Examines changes in the women's movement in the twenty years following women's suffrage, and describes the complex issues of that period.

The grounding of modern feminism

The rule of law is among the essential pillars upon which any highquality democracy rests. But this kind of democracy requires not simply a rule of law in the minimal, historical sense that I will shortly explain. What is needed, rather, is a truly democratic rule of law that ensures political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability which in turn affirm the political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state power. Seen thus, the rule of law works intimately with other dimensions of the quality of democracy. Without a vigorous rule of law, defended by an independent judiciary, rights are not safe and the equality and dignity of all citizens are at risk. Only under a democratic rule of law will the various agencies of electoral, societal, and horizontal accountability function effectively, without obstruction and intimidation from powerful state actors. And only when the rule of law bolsters these democratic dimensions of rights, equality, and accountability will the responsiveness of government to the interests and needs of the greatest number of citizens be achieved. Although in some of my previous writings readers may find partial attempts at the theoretical and normative justification of a democratic rule of law, here I make only passing reference to these matters. My intention is to contribute to a discussion concerning if and how something called the rule of law, or the democratic rule of law, may be conceptualized and, insofar as possible, empirically gauged. To this Guillermo O’Donnell is Helen Kellogg Professor of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. This essay combines new material with a reorganized version of some of the author’s other writings on this subject, especially The Quality of Democracy: Theory and Applications (2004) and “Polyarchies and the (Un)Rule of Law in Latin America” in Juan Mendez, Guillermo O’Donnell, and Paul Sergio Pinheiro, eds., The Rule of Law and the Underprivileged in Latin America (1999), both published by the University of Notre Dame Press.

Why the Rule of Law Matters

We develop an informational theory that analyzes conditions under which a reelection-seeking executive will act in the public interest. The theory considers factors such as executive competence, challenger quality, and the likelihood that voters will learn the consequences of policy decisions before an upcoming election. We ...nd that an executive who has information suggesting that a popular policy is contrary to voters’ interests may or may not pander to voters by choosing it; under certain conditions, the executive can actually increase his probability of reelection by choosing an unpopular policy that is in the public interest. However, we also show that an executive will sometimes face electoral incentives to enact a policy that is both unpopular and contrary to voters’ interests. We illustrate our model with examples involving President Abraham Lincoln, California Governor Earl Warren, and President Gerald Ford. ¤For helpful comments we thank Steve Ansolabehere, David Austen-Smith, Dan Carpenter, Cary Covington, Patricia Conley, Daniel Diermeier, Tim Fedderson, Fred Greenstein, Keith Krehbiel, Dan Kryder, Jim Snyder, Craig Volden, and seminar participants at Berkeley, Dartmouth, Harvard, MIT, Northwestern, NYU Law School, Princeton, Stanford, and SUNY Stony Brook. yAssistant Professor of Political Science, MIT. zAssistant Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University. xCorresponding author. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University, 601 University Place, Evanston IL 60208-1006. Email: k-shotts@nwu.edu. Phone: (847) 491-2628. Fax: (847) 491-8985. “There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current...as its best recommendation. But such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for which government was instituted, as of the true means by which the public happiness may be promoted...When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests.” Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper 71

Leadership and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking

The greatest obstacle to sound economic policy is not entrenched special interests or rampant lobbying, but the popular misconceptions, irrational beliefs, and personal biases held by ordinary voters. This is economist Bryan Caplan's sobering assessment in this provocative and eye-opening book. Caplan argues that voters continually elect politicians who either share their biases or else pretend to, resulting in bad policies winning again and again by popular demand. Boldly calling into question our most basic assumptions about American politics, Caplan contends that democracy fails precisely because it does what voters want. Through an analysis of Americans' voting behavior and opinions on a range of economic issues, he makes the convincing case that noneconomists suffer from four prevailing biases: they underestimate the wisdom of the market mechanism, distrust foreigners, undervalue the benefits of conserving labor, and pessimistically believe the economy is going from bad to worse. Caplan lays out several bold ways to make democratic government work better--for example, urging economic educators to focus on correcting popular misconceptions and recommending that democracies do less and let markets take up the slack. The Myth of the Rational Voter takes an unflinching look at how people who vote under the influence of false beliefs ultimately end up with government that delivers lousy results. With the upcoming presidential election season drawing nearer, this thought-provoking book is sure to spark a long-overdue reappraisal of our elective system.

Introduction to The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies

A paper like this does not lend itself to conclusions. The unifying theme of the paper is a question: when and why does Congress choose to modify social and/or economic behavior by establishing a regulatory agency rather than by writing a law to be enforced in the courts? This is a special case of the more general question of why politicians delegate their power to administrators. I have not sought to answer that question in any definite way; rather, I have tried to identify some of the potential answers, most of which are mutually compatible, all of which have some support in the literature, and few of which have been dealt with systematically by modern political economists. I have ignored certain answers that appear in the literature — the complexity of modern problems, the demands on legislator time, and so forth. These may have some effect on what Congress decides to delegate, but in the main I believe they are largely rationalizations which scholars are too quick to believe. Where politicians have the incentive, they manage to deal with complexity, and they find the time to do it. It is our job to identify those incentives and trace their implications for the formation of public policy in this country. Without denigrating the work that has been done, it is fair to say that our work is only beginning, despite the extravagant claims of some authors to the contrary.

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Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?

The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value

Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees, The Supreme Court under Edward Douglass White, 1910–1921 and Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America

The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence. By Howard Gillman. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993. x, 317 pp. $34.95, ISBN 0-8223-1283-2.)

This is a major biography of one of America's most influential and respected Supreme Court justices by a leading law scholar. In the late 1970s, Earl Warren's papers were opened and G. Edward White, a former law clerk of Warren, was given complete access to research this book. The result is the first study of the Chief Justice to cover his entire political career and to examine aspects of Warren's character that have seemed paradoxical. White goes back to Warren's roots in California Progressivism to illuminate his mid-century liberalism and the controversial decisions over which he presided in the Supreme Court. Based on a wealth of newly available information and White's understanding of Warren's work and personality, this is a fascinating, original portrait of Chief Justice Earl Warren.

Earl Warren: A Public Life

H ISTORIANS have generally seen the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 as the first major step on the road to federal regulation of business. While much of the rhetoric of American politics painted the issue in terms of "the people" or "the farmers" against "business," scholars have long been aware of the inadequacy of that view. Rather than opposing all government regulation, businessmen were often involved in sponsoring and supporting such legislation. Within the last two decades historians have published several important studies concerning the origin and purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. Lee Benson, studying the New York State movement toward regulation of the roads, was able to delineate the impact of railroad development on various economic interest groups in the state and explain the conflict generated among them. He focused mainly on merchants, especially those in New York City, and their fight for more favorable freight rates. "New York merchants," he concluded, "constituted the single most important group behind the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act."' More recently, Gabriel Kolko finished an examination of federal regulation from 1877 to 1916, which concentrated on the machinations and motives of railroad leaders. The railroads were ruining themselves by cutthroat competition, Kolko argued; and hence they actually sought government regulation to stabilize their industry and to make it more profitable. He amply demonstrated that many railroad men both accepted the premise of federal regulation and strongly supported certain proposed laws. Although railroad managers were obviously not alone in urging federal action and often disagreed among themselves, Kolko maintained that "the rail-

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Edward A. Purcell

Papers

The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value

Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees, The Supreme Court under Edward Douglass White, 1910–1921 and Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America

The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence. By Howard Gillman. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993. x, 317 pp. $34.95, ISBN 0-8223-1283-2.)

Earl Warren: A Public Life

Ideas and Interests: Businessmen and the Interstate Commerce Act