.S.-listed companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act we find that these social ties have a negative effect on variables that proxy for oversight quality. In particular, we find that firms whose audit committees have “friendship” ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit services and engage more in earnings management. Auditors are also less likely to issue going-concern opinions or to report internal control weaknesses when friendship ties are present. On the other hand, social ties formed through “advice networks” do not seem to hamper the quality of audit committee oversight.

The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or Personal Friend of the CEO?

This paper investigates how the organization and presentation of performance measures affect how evaluators weight financial and non-financial measures when evaluating performance. We conduct two experiments, in which participants act as senior executives charged with evaluating two business-unit managers. Performance differences between business units are contained in either a financial or one of the three non-financial categories. Specifically, the first experiment studies how organizing measures in a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) format affects performance evaluations. Our results show that when the performance differences are contained in the financial category, evaluators that use a BSC-format place more weight on financial category measures than evaluators using an unformatted scorecard. Conversely, when performance differences are contained in the non-financial categories, whether measures are organized into a BSC-format or into an unformatted scorecard has no impact on the evaluation. The second experiment shows that when performance markers are added to the scorecards (i.e., +, −, and = signs for above-target, below-target, and on-target performance), evaluators that use a BSC-format weight measures in any category containing a performance difference more heavily than evaluators using an unformatted scorecard. Our findings suggest that firms should carefully consider how to present and organize measures to get the intended effect on performance evaluations.

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Financial versus non-financial information: The impact of information organization and presentation in a Balanced Scorecard

To ensure that audit committees provide sufficient oversight over the auditing process and quality of financial reporting, legislators have imposed stricter requirements on the independence of audit committee members. Although many audit committees appear to be “fully” independent, anecdotal evidence suggests that CEOs often appoint directors from their social networks. Based on a 2004 to 2008 sample of U.S.-listed companies after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we find that these social ties have a negative effect on variables that proxy for oversight quality. In particular, we find that firms whose audit committees have “friendship” ties to the CEO purchase fewer audit services and engage more in earnings management. Auditors are also less likely to issue going-concern opinions or to report internal control weaknesses when friendship ties are present. On the other hand, social ties formed through “advice networks” do not seem to hamper the quality of audit committee oversight. Data Availability: All d...

Most studies on cost-based decision-making examine the profit impact of cost reports that rely on different methods to allocate costs. In practice, firms’ cost reports often employ the same cost allocation method with subtle variations in the way that the cost data are presented. This paper examines experimentally the profit impact of a cost report’s presentation format in relation to a decision maker’s level of cost accounting knowledge. Using a customer profitability report prepared using activity-based costing and presented in either a tabular or a graphical format, participants analyze a complex pricing and resource allocation task that affects firm profitability. The results suggest a strong relation between presentation format and cost accounting knowledge. Specifically, decision makers with a low level of cost accounting knowledge attain higher profits when they use a graphical format in comparison to a tabular format. More surprisingly, graphs (versus tables) have an adverse effect on profits for users with a high level of cost knowledge. This result has broad implications: in order to facilitate the decisions of a variety of users of accounting data (e.g. managers, external investors, etc.), firms may need to adapt the presentation format of their accounting data to the level of accounting sophistication of the users.

/pdf/the-interplay-between-cost-accounting-knowledge-and-16jkuhwq4u.pdf

The interplay between cost accounting knowledge and presentation formats in cost-based decision-making

Although employees' time estimates are used extensively for costing purposes, they are prone to measurement error. In an experimental setting, we research how measurement error in time estimates varies with: (1) the level of aggregation in the definition of costing system activities (aggregated or disaggregated); (2) task coherence (the extent to which the activities that require time estimates present themselves coherently or incoherently); and (3) when notice is given that time estimates will be required (in advance or after the fact), that is, whether participants know that time estimates will be required before they perform the activities. We also test on response mode (estimates in percentages or absolute time units). The results suggest an important trade‐off between the level of aggregation and measurement error: increasing aggregation in the definition of activities leads to lower measurement error. Also, advance notification reduces measurement error, especially in settings with aggregated activi...

Eddy Cardinaels

Papers

The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or Personal Friend of the CEO?

Financial versus non-financial information: The impact of information organization and presentation in a Balanced Scorecard

The Audit Committee: Management Watchdog or Personal Friend of the CEO?

The interplay between cost accounting knowledge and presentation formats in cost-based decision-making

On the Determinants of Measurement Error in Time-Driven Costing