Disobedience and democratic theory

He concedes, however, that it is at least logically possible that obedience to one's conscience (which he calls "virtue") does not pay from the point of view of self-interest. What is in our interest, according to Butler, is nothing but our happiness, and happiness consists of the pleasure we feel in getting what we desire. It is at least possible that going against our conscience (which Butler calls "vice") will bring us more pleasure (all in all) than a virtuous act. It is true that most persons' self-esteem depends to some degree upon doing what is thought to be morally right, so virtue can play an important part in bringing happiness. But virtue is not the only source of happiness, and we can care so much about things like acclaim, wealth, and power as to make it seem worthwhile to forgo the self-esteem that comes from being morally good in order to get them. Butler even concedes that there are persons so perverted as not to be bothered at all, or bothered very little, by knowingly going against their own consciences.3 Such men might reasonably think that they have much happiness to gain from carefully chosen acts of wrong-doing. So it seems that, for Butler, it is at least logically possible for the paths of virtue and advantage to diverge.

Edmund Leites

Papers

A Problem in Joseph Butler’s Ethics